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PREFATORY    REMARKS. 


THE  year  of  our  Lord,  1863,  opened  upon  the  darkest 
period  in  the  history  of  the  momentous  struggle  in  which  we 
are  yet  engaged.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  had 
gone  forth  in  April  of  the  previous  year,  at  a  period  when 
victory  had  recently  everywhere  favored  our  banners  and  it 
seemed  left  only  to  give  one  vigorous  blow  to  quell  forever 
the  rebellion,  had  been  disastrously  driven  from  Richmond, 
and  called  back  to  Washington,  to  arrive  barely  in  time  to 
save  that  city  -from  the  grasp  of  an  enemy  resuscitated  in 
strength,  and,  with  renewed  audacity,  assuming  everywhere 
a  vigorous  offensive  action.  In  the  "West  the  course  of  things 
had  but  too  faithfully  followed  the  reverses  of  the  East.  The 
renewed  hope  which  followed  the  repulse  of  the  rebel  armies 
from  Maryland  had  been  darkened  by  the  long  delays  which 
ensued,  and  the  subsequent  disastrous  failure  at  Fredericks- 
burg. 

Military  calamities,  disheartening  as  they  might  be,  would 
have  been  of  comparatively  little  moment,  however,  had 
military  calamities  been  all  that  darkened  the  aspects  of  the 
time.  The  country  ivas  rich  in  men  and  means,  and  its  re- 
sources had,  as  yet,  been  lightly  drawn  upon.  It  had  put 
forth  its  strength,  indeed,  but  not  its  whole  .strength.  Men 
did  not  feel  dismayed  because  they  doubted  the  ability  of  the 


4  PKEFATOKT     EEMAKK8. 

nation  to  carry  the  struggle  to  a  successful  issue,  but  because, 
for  the  time,  the  power  of  the  nation  was  partially  paralyzed. 
Yet  there  never  was  a  moment  when  the  public  safety,  and 
the  safety  of  the  common  cause  more  urgently  demanded  the 
exartion  of  all  the  nation's  strength.  Why,  then,  did  men 
doubt  ?  Where  was  the  origin  of  this  paralysis  ?  It  was  in 
the  charge,  audaciously  made,  impudently  persisted  in, 
that  to  the  blunders  and  incapacity  of  the  Administration, 
all  our  disasters  were  due ;  that,  with  such  incapacity  at  the 
head  of  affairs,  our  resources,  though  they  were  poured  forth 
like  water,  would,  like  water,  too,  be  spilt  on  the  ground. 
Men  will  sacrifice  much  in  great  emergencies,  but  they  never 
will  give  their  lives  or  their  money  merely  that  such  treasures 
may  be  ignorantly  or  wantonly  wasted. 

"  Had  HcClellan  but  had  his  way,  had  he  not  been  inter- 
fered with,  had  not  his  army  been  reduced  and  taken  away 
from  him,  and  his  movements  in  a  thousand  ways  hampered 
and  balked,  had  he,  in  short,  had  the  sole  control  of  military 
affairs,  all  would  have  been  different.  Richmond  would 
have  been  ours,  the  rebellion  would  have  been  subdued,  and, 
instead  of  disaster  and  prolonged  war,  a  triumphant  peace 
might  have  been  our  happier  lot."  To  such  charges  against 
the  administration  which  had  raised  him  to  his  position,  and 
which,  through  the  President,  had  ever  showed  him  un- 
wearied kindness,  and  given  him  all  the  confidence  it  could 
give,  Gen.  McClellan  lent  the  full  weight  of  his  name  and 
reputation.  Throwing  himself  into  the  arms  of  a  party  bit- 
terly hostile  to  that  administration,  associated  with  men  who 
loaded  the  agents  of  the  Government  with  reproach,  and 
among  whom  were  some  so  insensible  to  the  honor  of  the 
country  and  the  sacredness  of  the  cause  as  to  court  foreign 
mediation  and  to  meditate  a  disgraceful  and  humiliating 
peace,  (1)  to  him,  and  to  the  erroneous  ideas  disseminated 


PREFATORY     E  E  M  A  E  K  S  .  5 

concerning  his  capacity,  merits  and  agency,  the  paralysis  of 
doubt  was  due,  as  it  was  to  him  were  justly  ascribable  the 
disasters  which  brought  our  military  affairs  to  so  low  an  ebb. 

The  administration,  thus  denounced,  was,  for  better  or 
worse,  the  constituted  agency  through  which  the  war,  if  it 
were  to  be  carried  on  at  all,  must  be  conducted.  That  fact 
could  not  be  altered.  The  men  who  weakened  the  arm  of 
the  nation's  sole  war-making  power,  just  to  that  degree  en- 
dangered the  nation's  cause.  Therefore  the  question  of  Gen. 
McClellan's  responsibility  for  our  disasters  ceased  to  be  a 
mere  abstract  question  about  which  men  might  differ  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  public  interests ;  it  became  a  national 
question,  and  one  of  vast  import. 

It  was  under  such  circumstances  that,  in  writing  an  official 
report,  at  the  request  of  Gen.  McClellan  himself,  of  the 
engineering  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  I 
deemed  it  my  duty  to  state  what  I  believed  to  be  the  sources 
of  failure  of  the  campaign  of  the  Peninsula.  The  opinions 
therein  written  down  were  no  afterthoughts.  Six  months 
before  I  had  formed  them,  and  when  I  spoke  at  all,  (which  I 
did  not  do  openly,)  expressed  them.  I  had  formed  them 
painfully,  reluctantly,  at  a  period  when  political  questions 
had  not  become  involved  with  this  subject,  and  no  such 
causes  existed  to  influence,  in  any  manner,  my  judgment. 
It  was  at  a  period  when  for  Gen.  McClellan  I  entertained  the 
warmest  personal  regard — a  feeling  which  I  distinctly  and 
sincerely  expressed  in  writing  on  leaving  him  in  August, 
1862.  With  no  man  have  I  ever,  with  a  more  absolute  free- 
dom from  any  other  feeling  than  one  of  personal  kindness, 
been  so  long  closely  associated,  and  if,  at  any  moment,  there 
seemed  to  me  to  exist  some  slight  grounds  for  complaint, 
they  were  never  such  as  to  be  remembered,  or  to  have  any 
abiding  place  in  my  bre%st. 


6  PKEFATORYKEMAEKS. 

But  there  are  cases  in  which  personal  feelings  must  be 
allowed  little  weight.  The  destinies  of  nations  cannot  be 
trifled  with,  and  in  all  that  affects  them,  convictions  of  truth 
must  be  uttered.  The  Report  of  the  engineering  operations 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  statements  of  these 
pages,  are  the  utterances  I  am  constrained  to  make. 

The  review  which  follows  was  first  prepared  as  a  magazine 
article.  It  has  not  been  thought  necessary  to  alter  the 
phraseology,  though  another  form  of  publication  is  adopted. 

J.  G.  B. 


THE    PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN. 


GEN.  MCC/LELLAN  had  been  called  to  the  command  o?  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  with  an  unanimity  of  feeling  and 
lavish  bestowal  of  confidence,  which  stand  almost  alone  in 
our  history.  The  army  looking  upon  Gen.  Scott  as  past  the 
age  of  further  active  service,  and  upon  most  of  the  officers 
of  rank  as  superannuated  or  otherwise  incapable  of  meeting 
such  an  emergency,  hailed  the  advent  of  a  new  chief,  whose 
juvenile  promise,  whose  thorough  military  education,  and 
whose  already  extended  reputation,  seemed  to  give  assurance 
of  precisely  the  one  thing  needed — a  capable  leader. 

Under  such  circumstances,  neither  the  nation,  nor  the 
administration,  nor  the  army,  were  disposed  to  exercise — nor 
did  they  exercise — undue  pressure.  Every  indulgence  was 
extended  to  one  upon  whom  so  heavy  a  responsibility  had 
been  laid,  for  the  acknowledged  difficulties  of  the  situation, 
and  for  his  own  inexperience  and  want  of  preparation. 

Now,  had  Gen.  McClellan  been  a  Napoleon,  with  the 
prestige  of  a  hundred  victories — or  even  a  Scott — old  in  the 
regard  of  the  people — old  in  experience  of  war  even  upon  a 
comparatively  limited  scale,  but  rejuvenated  in  years — had 
he  been  either  of  these — he  might  with  propriety,  if  he 
thought  the  case  demanded  it,  have  drawn  heavily  upon  the 
indulgence  so  freely  extended.  Being  neither,  it  was  impor- 


8  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

tant  that  he  should  make  the  lightest  possible  draft ;  that,  at 
the  very  earliest  moment,  he  should  do  something  to  confirm, 
continue  and  justify  the  nation's  confidence.  Of  all  Gen. 
McClellan's  faults  and  incapacities,  nothing — not  even  his 
irresolution  and  mismanagement  in  face  of  the  enemy,  nor 
his  inability  ever,  in  any  case,  to  act  when  the  time  came — 
furnishes  a.  clearer  proof  of  the  lack  of  those  qualities  which 
make  a  great  general  or  a  great  statesman,  than  his  failure 
to  do  this. 

Let  it  be  granted  that  it  was  not  best  to  make  any  great 
movement  till  the  winter  of  1861-'62  had  wholly  passed 
away,  (though  there  were  the  strongest  political  reasons 
against  such  delay,)  yet  Gen.  McClellan  should  have  been 
aware  that,  unless  his  prestige,  through  these  long  months, 
should  be  supported  by  some  deeds,  he  would  find  himself 
virtually  destitute  of  the  power  to  carry  out  his  own  plans 
when  the  moment  proper  for  such  a  movement  should  arrive ; 
and  so  it  happened.  But,  after  six  long  months  of  omission, 
he  added  to  his  imprudence  the  positive  folly  of  making  an 
extravagant  and  senseless  draft  upon  that  confidence  of  the 
administration  and  the  public,  which  in  the  beginning  had 
been  so  generously  given  him,  but  which  he  had  so  lightly 
permitted  to  be,  in  a  measure,  lost. 

Grant,  again,  that  the  lower  Chesapeake  was  the  true  line 
of  approach  to  Richmond,  and  the  sole  route  by  which  to 
attain  results  of  such  magnitude  as  Gen.  McClellan  pre- 
dicted from  its  adoption,  yet,  it  was  nevertheless  true  that 
this  route  was  strongly  disapproved  by  the  President,  and  by 
many  whose  judgment  carried  great  influence,  and  that  it 
involved,  in  the  minds  of  not  a  few,  great  danger  to  the 
Capital.  Yet,  in  the  face  of  all  this,  Gen.  McClellan,  who 
had  never  furnished  any  adequate  evidence  of  his  ability  to 
plan  or  execute  a  great  campaign,  persisted  in  carrying  off 
his  army,  at  enormous  expense,  to  a  distant  point,  leaving 
that  enemy,  to  whom  he  attributes  a  force  of  no  less  than  one 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  "  well  disciplined  and  under 
able  leaders,"  confronting  Washington,  with  nothing  but  the 
garrison  of  the  place,  and  its  very  imperfect  system  of  forti- 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  9 

fications,  to  protect  it.  Tlie  line  of  forts  on  the  Yirginia  side 
of  the  Potomac  had  been  hastily  thrown  up,  and  was  really, 
at  that  time,  considering  its  great  extent,  very  incomplete  and 
weak ;  on  the  Maryland  side  it  was  so  imperfect  as  hardly  to 
deserve  the  name  of  a  fortified  line. 

Gen.  Barnard  in  his  official  report  says,  "  When  the  army 
was  to  go  by  Annapolis,  I  felt  confident  that  one-half  would 
be  no  sooner  embarked  than  the  other  would  be  ordered 
back  to  Washington."  No  one  could,  we  think,  have  spent 
a  week  in  Washington,  at  this  period,  without  being  con- 
vinced that,  whether  reasonably  or  not,  such  would  have 
been  the  result  of  a  mere  demonstration  of  the  enemy 
against  the  city.  Congress  was  in  session.  Half  its  mem- 
bers already  hostile  to,  and  without  confidence  in,  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan,  looked  upon  his  plan  with  distrust.  In  the  event 
supposed,  the  citizens  would  have  been  frightened,  and  the 
President  and  Cabinet,  alarmed  and  worried,  could  not  have 
refrained  from  interfering  to  prevent  the  army  from  being 
withdrawn — more  especially  from  being  led  away  by  one 
who  had  yet  to  establish  his  claim  to  such  unlimited  confi- 
dence in  his  military  abilities. 

Looking  back  to  the  middle  of  October,  we  find,  by  Gen. 
McClellan's  own  statement,  that  there  were  at  that  date 
76,285  men  under  his  command,  disposable  for  an  advance. 
There  are  yet  before  us  three  months  of  the  finest  weather, 
and  the  finest  roads  that  were  ever  known  in  Virginia.  It 
was  of  the  first  importance  that  Gen.  McClellan  should 
show  himself  possessed  of  a  just  claim  to  the  nation's  confi- 
dence ;  it  was  of  higher  importance  that  foreign  nations  should 
not  be  allowed  to  see  the  rebellion  swell,  unchecked,  until  it 
should  reach  a  stage  which  would  justify  their  interposition. 

Bear  in  mind,  too,  that  at  this  very  date,  when  he  ac- 
knowledged himself  to  have  a  force,  disposable  for  an  advance, 
of  75,000  men,  there  commenced  a  series  of  events  in  the 
highest  degree  disreputable  to  the  national  cause — the  blun- 
der of  Ball's  Bluff  and  the  blockade  of  the  Potomac — and 
that  for  six  weeks  the  enemy  had  flaunted  his  hateful  banner 
in  the  very  sight  of  the  Capitol. 


10  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

After  rehearsing  instructions  given  in  November,  as  Gen- 
eral-in-Chief, to  various  Commanding  Generals,  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan  remarks,  (p.  42,)  "  The  plan  indicated  in  the  above 
letters  comprehended  in  its  scope  the  operations  of  all  the 
armies  of  the  Union,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  well.  It 
was  my  intention,  for  reasons  easy  to  be  seen,  that  its  vari- 
ous parts  should  be  carried  out  simultaneously,  or  nearly  so, 
and  in  cooperation  along  the  whole  line.  If  this  plan  was 
wise — and  events  have  failed  to  prove  that  it  was  not — then 
it  is  unnecessary  to  defend  any  delay  which  would  have  en- 
abled the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  perform  its  share  in  the 
execution  of  the  whole  work." 

"We  cannot  regard  this  as  other  than  an  afterthought  •  and 
we  think  that  the  character  of  many  other  portions  of  the 
report,  and  its  laboriously  apologetic  spirit,  render  this  con- 
clusion not  uncharitable.  There  never  was  that  concert  of 
action,  and  never  could  be,  between  the  forces  in  the  differ- 
ent sections  of  the  extended  theatre  of  war,  which  would 
justify  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  waiting  a  day  for 
movements  elsewhere.  Moreover,  the  unnecessary  inaction 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  extends  back,  as  we  have 
shown,  to  a  period  prior  to  Gen.  McClellan's  assuming  the 
functions  of  Commander-in-Chief. 

In  his  apology  to  the  President  and  exposition  of  his  pet 
scheme  of  "  changing  his  base"  of  operations  to  the  lower 
Chesapeake,  he  says : 

"When  I  was  placed  in  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States,  I  immediately  turned  my  attention  to  the 
whole  field  of  operations,  regarding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
as  only  one,  while  the  most  important,  of  the  masses  under 
my  command. 

"  I  confess  that  I  did  not  then  appreciate  the  total  absence 
of  a  general  plan  which  had  before  existed,  nor  did  I  know 
that  utter  disorganization  and  want  of  preparation  pervaded 
the  western  armies. 

"  I  took  it  for  granted  that  they  were  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
in  condition  to  move  towards  the  fulfilment  of  my  plans.  I 
acknowledge  that  I  made  a  great  mistake. 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  11 

"  I  sent  at  once,  with  the  approval  of  the  executive,  officers 
I  considered  competent,  to  command  in  Kentucky  and  Mis- 
souri. Their  instructions  looked  to  prompt  movements.  I 
soon  found  that  the  labor  of  creation  and  organization  had  to 
be  performed  there ;  transportation,  arms,  clothing,  artillery, 
discipline,  all  were  wanting.  These  things  required  time  to 
procure  them. 

"  The  generals  in  command  have  done  this  work  most 
creditably,  but  we  are  still  delayed.  I  had  hoped  that  a 
general  advance  could  be  made  during  the  good  weather  of 
December ;  I  was  mistaken." 

Take  this  in  connection  with  the  paragraph  of  page  42, 
just  quoted,  and  we  are  bound  to  believe  that  no  sooner  did 
he  reach  the  supreme  command  than  he  deliberately  deferred 
all  action  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  not  because  it  was 
not  ready  to  act,  but  until  "  a  general  advance  could  be  made 
during  the,  good  weather  of  December."  Without  comment- 
ing upon  the  censure  cast  upon  his  illustrious  and  venerable 
predecessor,  Gen.  Scott,  for  the  "  total  absence  of  a  general 
plan,  &c.,"  "  the  utter  disorganization  and  want  of  prepara- 
tion in  the  western  armies,  &c.,"  we  remark  that  if  the 
western  armies  were  unprepared  it  was  mainly  because  of 
his  own  insatiable  demands  for  everything  the  nation  could 
furnish,  for  all  that  he  asked  for  was  granted,  as  much  as  if 
he  had  been  already  commander-in-chief;  moreover  that, 
though  he  kept  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  spell-bound,  wait- 
ing for  "disorganized"  and  "unprepared"  armies  to  move, 
those  very  armies  actually  did  move,  took  Fort  Henry,  Fort 
Donelson,  Columbus  and  Nashville,  reached  the  very  southern 
borders  of  Tennessee,  and  fought  the  battle  of  Shiloli  before 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  fairly  inaugurated  its  cam- 
paign. Indeed,  an  admirer  of  Gen.  McClellan's  strategy  of 
that  day  entered  into  a  long  newspaper  argument  to  show 
why  this  great  movement  of  the  right  wing  must  take  place 
lefore  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  could  be  released  from  its 
compulsory  inactivity. 

Gen.  McClellan  cannot  assign  the  mud  obstacle,  (hitherto 
BO  much  insisted  upon,)  as  an  apology  for  inaction  in  a  region 


12  THE   PENINSULA   CAMPAIGN 

selected  by  himself,  and  where,  according  to  his  own  most 
formal  statements,  now  published  with  his  report,  he  believes 
that  the  roads  are  passable  at  all  seasons  of  the  year.  Let  us 
therefore  accept  his  apology — he  was  waiting  for  the  "  com- 
bined "  movements  of  other  armies  wh4ch  actually  moved — 
effected  great  conquests  and  f ought  one  desperate  pitched 
tattle,  before  the  campaign  of  his  own  Army  of  the  Potomac 
was  commenced ! 

But  even  if  mud  and  the  weather  had  been  a  cause  for 
delaying  the  great  movement  in  January,  and  February,  and 
March,  1862,  it  was  no  reason  that  nothing  should  be  done. 
The  capture  of  Norfolk  would  have  been  a  most  important 
step,  preliminary  and  accessory  to  a  campaign  against  Rich- 
mond, with  the  James  River,  or,  indeed,  any  part  of  the 
"  lower  Chesapeake "  as  a  base.  The  failure  to  take  that 
place  during  the  winter  virtually  frustrated  all  Gen.  McClel- 
lan's  plans  in  this  direction.  The  capture  of  this  most  im- 
portant point  would,  if  it  had  had  none  of  the  other  results 
we  have  pointed  out,  have  quieted  the  public  mind,  have 
given  Gen.  McClellan  another  lease  on  the  rapidly  waning 
public  confidence,  and  have  had  an  important  bearing  upon 
our  European  relations.  The  fitting  up  of  the  Merrimac  as 
an  iron  clad  ram  was  known  to  be  going  on  at  that  period. 
Serious  forebodings  of  the  consequences  which  might  ensue 
— forebodings  afterwards  too  fully  realized — were  entertained 
by  the  Navy  Department,  by  whom  the  capture  of  the  place 
was  urgently  desired.  Gen.  McClellan  alone  seems  to  have 
been  insensible  to  its  importance.  (2.) 

A  recent  publication  of  Lieut.-Col.  Lecomte,  contains 
some  matter  of  interest  concerning  this  period  of  inaction, 
from  October  to  March.  The  writer,  a  Swiss  officer,  who 
served  as  volunteer  aid  on  Gen.  McClellan's  staff  up  to,  and 
during  a  portion  of,  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  has  translated 
into  French  the  report  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  with  notes  and  comments.  These  additions  are 
thoroughly  in  the  McClellan  interest,  defending  his  late 
chief  against  every  charge,  and  lauding  his  generalship. 

Col.  Lecomte  says  the  "  secret  service  "  of  the  army  of  the 


AND   ITS    ANTECEDENTS. 


13 


Potomac  was  "  particularly  well "  performed — that  our  in- 
formation of  the  force  and  position  of  the  enemy  was  very 
thorough — in  fact  that  it  was  the  special  business  of  the 
Orleans  Princes,  (admirable  young  officers,  doubtless,  but 
not  the  best  fitted,  as  foreigners,  for  the  secret  service  duty,) 
and  that  on  the  21st  of  February  the  "  Count  of  Paris  "  pre- 
sented Gen.  McClellan  with  a  statement  of  the  enemy's 
force  as  follows : — 

Division  Holmes,  (from  Fredericksburg  to  Dumfries,)          .         .         .  12,000 

Division  Whiting,  (from  Dumfries  to  the  Occoquan,)      ....  6,000 

A  Division  on  the  Occoquan, 10,000 

A  Brigade  about  Manassas, 3,000 

Division  Smith,  between  Manasses  and  Union  Mills,-         .        .        .  17,000 

A  Brigade  of  Cavalry  at  bridge  over  Bull  Run,      .        .        .        .        .  3,000 

A  Division,  (Longstreet,)  at  Centreville, 14,000 

Brigade,  (Hill,)  at  Leesburg, 6,000 


Total, 70,000 

And  the  "  Division  Jackson  "  at  Winchester,        ....    12  to  18,000 

Now  Gen.  McClellan  states,  in  his  Report,  (p.  56,  last  par.,) 
that  "  from  the  Report  of  the  Chief  of  the  Secret  Service," 
there  were  on  the  8th  of  March  at 

Manasses,  Ceutreville,  Bull  Bun  and  Upper  Occoquan,  .  .  .  80,000 
Brooks'  Station,  Dumfries,  Lower  Occoquan,  .....  18,000 
Leesburg, 4,500 


Total, 102,500 

And  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 13,000 

A  discrepancy  of  from  27,000  to  33,000  in  the  aggregate, 
and  of  30,000  in  the  estimate  of  the  rebel  forces  east  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  confronting  Washington  and  the  Potomac. 

Col.  Lecomte  further  states  that,  on  visiting  the  rebel  po- 
sitions on  the  llth  of  March,  the  Count  of  Paris  had  his 
map  in  hand,  and  found  the  accuracy  of  his  estimates  con- 
firmed in  a  remarkable  manner.*  Now,  the  estimates  so 

*  These  estimates  attribute  to  the  enemy  70,000  men,  from  Fredericksburg 
to  Leesburg — less  than  Gen.  McClellan's  "disposable  force"  of  Oct.  15,  1861. 
Yet  Gen.  McClellan,  at  that  early  date,  expressed  officially  his  belief,  founded 


14  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

remarkably  confirmed  assign  to  Centreville,  Bull  Run  and 
the  Occoquan  .an  aggregate  of  47,000  men,  whereas  the 
report  of  the  "  Chief  of  the  Secret  Service,"  cited,  assigns  to 
the  same  region,  exclusive  of  the  "Lower"  Occoquan,  an 
aggregate  of  80,000  men.  The  above  statements  and  esti- 
mates may  be  properly  left  to  Col.  Lecomte  and  the  "  Chief 
of  the  Secret  Service"  to  reconcile.  They  furnish  evidence, 
however,  of  the  real  value  of  the  "  secret  service"  estimates 
as  they  are  quoted  in  tho  "  Report."  Col.  Lecomte's  state- 
ment of  numbers  does  not  differ  very  much  from  one  laid 
by  Gen.  McClellan  before  a  council  of  war  on  the  2d  of 
March. 

It  is  next  to  certain  that  nothing  like  the  numbers  given 
even  by  the  lowest  estimate  were  in  front  of  us,  from  Fred- 
ericksburg  to  Leesburg,  at  that  time,  and  also  that  the  evac- 
uation commenced  several  weeks  before  the  8th  of  March. 
Wm.  Henry  Hurlbert,  who  certainly  had  most  excellent  op- 
portunities of  judging,  and  whose  admiration  of  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan would  not  cause  him  to  err  consciously  on  the  unfa- 
vorable side,  says : — 

"  I  have  reason  to  believe  that,  when  the  history  of  the 
present  war  shall  come  to  be  written  fairly  and  in  full,  it  will  be 
found  that  Gen.  Johnston  never  intended  to  hold  Manassas 
and  Centreville  against  any  serious  attack ;  that  his  army  at 
these  points  had  suffered  greatly  during  the  autumn  and 
winter  of  1861-'2 ;  that  from  October  to  March  he  never 
had  an  effective  force  of  more  than  40,000  under  his  orders ; 
that  his  preparations  for  an  evacuation  were  begun  as  early 
as  October,  1861 ;  and  that  after  that  time  he  lay  there  sim- 
ply in  observation." 

Lecomte's  remarks  on  the  fortifications  of  Washington 
deserve  special  attention,  considering  the  inspiration  under 
which  he  writes.  It  has  always  been  supposed  that  these 
fortifications,  scarcely  commenced  when  Gen.  McClellan  as- 
sumed the  command,  but  renewed  with  immense  energy 

on  reports  of  "spies,  prisoners,  &c.,"  that  "the  enemy  had  a  force  on  the  Poto- 
mac not  less  than  150,000  strong,  well  drilled,  &c."  I 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  15 

from  that  moment — carried  on  under  his  own  frequent  in- 
spection— were  part  of  his  great  strategic  plan ;  that  they 
were  to  give  security  to  Washington  while  he  should  move 
the  bulk  of  his  army  even  to  a  place  like  the  Peninsula, 
where  it  could  not  possibly  act  directly  in  the  defence  of  the 
Capital.  It  has  been  supposed,  too,  that  the  works  consti- 
tuting the  defences  of  Washington,  thus  sanctioned  and 
directed  by  Gen.  McClellan,  planned  and  executed  by  Gen. 
Barnard  and  his  subordinates,  emanating  principally  from 
one  head  and  executed  by  one  will,  would  form  a  system 
having  unity  and  consistency,  and  in  which  we  might  find 
happy  adaptations,  and  even  high  specimens  of  engineering 
skill.  Col.  Lecomte's  account  gives,  however,  quite  a  differ- 
ent view : — 

"  The  construction  was  carried  on  under  a  feverish  excite- 
ment; the  soil  was  tormented,  without  truce  or  respite, 
throughout  all  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  beyond." 

"  Every  one  ordered,  in  turn,  a  bit  (un  l>ouf)  of  fortifica- 
tion, according  to  the  needs  of  the  moment,  which  fragment 
soon  made  necessary  others  in  its  connection ;  and  so  it  con- 
tinued, without  having  even  yet  ceased  after  more  than  two 
years.  The  result  was  a  network  of  forts  for  which  no  per- 
son could  be  really  responsible." 

Another  note-worthy  remark  of  Lecomte.  His  low  opin- 
ion of  the  fortifications  of  Washington  does  not  permit  him, 
consistently  with  his  admiration  for  Gen.  McClellan,  to  sup- 
pose that  the  latter  had  any  confidence  in  them,  and  he  is 
authority  for  the  following  design  or  idea  on  the  part  of  his 
hero : — 

"  As  to  the  place  itself,  (i.  e.,  Washington,)  to  leave  a  por- 
tion of  the  works  of  the  right  bank  (i.  e.,  forts)  outside  of 
the  real  line  of  defence,  and  to  mine  them  and  blow  them  up 
under  the  enemy's  feet.  It  was  for  this  cause,  doubtless, 
that  the  armaments  of  several  forts  had  been  neglected. 
This  design,  one  may  readily  comprehend,  could  not  be 
spoken  of  beforehand,  nor  exposed  to  indiscretions"  !* 

*  So  far  from  the  "armament  of  several  forts  having  been  neglected,"  there 
was  not  a  single  fort  in  the  line  that  had  not  been  heavily  armed.     The  only  un- 


16  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

The  only  KEAL  DEFENCE  Washington  had,  then,  was  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that,  as  we  know,  was  to  be  car- 
ried off  to  a  region  where  by  no  possibility  could  it  render 
aid,  should  the  enemy,  paying  no  attention  to  the  safety  of 
Kichmond,  choose  to  turn  upon  the  capital.  (3) 

The  movement  by  the  lower  Chesapeake  having  been  de- 
termined upon,  it  was  necessary  to  move  the  troops  by  water, 
and  the  President  insisted  upon  the  destruction  of  the  ene- 
my's batteries  on  the  Potomac.  Gen.  McClellan  admits  the 
incredible  fact  that,  under  his  authority,  "  preparations  had 
been  made  for  throwing  Hooker's  division  across  to  carry 
them  by  assault."  The  barges  (canal  boats)  were  collected 
and  fitted  up,  and  the  time  of  the  expedition  fixed.  A 
BdWs  Bluff  affair,  ten  times  intensified,  would  have  been 
the  certain  result.  Yet  the  assault  would  have  been  made 
but  for  "  an  adverse  report  from  Brig.-Gen.  J.  G.  Barnard." 
(See  p.  50.)  He  adds  that  "  a  close  examination  of  the  ene- 
my's works  and  their  approaches,  made  after  they  were  evac- 
uated, showed  that  the  decision  was  a  wise  one."  And  yet 
this  project  was  deliberately  gotten  up  as  a  preliminary  to 
the  embarkation  of  the  army  ! 

i  Just  as  the  movement  to  the  lower  Chesapeake  was  about 
to  be  executed,  the  appearance  of  the  long-expected  Merri- 
mac  threw  the  whole  scheme  again  into  uncertainty.  Now, 
though  the  "power"  of  the  Monitor  may  have  been  "  satisfac- 
torily demonstrated"  by  the  combat  which  occurred,  it  never 
was  "  satisfactorily  demonstrated"  that  she  could  neutralize 
the  Merrimac.  It  was  all  conjecture.  All  that  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  or  Mr.  Fox — all  that  Commodore  Golds- 
borough —  could  affirm,  was  that  she  should  not  escape  from 
Hampton  Roads.  The  filling  of  Hampton  Roads  with 
transports,  under  such  circumstances,  was  attended  with 
great  risk.  The  Prince  de  Joinville  says :  "  These  were  the 
circumstances  in  which  I  arrived  at  Fortress  Monroe.  Soon 
the  Roads  were  filled  with  vessels  coming  from  Alexandria 
or  Annapolis,  and  filled,  some  with  soldiers,  some  with 

armed  or  slightly  armed  works  were  those  at  Upton's  Mill,  which  had  special 
objects,  and  which  it  was  never  intended  to  arm  permanently. 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  17 

horses,  cannon  and  munitions  of  all  kinds.  Sometimes  I 
counted  several  hundred  vessels  at  the  anchorage,  and  among 
them  twenty  or  twenty-five  large  steam  transports  waiting 
for  their  turn  to  come  up  to  the  quay  and  land  the  fifteen  or 
twenty  thousand  men  whom  they  brought.  The  reader  may 
judge  how  fearful  would  have  been  the  catastrophe  had  the 
Merrimac  suddenly  appeared  among  this  swarm  of  ships, 
striking  them  one  after  another,  and  sending  to  the  bottom 
these  human  hives  with  all  their  inmates!  The  Federal 
authorities,  both  naval  and  military,  here  underwent  several 
days  of  the  keenest  anxiety.  Every  time  that  a  smoke  was 
seen  above  the  trees  which  concealed  the  Elizabeth  River, 
men's  hearts  beat  fast.  But  the  Merrimac  never  came.  She 
allowed  the  landing  to  take  place  without  opposition. 

"  Why  did  she  do  this  ? 

"  She  did  not  come  because  her  position  at  Norfolk,  as  a 
constant  menace,  secured  without  any  risk  two  results  of 
great  importance.  In  the  first  place,  she  kept  paralyzed  in 
Hampton  Roads  the  naval  forces  assembled  to  join  the  land 
army  in  the  attack  upon  Yorktown ;  in  the  second  place, 
and  this  was  the  principal  object,  she  deprived  the  Federal 
army  of  all  the  advantages  which  the  possession  of  the  James 
would  have  secured  to  it  in  a  campaign  of  which  Richmond 
was  the  base." 

Nothing,  however,  could  divert  Gen.  McClellan  from  his 
movement  "  by  the  lower  Chesapeake" — neither  considera- 
tion for  the  President's  convictions  nor  the  dictates  of  ordi- 
nary prudence ;  but  it  is  amusing  that  he  should  attribute 
the  "  retirement  of  the  enemy"  to  his  ascertaining  that  "  the 
movement  to  the  Peninsula  was  intended"  Supposing  the 
enemy  to  have  had  anything  like  the  forces  attributed  to 
him,  this  theory  supposes  him  to  have  been  possessed  with  a 
stupidity  inconceivable.  Had  he  been  timid  as  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan professes  to  believe,  he  would  not  have  abandoned 
his  strong  and  fortified  "  central  position"  until  something 
more  than  rumors  of  an  intention  to  embark  our  army 
should  have  reached  him.  He  would  have  held  his  position 
till  ,the  movement  had  become  pronounced.  Had  the 


18  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

enemy's  "  leaders"  had,  moreover,  a  small  modicum  of  the 
"  ability"  which  Gen.  McClellan  attributes  to  them,  with  an 
army  of  115,000  men,  they  would  not  have  retired  even 
then.  A  serious  menace  upon  "Washington — to  say  nothing 
of  a  serious  attack — would  have  frustrated  the  movement  to 
the  Peninsula. 

The  truth  is,  the  enemy  abandoned  Manassas  because  his 
force  was  too  weak,  and  because  the  risks  wrere  too  great,  to 
permit  him  to  remain  longer  where  he  was.  He  abandoned 
Manassas  after  the  President's  orders  for  advance  had  been 
given — a  week  after  a  council  of  war  had  leen  held  to  deter- 
mine the  means  and  modus  operandi  of  attacking  him 
where  he  was.  It  is  likely  that  he  feared  an  "  intention"  of 
attack  more  than  an  intention  of  a  "  movement  to  the  Pen- 
insula," where  he  actually  had  a  fortified  line  strong  enough 
(as  it  turned  out)  to  arrest  our  army  a  whole  month. 

Having  with  such  affluence  of  argument  demonstrated  to 
the  President  the  superiority  of  his  "  plan" — having  tena- 
ciously cherished  it  for  four  long  months — having  persisted, 
even  against  risks  of  no  ordinary  magnitude,  and  against 
the  settled  convictions  of  the  President,  in  carrying  it  out, 
Ve  cannot  doubt  that  at  least  Gen.  McClellan  has  perfect 
knowledge  of  the  new  theatre  of  war  upon  which  he  is  en- 
tering— or,  at  least,  such  knowledge  as  would  justify  his 
assumptions  and  approve  his  military  judgment.  What, 
then,  is  our  astonishment  when  we  find  that  he  carried  his 
army  'into  a  region  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant — that 
the  quasi  information  he  had  about  it  was  all  erroneous — 
that  within  twelve  miles  of  the  outposts  of  troops  under  his 
command  a  powerful  defensive  line  had  been  thrown  up 
during  the  winter  and  spring,  of  which  he  knew  nothing 
whatever,  though  it  lay  across  his  meditated  line  of  march, 
and  altered  the  whole  character  of  the  problem — that  the 
roads  "passable  at  all  seasons"  were  of  the  most  horrible 
character,  and  the  country  a  wilderness.  His  own  account 
of  his  information  is  given  as  follows,  (p.  74 :) 

"  As  to  the  force  and  position  of  the  enemy,  the  informa- 
tion then  in  our  possession  was  vague  and  untrustworthy. 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  ,  19 

Much  of  it  was  obtained  from  the  staff  officers  of  Gen. 
"Wool,  and  was  simply  to  the  effect  that  Yorktown  was  sur- 
rounded by  a  continuous  line  of  earthworks,  with  strong 
water  batteries  on  the  York  River,  and  garrisoned  by  not 
less  than  15,000  troops,  under  command  of  Gen.  J.  B.  Ma- 
gruder.  Maps,  which  had  been  prepared  by  the  topographi- 
cal engineers  under  Gen.  Wool's  command,  were  furnished 
me,  in  which  the  Warwick  River  was  represented  as  flowing 
parallel  to,  but  not  crossing,  the  road  from  Newport  News 
to  Williamsburg,  making  the  so-called  Mulberry  Island  a 
real  island ;  and  we  had  no  information  as  to  the  true  course 
of  the  Warwick  across  the  Peninsula,  nor  of  the  formidable 
line  of  works  which  it  covered." 


And  again,  (p.  75  :)  "  In  the  commencement  of  the  move- 
ment from  Fort  Monroe,  serious  difficulties  were  encoun- 
tered, from  the  want  of  precise  topographical  information  as 
to  the  country  in  advance.  Correct  local  maps  were  not  to 
be  found,  and  the  country,  though  known  in  its  general  fea- 
tures, we  found  to  be  inaccurately  described  in  essential 
particulars  in  the  only  maps  and  geographical  memoirs  or 
papers  to  which  access  could  be  had.  Erroneous  courses  to 
streams  and  roads  were  frequently  given,  and  no  dependence 
could  be  placed  on  the  information  thus  derived.  This  dif- 
ficulty has  been  found  to  exist  with  respect  to  most  portions 
of  the  State  of  Virginia,  through  which  my  military  opera- 
tions have  extended." 

The  censure  thrown  upon  "  Col.  Cram"  and  "  the  topo- 
graphical officers  under  Gen.  Wool's  command,"  is  an  un- 
generous means  of  justifying  himself.  (4)  It  was  for  Gen. 
McClellan  and  his  "  secret  service"  to  establish  such  investi- 
gations as  would  give  him  some  light  on  the  fundamental 
data  of  his  campaign. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  corps  of  Gen.  McDowell  from  this 
expedition  is  the  great  incident  upon  which  have  been  based 
the  fiercest  invectives  against  the  administration  for  its 
"  interference,"  and  the  charges  upon  it  of  responsibility  for 


20  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

the  failure  of  the  campaign.  "We  shall  go  no  further  into 
the  matter,  here,  than  to  say,  first,  that  the  decision  of  the 
corps  commanders  (pp.  59  and  60)  and  the  approval  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  (p.  60)  were  the  sole  points  of  understand- 
ing between  Gen.  McClellan  and  the  War  Department. 
Notwithstanding  that  Gen.  McClellan  was  in  the  vicinity  of 
Washington  eighteen  days  after  those  conditions  were  estab- 
lished, he  never  had,  or  took  pains  to  have,  an  under- 
standing as  to  how  they  were  to  be  executed.  (5.)  The 
very  day  he  sailed  (April  1)  he  sent  to  the  Adjutant-General 
a  statement  of  his  dispositions,  and  this,  submitted  by  the 
Secretary  of  War  to  military  advisers,  and  decided  by  them 
to  be  not  a  fulfillment  of  the  conditions,  prompted  and 
justified  the  order  withdrawing  McDowell.  With  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  and  his  advisers  it  was  simply  a  question 
whether  the  conditions  which  the  President  had  imposed  in  ap- 
proving, or  rather  in  permitting,  Gen.  McClellan's  eccentric 
movement,  had  been  fulfilled.  They  had  not  been  fulfilled, 
and  the  whole  thing  had  been  carried  on  from  the  beginning 
in  disregard,  not  only  of  the  President's  wishes,  but  of  his 
positive  orders,  and  of  the  conditions  which  he  (through  a 
council  of  war)  imposed  upon  the  movement.  (6) 

Citing  the  order  detaining  McDowell,  Gen.  McClellan  re- 
sorts to  the  unworthy  subterfuge  of  representing  it  as  a 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  his  command,  by  the  President,  in 
violation  of  his  promise  "  that  nothing  of  that  sort  should  be 
repeated,"  (he  refers  to  a  previous  withdrawal  of  Blenker's 
division — a  body  of  troops  of  which  he  had  more  than  once 
expressed  his  determination  to  rid  himself  in  some  way,) 
"  that  I  might  rest  assured  that  the  campaign  should  proceed 
with  no  further  deductions  from  the  force  upon  which  its 
operations  had  been  planned ;"  whereas  it  was  simply  an  en- 
forcement of  the  conditions  upon  which  the  President  reluc- 
tantly sanctioned  the  plan.  He  goes  on  to  say : — 

"  To  me  the  blow  was  most  discouraging.  It  frustrated 
all  my  plans  for  impending  operations.  It  fell  when  I  was 
too  deeply  committed  to  withdraw.  It  left  me  incapable  of 
continuing  operations  which  had  been  begun.  It  compelled 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  21 

the  adoption  of  another,  a  different  and  less  effective  plan  of 
campaign.  It  made  rapid  and  brilliant  operations  impossi- 
ble. It  was  a  fatal  error." 

The  very  circumstances  he  here  details  stultify  his  conclu- 
sions. "Rapid  and  brilliant  operations"  were  more  than 
ever  imposed  upon  him.  When  Napoleon,  with  his  handful 
of  men,  drove  the  Austrians  out  of  Italy,  though  twice  and 
thrice  placed,  by  the  paucity  of  his  numbers,  in  almost  des- 
perate situations,  it  was  not  by  admitting  that  "  rapid  and 
brilliant  operations  "  were  "  impossible,"  (a  word,  by  the  by, 
which  he  ever  repudiated,)  but  by  recognizing  that  in  them 
alone  his  hope  lay. 

The  order  referred  to  was  received  by  Gen.  McClellan 
simultaneously,  almost  (April  5th,)  with  the  arrival  of  his 
army  before  the  lines  of  Yorktown.  As  to  the  propriety  of 
assaulting  those  lines,  if  there  ever  was  a  case  in  wrhich  such 
a  step  was  not  merely  justifiable  and  advisable,  but  demanded 
by  the  circumstances,  it  was  surely  this.  Through  various 
causes  not  necessary  to  enumerate,  the  morale  of  the  rebel 
forces  was  at  its  lowest  ebb.  That  of  our  armies  was  high. 
Gen.  McClellan,  entering  upon  a  campaign  which  he  had  ob- 
stinately inaugurated  against  the  most  earnest  remonstrances 
of  the  President,  found  himself  interrupted  by  an  obstacle 
wholly  unknown  to  him,  proving,  at  the  same  time,  the  utter 
defectiveness  of  his  data,  and  his  own  culpable  negligence 
in  failing  to  obtain  proper  information  upon  which  to  base  a 
campaign.  He  had  trifled  with  the  destinies  of  the  nation  in 
thus,  with  more  than  childish  levity  and  obstinacy,  leading 
its  most  powerful  army  into  such  a  situation.  There  was  but 
one  way  to  get  out  of  the  scrape — to  break  down  the  obstacle 
by  a  vigorous  assault.  Again,  he  was  entering  upon  his  vir- 
gin campaign  as  commander  of  a  great  army.  Had  there 
been  no  antecedents  it  would  have  become  him  to  inaugurate 
this  campaign  and  his  career  by  a  coup  de  mgueur  which 
should  carry  terror  to  his  enemies,  and  firmly  fix  himself  in 
the  estimation  of  his  troops.  But  there  were  antecedents. 
Eight  months  of  inactivity  had  shaken  his  reputation  with 
the  President  and  with  his  own  nearest  friends,  while  it  had 


22  THE   PENINSULAS   CAMPAIGN 

destroyed  confidence  in  the  minds  of  the  majority  of  the 
most  influential  of  his  countrymen.  The  attack  of  Napoleon 
on  the  bridge  of  Lodi  was  certainly  the  very  sublimity  of 
rashness ;  he  made  it  with  nice  apprehension  of  the  relative 
morale  of  his  own  troops  and  of  that  of  the  Austrians,  and 
of  the  effects  of  an  action  of  such  extraordinary  boldness. 
Though  not  to  the  same  degree,  perhaps,  there  was  a  corres- 
ponding difference  in  the  morale  of  the  Union  and  rebel 
armies,  and  the  most  powerful  motives  for  a  corresponding 
boldness  of  action.  All  chances  of  success  of  the  campaign 
turned  upon  not  being  delayed  at  Yorktown. 

We  believe  that  there  must  be  some  error  in  the  assertion 
that  Gen.  Barnard  "expressed  the  judgment  that  these 
works  could  not,  with  any  reasonable  degree  of  certainty,  be 
carried  by  assault."  Gen.  Barnard  pointed  out  where  the 
lines  were  weak,  and,  without  recommending  one  thing  or 
the  other,  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  he  could  depend  upon 
his  troops,  he  would  assault  there.  It  was  for  Gen.  McClel- 
lan,  who  knew  his  troops  better  than  Gen.  Barnard,  (the 
latter's  duties  not  bringing  him  into  close  connection  with 
them,)  and  who  was  solely  responsible,  to  decide  the  matter. 

The  description  of  the  works  extracted  from  Gen.  Bar- 
nard's report,  (p.  84,)  to  the  Chief  Engineer  U.  S.  A.,  gives 
their  condition  as  it  was  May  5th,  one  month  after  we  first 
encountered  them,  and  after  the  whole  force  of  Johnston  had 
been  working  during  all  that  time  upon  them ;  the  process  of 
throwing  up  earth  works,  mounting  guns,  forming  embra- 
sures, &c.,  having  been  going  on  day  by  day,  under  our  ob- 
servation, for  the  whole  period.  When  we  first  saw  them, 
(April  5th,)  there  were  very  few  guns  upon  them,  and  those 
mostly  field  or  siege  guns  on  travelling  carriages,  in  barbette, 
and  which  could  not  have  maintained  their  positions  against 
a  vigorous  cannonade.  The  connection  between  Fort  Ma- 
gruder  and  the  "  red  redoubt "  was  a  mere  rifle  pit,  and  from 
the  "  red  redoubt "  to  the  swamp  there  was  nothing  whatever. 

The  ground  between  and  behind  these  two  works  was  seen 
and  could  be  swept  by  our  artillery  fire.  Our  assaulting 
columns  would  have  been  from  two-thirds  of  a  mile  to  one 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS. 


23 


mile  removed  from  the  artillery  of  Yorktown,  from  the  fire 
of  which  undulations  of  the  ground  afforded  much  cover, 
even  supposing  that  the  fire  of  that  place  could  not  have 
been  subdued  by  our  own  batteries.  The  "red  redoubt" 
towards  which  the  assault  would  have  been  directed  was  a 
very  insignificant  work. 

When  Gen.  Grant  arrived  before  Yicksburg  he  thought  it 
necessary  to  try  the  efficacy  of  an  assault.  In  so  doing  he, 
at  least,  satisfied  his  army  and  satisfied  the  public  mind. 
All  the  motives  which  could  justify  Gen.  Grant  existed  in 
the  case  before  us,  intensified  by  the  circumstances  we  have 
already  noticed.  (T) 

We  shall  not  pause  here  to  dwell  upon  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg.  That  a  fierce  battle  was  fought  at  a  point 
where  there  was  a  strong  probability  that  such  a  rencontre 
would  occur,  (for  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  enemy 
would  require  further  time  to  secure  his  retreat  and  save  his 
trains,  and  here  was  a  fortified  position  perfectly  adapted  to 
such  a  temporary  stand,*)  that  it  occurred  without  foresight, 
preparation  or  orders,  and  that  there  was  utter  confusion  with 
regard  to  the  command  and  direction  of  the  troops,  that  the 
Commanding  General  himself,  though  only  12  miles  distant, 
was  "  completing  the  preparations  for  the  departure  of  Gen. 
Franklin's  troops  by  water,  and  making  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements with  the  naval  commander  for  his  co-operation," 
that  we  lost  2288  men  in  an  affair  in  which  we  gained 
nothing  and  which  need  not  have  cost  us  a  man,  is  all  now 
well  understood. 

Neither  shall  we  dwell  on  the  extraordinary  sluggishness 
of  the  march  from  Williamsburg  to  the  Chickahominy,  fol- 
lowing the  Commanding  General's  boastful  declaration  that 
he  should  "  push  the  enemy  to  the  wall."  (A  dispatch,  by 
the  by,  which  he  has  suppressed  in  this  report.)  We  shall 
only  stop  to  call  attention  to  the  dispatch  of  the  Secretary 
of  War  of  May  18th,  (p.  96,)  and  to  the  following  comment 
of  Gen.  McClellan:  "It  will  be  observed  that  this  order 

*  "  It  was  also  known  that  there  wero  strong  defensive  works  at  or  near 
Williamsburgh,"  (McClellan's  Report,  p.  74.) 


24  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

rendered  it  impossible  for  me  to  use  the  James  River  as  a 
line  of  operations,  and  forced  me  to  establish  our  depots  on 
the  Pamunkey,  and  to  approach  Richmond  from  the  north. 

"  I  had  advised  and  preferred  that  reinforcements  should 
be  sent  by  water,  for  the  reasons  that  their  arrival  would  be 
more  safe  and  certain,  and  that  I  would  be  left  free  to  rest 
the  army  on  the  James  River  whenever  the  navigation  of 
that  stream  should  be  opened. 

"  The  land  movement  obliged  me  to  expose  my  right  in 
order  to  secure  the  junction,  and  as  the  order  for  Gen.  Mc- 
Dowell's march  was  soon  countermanded,  I  incurred  great 
risk,  of  which  the  enemy  finally  took  advantage,  and  frustra- 
ted the  plan  of  the  campaign."  „ 

"We  here  remark  that  it  was  at  Ropers  Church,  where  the 
army  was  on  the  llth  of  May,  that  it  was  necessary  to  decide 
whether  we  would  cross  the  Chickahominy  near  that  place 
and  approach  the  James  (then  open  to  us  by  the  destruction 
of  the  Merrimac)  or  continue  on  the  "Williamsburg  road  to 
Richmond.  The  great  mistake  of  not  taking  the  James 
River  route  was  made  eight  days  previous  to  the  date  of  this 
order,  and  was  due  to  Gen.  McClellan's  total  ignorance  of 
the  topography  of  the  country  he  was  operating  in,  to  his 
want  of  any  due  appreciation  of  the  superior  value  of  the 
James  as  a  base,  and  not  to  an  order  received  eight  days 
later. 

In  his  eagerness  to  make  this  grave  charge  against  tho 
War  Department,  and  to  manufacture  excuses  for  his  own 
oversight,  (to  use  a  very  mild  term,)  he  has  forgotten  his  own 
evidence,  given  under  oath,  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Con'duct  of  the  War,  as  follows : — 

"  Question. — Could  not  the  advance  on  Richmond  to 
Williamsburg  liave  been  made  with  better  prospect  of  success 
by  the  James  River  than  by  the  route  pursued,  and  what 
were  the  reasons  for  taking  the  route  adopted  ?" 

"Answer. — I  do  not  think  that  the  navy  at  that  time  was 
in  a  condition  to  make  the  line  of  the  James  River  perfectly 
sure  for  our  supplies.  The  line  of  the  Pamunkey  offered 
greater  advantages  in  that  respect.  The  place  was  in  a 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  25 

better  position  to  effect  a  junction  with  any  troops  that  might 
move  from  Washington  on  the  Fredericksburgh  line.  I  remem- 
ber that  the  idea  of  moving  on  the  James  River  was  seriously 
discussed  at  that  time.  But  the  conclusion  was  arrived  at 
that,  under  the  circumstances  then  existing,  the  route 
actually  followed  was  the  best.  I  think  the  Merrimac  was 
destroyed  while  we  were  at  Williamsburg."  (8) 

Next  to  the  taking  away  of  McDowell's  corps  the  most  im- 
portant specification  against  the  administration  for  interfer- 
ence, has  been  founded  upon  the  compelling  of  Gen.  McClel- 
lan  to  base  himself  upon  the  York  and  Pamunkey  Rivers, 
instead  of  the  James,  in  order  to  connect  with  McDowell, 
and  Gen.  McClellan  himself  does  not  scruple  to  assert  it, 
though,  in  so  doing,  he  contradicts  himself.  The  stamp  of 
disingenuous  afterthought — so  palpable  on  every  page  of  the 
report  to  those  who  are  familiar  with  the  march  of  events 
of  this  campaign — is  here  made  palpable  to  the  general 
reader. 

On  the  18th  of  May  our  depot  was  firmly  established  on 
the  York  River.  The  army  was  well  nigh  up  to  the  Chick- 
ahominy,  the  right  wing  on  the  New  Bridge  road,  the  left 
wing  on  the  Bottom's  Bridge  road. 

Gen.  Barnard  has  given  in  his  report  a  concise  description 
of  that  (now)  \vell-known  stream,  calling  it  "  one  of  the  most 
formidable  military  obstacles  that  could  be  opposed  to  the 
advance  of  an  army ;  an  obstacle  to  which  an  ordinary  river 
though  it  be  of  considerable  magnitude,  is  comparatively 
slight."  Formidable  as  it  was,  Gen.  B.  further  remarks, 
"  the  barrier  of  the  Chickahominy  being  left  unguarded  at 
Bottom's  Bridge,  no  time  should  have  been  lost  in  making 
use  of  the  circumstance  to  turn  and  seize  the  passage  of 
New  Bridge,  which  might  have  been  done  by  the  28th,  and 
even  earlier,  had  measures  been  pressed  for  taking  it." 

In  reference  to  the  same  period  and  the  same  obstacle  we 
find  in  the  report  before  us,  (p.  100,  1st  par.,)  "  In  view  of 
the  peculiar  character  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  the  liability 
of  its  bottom  land  to  sudden  inundation,  it  became  necessary 
to  construct  between  Bottom's  Bridge  and  Mechanicsville, 


26  THE  PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

eleven  (11)  new  bridges,  all  long  and  difficult,  with  extensive 
log-way  approaches." 

It  may  here  be  remarked  that  we  knew  as  little  of  the 
"  peculiar  character  of  the  Chickahominy  "  and  "  the  liability 
of  its  bottom  land  to  sudden  inundations"  as  we  confessedly 
did  of  the  topography  and  roads  and  physical  character  of 
this  whole  region — nothing  at  all. 

The  "  eleven  new  bridges,"  (including  in  this  enumeration 
the  railroad  bridge,  Bottom's  Bridge  and  New  Bridge,)  are 
here  emphatically  mentioned  as  if  at  that  date,  (May  24th,) 
it  was  as  "  necessary  to  construct "  all  these,  as  if  the  con- 
struction of  each  and  all  had  been  part  of  the  programme, 
preliminary  to  any  further  motien.  If  this  is  not  asserted, 
the  idea  is  conveyed  by  the  1st  par.,  p.  100,  and  confirmed 
by  the  8th  and  9th.  ("  The  work  upon  the  bridges  was 
commenced  at  once,"  &c.,  &c.) 

By  reference  to  Gen.  Barnard's  report,  (p.  21,)  it  will  be 
seen  that,  at  this  period,  three  points  for  bridges  were  selected 
in  front  of  the  right  wing  of  the  army  near  "  New  Bridge," 
viz. :  one,  a  half  mile  above,  another,  the  same  distance  be- 
low the  "  New  Bridge,"  and  the  New  Bridge  itself.  The 
latter  was  the  crossing  of  the  turnpike,  and  required  no  more 
than  an  hour  or  two  of  work  in  throwing  a  pontoon  bridge, 
when  the  time  of  crossing  should  come.  The  other  two  re- 
quired corduroy  work,  which  could  not  be  done  at  all,  (at 
least  it  was  not  part  of  the  plan  to  do  it,)  until  the  same  mo- 
ment should  arrive.  All  that  could  be  done  is  stated  in 
Gen.  Barnard's  Report,  viz. :  to  "  collect  the  bridge  materials 
and  corduroy  stuff;"  nor  was  any  very  extensive  work  an- 
ticipated, as  the  bottom  lands  were  quite  dry,  and  no  inun- 
dation had  yet  occurred  or  was  anticipated.  Gen.  McClellan 
was  not  waiting  for  the  bridges,  but  the  bridges  were  waiting 
for  Gen.  McClellan.  At  Bottom's  Bridge,  (one  of  the 
"  eleven,")  two  new  bridges  had  oeen  completed,  approaches 
and  all,  on  the  23d,  (May.)  On  the  27th  the  railroad  bridge 
was  completely  repaired. 

Intermediate  between  Bottom's  Bridge  and  the  three 
points  mentioned  ]pj  Gen.  Barnard,  (where  alone  a  passage 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS. 


27 


was  to  be  forced,)  Gen.  Sumner  had  built  two  bridges  with 
long  corduroy  approaches  through  the  swamp;  they  were 
both  finished  about  the  28th.  There  was  no  enemy  to  op- 
pose their  construction. 

Gen.  Barnard  says,  "So  far  as  engineering  operations 
were  concerned,  the  whole  army  could  have  been  thrown 
over  as  early  as  the  28th."  And  such  an  operation  was 
daily  looked  for  in  the  army,  and  was  the  avowed  intention 
of  Gen.  McClellan. 

But,  (between  Gen.  McClellan's  plans  and  their  execution 
there  is  always  a  "  but,")  "  a  considerable  force  on  his  right 
flank  "  caused  him  to  delay  and  to  send  off  Porter  to  achieve 
his  "  glorious  victories  "  which  so  puzzled  the  President,  and 
of  which  he  is  so  unable  to  "  appreciate  the  magnitude." 

This  really  useless  expedition  was  undertaken  just  at  the 
moment  when  Gen.  McClellan  was  "  ready,"  (if  he  ever  was 
ready,)  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy.  The  last 
few  days  of  comparatively  dry  ground,  favorable  for  the  exe- 
cution of  this  operation,  were  thus  lost.  On  the  30th  the 
tremendous  rain  storm  set  in  which  inundated  the  swamp 
and  bottom  lands.  On  the  31st  the  enemy  attacked  our 
isolated  left  wing.  Had  he  delayed  that  attack  twenty-four 
hours  it  would  have  been  fatal  to  that  wing,  and  put  a  disas- 
trous period  to  the  campaign ;  for  Sumner  could  not  have 
crossed,  and  the  two  corps  assailed  would  have  been  crushed 
without  his  aid.  Man  cannot  control  the  elements,  indeed, 
and  man,  perhaps,  could  not  foresee  this  inundation ;  but 
every  delay,  in  military  affairs,  is  a  risfc,  and  such  proved  to 
be  the  risks  which  this  needless  delay  involved — a  delay 
voluntarily  incurred  in  a  false  and  dangerous  position. 

The  promptness  of  Sumner,  and  the  intelligent  foresight 
he  displayed,  enabled  him  to  reach  the  field,  and  to  turn 
defeat  into  victory.  His  columns  were  formed  and  their 
heads  pushed  up  to  the  bridges,  that,  when  the  expected 
order  should  come,  he  might  be  at  once  in  motion.  There- 
after the  battles  which  ensued  took  the  usual  course.  Gen. 
Sumner,  the  highest  officer  of  the  army  next  to  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan, arrived  late  in  the  day,  with  a  part  of  his  corps,  to 


28  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

meet  the  enemy  on  ground  he  had  never  seen — to  aid  another 
body  of  troops  the  positions  of  which  he  knew  nothing  of. 
Rightfully,  after  his  arrival,  he  commanded  on  the  battle- 
field, but  neither  he  nor  Gen.  Heintzelman  encountered  each 
other,  nor  could  act  with  intelligent  reference  to  each  other's 
position.  No  supreme  head,  knowing  the  whole  ground, 
gave  unity  to  action  or  coherence  to  the  masses.  On  the 
second  day,  indeed,  Gen.  McClellan,  when  the  serious  work 
of  the  day  was  ended,-  made  his  appearance.  (9) 

The  enemy  being  finally  repulsed,  at  an  early  hour  on 
Sunday,  (June  1st,)  the  "  only  available  means"  of  uniting 
our  forces  at  Fair  Oaks  for  an  advance  on  Richmond,  and 
thus  to  obtain  some  results  from  our  victory,  was  not  to 
march  them  twenty-three  miles,  as  described  p.  112,  (a  con- 
siderable exaggeration  of  the  necessary  average  march  of  the 
army  by  the  route  described,)  but  to  move  a  force  from  Sum- 
ner's  command  to  take  possession  of  the  heights  near  Gar- 
nett's  and  Mrs.  Price's  houses,  and  then  to  bring  over  our 
right  wing  by  the  New  Bridge,  (actually  made  and  passable 
for  troops  and  artillery  at  8.15  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of 
June  1st.)  A  single  division  could  have  cleared  those 
heights. 

Gen.  McClellan  states,  (p.  113:)  "In  short,  the  idea  of 
uniting  the  two  wings  of  the  army  in  time  to  make  a  vig- 
orous pursuit  of  the  enemy,  with  the  prospect  of  overtaking 
him  before  he  reached  Richmond,  only  five  miles  dis- 
tant from  the  field  of  battle,  is  simply  absurd,  and  was,  I 
presume,  never  for  a  moment  seriously  entertained  by  any 
one  connected  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  (9£) 

An  ingenious  evasion  of  the  real  point  at  issue.  It  was 
not  to  "  overtake  the  enemy  before  he  reached  Richmond," 
but  to  follow  him  up  into  Richmond,  that  constituted  a 
"  taking  advantage"  of  the  victory  of  "  Fair  Oaks."  That 
we  might  have  entered  Richmond,  all  the  information  since 
obtained  goes  to  prove.  Wm.  Henry  Hurlbert  says :  "  The 
roads  into  Richmond  were  literally  crowded  with  stragglers, 
some  throwing  away  their  guns,  some  breaking  them  on  the 
trees — all  with  the  same  story,  that  their  regiments  had  been 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  29 

'  cut  to  pieces ;'  that  the  '  Yankees  were  swarming  on  the 
Chickahominy  like  "bees,'  and  'fighting  like  devils.'  In  two 
days  of  the  succeeding  week  the  provost-marshal's  guards 
collected  between  4,000  and  5,000  stragglers  and  sent  them 
into  camp.  "What  had  become  of  the  command  no  one 
knew." 

Gen.  Heintzelman  states  that,  "  after  the  enemy  retired, 
he  gave  orders  to  pursue  them ;"  that  he  "  countermanded" 
the  order  on  Sunday,  in  consequence  of  Gen.  Kearney's  sug- 
gestion and  allegation  that  "  Gen.  McClellan  would  order  a 
general  advance  in  two  or  three  days."  The  next  morning, 
on  learning  that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  in  great  confu- 
sion, he  sent  his  troops  "  forward,  and  they  got  within  about 
four  miles  of  Richmond ;"  but,  on  sending  word  of  it  to 
Gen.  McClellan,  he  was  ordered  to  "  stop  and  fall  back  to 
the  old  lines." 

Gen.  Sumner  testifies :  "  If  we  had  attacked  with  our 
whole  force,  we  should  have  swept  everything  before  us;" 
and  "  I  think  the  majority  of  the  officers  who  were  there 
think  so  now." 

Gen.  Keyes  testifies :  "  After  the  battle  of  Seven  Pines 
there  was  another  time  when  I  think,  if  the  army  had 
pressed  on  after  the  enemy  with  great  vigor,  we  should  have 
gone  to  Richmond ;  and,  in  connection  with  this  last,  I  am 
compelled  to  state  that- 1  think  Gen.  McClellan  does  not 
excel  in  that  quality  which  enables  him  to  know  when  to 
spring." 

We  have,  thus  positively,  the  opinions  of  the  commanders 
of  the  three  corps  engaged  in  the  battle. 

The  Prince  de  Joinville  says:  "Some  persons  thought, 
and  iliiiik  still,  that  if,  instead  of  Sumner  alone,  all  the  divi- 
sions of  the  right  wing  had  been  ordered  to  cross  the  river, 
the  order  would  have  been  executed.  It  is  easy  to  see  what 
must  have  happened. if,  instead  of  15,000,  50,000  men  had 
been  thrown  upon  Johnston's  flank.  But  Simmer's  bridge, 
no  doubt,  would  not  have  sufficed  for  the  passage  of  such  a 
force.  At  midnight  the  rear  of  his  column  was  still  strug- 
gling slowly  to  cross  this  rude  structure,  against  all  the  diffi- 


30  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

\ 

culties  of  a  roadway  formed  of  trunks,  which  slipped  and 
rolled  under  the  horses'  feet,  of  a  muddy  morass  at  either 
end,  and  of  a  pitchy  dark  night  rendere'd  darker  still  by  the 
density  of  the  forest.  But  several  other  bridges  were  ready 
to  be  thrown  across  at  other  points.  Not  a  moment  should 
have  been  lost  in  fixing  them,  and  no  regard  should  have 
been  paid  to  the  efforts  of  the  enemy  to  prevent  this  from 
being  done.  Johnston  had  paraded  a  brigade  ostentatiously, 
as  a  sort  of  scarecrow,  at  the  points  which  were  most  fitting 
for  this  enterprise  •  ~but  the  stake  was  so  vast,  the  result  to  be 
sought  after  so  important,  the  occasion  so  unexpected  and  so 
favorable  for  striking  a  decisive  blow,  that  in  our  judgment 
nothing  should  have  prevented  the  army  from  attempting 
this  operation  at  every  risk.  Here  again  it  paid  the  penalty 
of  that  American  tardiness  which  is  more  marked  in  the 
character  of  the  army  than  in  that  of  its  leader.  It  was  not 
till  seven  in  the  evening  that  the  resolution  was  taken  of 
throwing  over  all  the  bridges,  and  passing  the  whole  army 
over  by  daybreak  to  the  right  bank.  It  was  too  late !" 

The  Prince  here  labors  under  that  excusable  confusion  of 
ideas  wrhich  arises  from  an  amiable  unwillingness  to  carry 
his  own  convictions  to  a  logical  conclusion.  "  It  was  not  till 
seven  in  the  evening  that  the  resolution  was  taken"  &c. 
NoWj  the  army  had  been  waiting  for  several  days  for  that 
"  resolution"  to  be  taken.  The  moment  it  was  taken  the 
bridge  building  commenced.  The  rising  flood  and  the  dark- 
ness of  the  night  interfered  with  any  progress  till  daylight 
dawned ;  but  at  eight  o'clock  the  next  morning  one  bridge 
was  finished,  and  the  passage  practicable  for  all  arms ; 
during  the  day  two  other  passages  became  practicable  for 
infantry.  So  far  from  being  too  late,  the  bridges  were 
ready  just  in  time. 

The  Prince  further  says :  "  What  might  not  have  hap- 
pened, if  at  this  moment  the  35,000  fresh  troops  on  the 
other  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  could  have  appeared  upon 
the  flank  of  this  disordered  army,  after  passing  the  bridges 
in  safety !"  « 

Gen.  Barnard  states  (p.  23  of  his  "Report")  that  "at  8.15 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  31 

A.  M.  (June  1st)  the  pontoon  bridge  at  the  site  of  New 
Bridge  was  complete  and  practicable  for  infantry,  cavalry 
and  artillery.  About  noon  the  '  upper  trestle  bridge'  was 
practicable  for  infantry.  It  was  not  till  night  that  a  practi- 
cable bridge  for  infantry  was  obtained  at  the  '  lower  trestle 
bridge.' ';  He  adds  that,  owing  to  the  overflowed  condition 
of  the  bottom  lands,  the  two  last  bridges  could  not  be  made 
practicable  for  "  cavalry  or  artillery"  without  extensive  cor- 
duroying. He  further  remarks :  "  There  was  one  way, 
however,  to  unite  the  army  on  the  other  side;  it  was  to 
take  advantage  of  a  victory  at  Fair  Oaks,  to  sweep  at  once 
the  enemy  from  his  position  opposite  New  Bridge,  and  simul- 
taneously to  bring  over,  by  the  New  Bridge,"  (with  which, 
we  remark,  a  raised  turnpike  communicated,)  "  our  troops 
of  the  right  wing,  which  could  then  have  met  with  little  or 
no  resistance." 

"  Our  first  bridges  carried  off  or  rendered  impassable," 
(alluded  to  p.  100,)  were  the  two  bridges  made  by  Gen. 
Sumner,  which  were  too  remote  to  have  ever  been  counted 
on  for  the  close  connection  of  the  parts  of  the  army.  JVb 
bridges,  thus  designed  or  commenced,  were  ever  carried 
away,  for  none  were  commenced  before  the  flood  occurred. 
Bottom's  Bridge,  it  is  true,  became  "  impassable,"  but  this 
was  never  counted  on  for  movements  of  troops,  being  too 
remote.  The  railroad  bridge  continued  passable,  and  sup- 
plied our  army,  and  by  its  means  also  infantry,  in  unlimited 
numbers,  could  pass. 

The  true  statement  of  the  case  is,  that  the  favorable  time 
for  forcing  a  passage  at  the  "  New  Bridge"  (by  far  the  best 
crossing  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  one  which  no  inundation 
could  seriously  impair,)  having  been  trifled  away,  as  has  been 
already  shown,  and  the  opportunity  of  seizing  this  passage 
which  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  offered  having  been  lost,  then 
the  heavy  labors  of  bridge  building  commenced,  and  the 
inundated  condition  of  the  swamp  necessitated  the  laborious 
and  extensive  structures  called  "Woodbury  and  Alexan- 
der's" and  "  Duane's"  bridges,  besides  two  or  three  foot 
bridges,  which  required  little  labor.  Then,  too,  in  prose- 


32  THE   PENINSULAS   CAMPAIGN 

cuting  the  "  upper"  and  "  lower  trestle  bridge"  corduroys, 
"  our  men  were  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire,"  and  as  it  is 
impossible  to  lay  heavy  corduroy  roads  under  fire,  they  were 
abandoned  and  never  became  available. 

We  have  passed  through  one  crisis,  and  have  shown  that 
it  was  invited  by  the  dispositions  of  Gen.  McClellan,  by 
which  our  army  was  permitted  to  be  for  a  whole  week  divi- 
ded into  two  distinct  portions,  entirely  isolated.  (10)  This 
arrangement  took  place  at  a  moment  when  Gen.  McClellan 
avows  his  belief  that  the  enemy's  numbers  "  greatly  exceed 
our  own,"  and  that  he  has  every  reason  to  expect  desperate 
work.  (p.  98.)  The  weaker  of  the  two  isolated  portions  was 
thrust  forward  to  within  seven  miles  of  Richmond,  with  no 
obstacle  whatever  between  it  and  the  enemy's  superior  forces, 
on  ground  that  had  no  natural  strength,  and  to  which  little 
artificial  strength  could  be  given,  under  the  circumstances. 
The  position,  too,  in  which  our  troops  were  thus  risked  was 
never  seen  by  the  commanding  General  until  after  the  battle 
of  Fair  Oaks. 

The  weakness  of  the  enemy,  combined  with  his  blunders, 
alone  saved  us.  Gen.  McClellan  did  not  believe  in  his 
weakness — he  had  no  right  to  count  on  his  blunders.  Such 
is  the  generalship  which  can  do  nothing  "  rapid  or  brilliant," 
owing  to  alleged  numerical  weakness,  but  which,  in  delay, 
hesitation  and  uncertainty,  incurs  risks  such  as  the  rashest 
of  daring  and  energetic  generals  seldom  encounter.  (11) 

The  failure  of  the  enemy  to  crush  our  left  wing,  though 
he  unquestionably  exerted  his  whole  strength  to  do  it,  might 
well  shake  Gen.  McClellan's  credulity  with  regard  to  his 
"superior  numbers,"  and  authorize  his  otherwise  illogical 
statement  (see  telegram,  June  7th,  p.  115)  that  he  should  be 
"  in  perfect  readiness"  to  move  forward  and  "  take  Rich- 
mond the  moment  McCall  reaches  here  and  the  ground  will 
admit  the  passage  of  artillery."  With  "  superior  numbers" 
of  the  enemy  and  "  strong  works"  around  Richmond,  it  is 
astonishing  with  what  facility  he  is  always  "  taking  Rich- 
mond"— in  his  dispatches  ! » 

Again,  (June   10th,)  though  he    has    information   that 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  33 

"  Beauregard  has  arrived,"  and  "  some  of  his  troops  are  to 
follow  him,"  he  announces,  "  I  shall  attack  as  soon  as  the 
weather  and  ground  will  permit ;"  and  he  reiterates  in  the 
same  dispatch,  lest  he  should  not  be  understood  or  believed, 
"  I  wish  to  be  distinctly  understood  that  whenever  the  wea- 
ther permits,  I  will  attack  with  whatever  force  I  may  have," 
&c.  (p.  116.) 

McCall  arrived  on  the  12th  and  13th.  The  rains  of  the 
early  part  of  the  month  slackened  as  the  month  advanced, 
so  that  on  the  14th  the  General  announces  "  weather  now 
very  favorable."  The  ground  grew  firmer  as  the  June  sun 
continued  to  act  upon  it,  and  by  the  20th  artillery  could  op- 
erate with  facility.  On  this  date  the  General  telegraphs 
that  he  has  "  no  doubt  Jackson  has  been  reinforced  from 
here."  Now,  then,  is  the  time  to  "  move  forward"  and  to 
"  take  Richmond."  But,  instead  of  "  perfect  readiness,"  we 
hear  the  "  difficulties  of  the  country"  expatiated  upon — we 
learn  that  "  by  to-morrow  night"  certain  defensive  works 
will  be  finished — that  the  construction  of  these  "  defensive 
works"  is  rendered  necessary  by  his  "  inferiority  of  num- 
bers," so  that  he  can  bring  the  "  greatest  possible  numbers 
into  action,"  &c.,  &c.  Instead  of  "  attacking  with  whatever 
force  he  has" — instead  of  "perfect  readiness"  to  act,  (though 
he  learns  the  enemy  has  been  reduced  by  detachments,)  he 
is  waiting  for  "  defensive  works ;"  and,  instead  of  "  taking 
Richmond,"  or  doing  anything  towards  it,  he  "  would  be 
glad  to  have  permission  to  lay  before  the  President,  by  letter 
or  telegraph,  his  views  as  to  the  present  state  of  military 
affairs  throughout  the  whole  country"  ! 

Bear  in  mind  that,  two  months  before,  Gen.  McClellan 
had  been  relieved  from  a  position  which  made  the  expression 
of  such  views  a  part  of  his  official  duty ;  and  now,  after 
having  been  so  relieved,  at  such  a  moment  as  this,  when  the 
President  is  eagerly  scanning  each  telegram  to  know  if  the 
army  has  really  "  advanced"  and  "  taken  Richmond,"  he  is 
astounded  to  find  only  an  offer  of  "  views"  on  the  "  present 
state  of  military  affairs  throughout  the  whole  country," 
coupled  with  a  modest  request  to  know  "  the  numbers  and 


34  THE   PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN 

positions  of  the  troops  not  under  his  command  in  Virginia 
or  elsewhere."'  In  other  words.  Gen.  McClellan,  at  a  mo- 
ment so  critical  to  himself,  and  under  circumstances  which 
should  concentrate  all  his  thoughts  upon  the  work  imme- 
ately  in  hand,  asks  to  be  informed  of  the  numbers  and  posi- 
tions of  all  the  troops  of  the  United  States ! 

So  neither  McCalPs  arrival  nor  fine  weather  constituted 
"  perfect  readiness  to  advance."  All  the  "  eleven"  bridges 
are  finished — even  the  "  defensive  works"  will  be  ready  "  by 
to-morrow  night  (viz.,  June  21st) — and  yet  he  does  not 
"move  forward." 

Here  is  something,  at  least,  that  ought  to  start  him. 
Thus  far  "  all  the  information  previous  to  June  24th,"  &c., 
(p.  119)  induced  the  belief  that  Jackson  was  at  Gordonsville, 
receiving  reinforcements  from  Richmond.  Now  (June  24th) 
Gen.  McClellan  learns  that  Jackson  was  moving  to  Fred- 
ericshall  with  his  own  troops  and  all  those  "reinforce- 
ments" that  had  gone  to  him,  for  the  purpose  of  "  attacking 
my  rear  on  the  28th." 

Surely  now  is  the  time,  if  ever,  to  "  move  forward ;"  in 
two  or  three  days  the  enemy  will  receive  heavy  re-inforce- 
ments.  So,  at  last,  on  the  25th,  our  bridges  and  intrench- 
ments  being  "  at  last  completed,"  (N.  B.  The  bridges  were 
all  completed  by  the  19th,  the  "  defensive  works  "  were  an- 
nounced June  20th,  as  to  be  completed  to-morrow  night," 
viz.,  June  21st,  and,  we  remark,  they  were  ready  enough  at 
any  time  for  an  advance,)  something  is  really  to  be  done. 
The  reader  holds  his  breath  to  know  what  is  to  follow — it  is, 
"  an  advance  of  our  picket  lines  of  the  left  PREPARATORY  to  a 
general  forward  movement."  One  would  think  that  the  art 
of  "  preparation  "  had  been  exhausted,  but  if  so  simple  as  to 
believe  that  the  time  for  preparing  to  do  a  thing  ever  ends, 
and  the  time  of  executing  it  ever  commences,  his  military 
education  could  not  have  been  acquired  under  Maj.-Gen. 
McClellan.  This  preparatory  operation  at  any  rate  must  be 
the  last.  But  alas  !  though  "  successful  in  what  we  have 
undertaken,"  the  courage  which,  in  the  morning  was  screwed 
up  to  order  "  an  advance  of  our  picket  line  of  the  left,  pre- 


AND   ITS    ANTECEDENTS.  35 

paratory  to  a  general  forward  movement,"  has  all  oozed  out 
by  "6.15  P.  M."  "Several  contrabands,"  (we  hope  they 
were  intelligent !  !)  "just  in,"  announce  that  "  Jackson's  ad- 
vance is  at  or  near  Hanover  C.  II. ;"  that  the  perpetual  bug- 
bear, Beauregard,  "  had  arrived,"  and  that  the  rebel  "  force 
is  stated  at  200,000  men,  including  Jackson  and  Beaure- 
gard."* 

The  "general  forward  movement"  of  the  morning  is 
totally  forgotten  after  the  interview  with  these  "  contrabands," 
and  we  have  this  feeble  announcement :  "  But  this  army  will 
do  all  in  the  power  of  men  to  hold  their  position  and  repulse 
any  attack.'1''  Regretting  his  "  inferiority  of  numbers,"  for 
which  he  is  not  "  responsible,"  he  "  will  do  all  that  he  can  do 
with  the  splendid  army  he  has  the  honor  to  command," 
(Oh,  that  in  such  a  moment  surely  every  reader  will  aspirate 
such  an  army  had  but  a  leader,}  and  if  destroyed  by  "  over- 
whelming numbers  "  "  can  at  least  die  with  it  and  share  its 
fate."  For  once,  however,  he  feels  that  "  there  is  no  use  in 
again  asking  for  reinforcements." 

Thus  in  the  morning  we  are  treated  with  a  grand  "  pre- 
paratory movement,"  (what  the  particular  necessity  of  losing 
a  whole  day,  when  time  was  so  precious,  in  this  absurd  man- 
ner, the  uninitiated  can  scarcely  comprehend,)  for  a  "  gene- 
ral advance,"  and  by  sunset  we  have  this  feeble  wail  of  de- 
spair. Does  any  one  believe  that  any  such  sudden  and  por- 
tentous change  had  come  over  the  state  of  affairs,  as  would 

O  * 

justify  such  a  change  in  the  spirit  of  the  General,  or  that  the 
tales  of  "  several  contrabands  "  could  so  completely  turn  the 
tables  ?  If  he  does  not  believe  this,  then  the  alternative  is 
to  believe  the  Report  which  contains  such  statements  to  be  a 
mere  veil — transparently  thin — with  painful  labor,  drawn 
over  the  writer's  conscious  ignorance  of  his  own  plans,  inten- 
tions or  situation. 

He  goes  on  to  say,  (p.  122,)  "  on  the  26th,  the  day  upon 
which  / had  decided  as  the  time  of  our  final  advance"  (it 

*  As  early  as  June  10th  the  General  has  "  information  that  Beauregard  had 
arrived,"  and  "that  some  of  his  troops  were  to  follow  him."  The  "contra- 
bands "  bring  no  news  after  all.  (See  p.  33,  ante.) 


36  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

has  already  been  at  least  six  days  since  the  whole  category 
of  conditions  for  moving  forward  and  taking  Richmond  has 
been  fulfilled,  and  six  days  since  an  additional  condition 
turned  up  in  his  favor — the  reinforcing  of  Jackson  at  Gor- 
donsville,  from  Richmond/ — it  has  been  two  days  since  he 
learned  that  the  powerful  corps  of  Jackson,  thus  reinforced, 
was  but  two  or  three  days  march  off,  on  his  way  to  join  Lee,) 
"  the  enemy  attacked  our  right  in  force,  and  turned  my  at- 
tention to  the  protection  of  our  communications  and  depots 
of  supply  /"  both  of  which,  by  the  by,  were  lost,  and  were 
expected  to  be  lost,  since  he  telegraphs  the  Secretary  of  War 
"  not  to  be  discouraged  if  you  learn  that  my  communications 
are  cut  off  and  even  Yorktown  in  possession  of  the  enemy" 

Now,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Jackson's  main  body 
was  yet  a  full  day's  march  off.  It  was  noon  on  the  26th, 
(p.  124,)  before  the  enemy  was  discovered  to  be  in  motion, 
and  3  P.  M.,  (p.  125,)  before  he  had  "formed  his  line  of  bat- 
tle "  to  attack  McCall,  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  The  troops 
which  attacked  on  the  26th  were  not  Jackson's,  but  a  part 
of  the  very  force  Gen.  McClellan  was' to  have  attacked  him- 
self. Thus  we  learn  the  curious  and  astonishing  fact  that 
the  "  general  forward  movement,"  or,  as  styled,  p.  122,  "  our 
final  advance  decided  upon  for  that  day,"  was  postponed  and 
abandoned  in  consequence  of  an  attack  of  the  enemy's  which 
took  place  at  3  P.  M.  of  the  same  day  ! 

Now  if  the  case  was  really  hopeless,  we  would  fold  our 
hands  in  resignation,  only  asking  why  the  conclusion  was  not 
arrived  at  three  weeks  earlier ;  for  we  affirm  that  nothing 
happened  up  to  the  26th  to  make  a  "  moving  forward  and 
taking  Richmond  "  more  impracticable  than  when  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan, (on  the  7th,)  announced  that  he  should  be  "  in  per- 
fect readiness  "  when  McCall  arrived  and  the  ground  dried — 
conditions  all  fulfilled  as  early  as  the  20th.  (12)  Even  to  the 
25th  nothing  that  has  occurred  has  daunted  the  ostensible 
determination  to  "advance  and  take  Richmond,"  and  a 
grand  "preparatory"  movement  to  a  "general  forward 
movement "  was  ordered.  But  man  cannot  control  events, 
and  who  could  forbode  that,  almost  simultaneously  with  the 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  37 

order  for  "  an  advance  of  our  picket  line  of  the  left  prepara- 
tory, &c.,  &c.,"  several  contrabands  would  be  on  their  way 
with  tidings  of  Beauregard  and  Jackson !  that  a  "  final  ad- 
vance "  for  to-morrow,  (the  26th,)  will  be  utterly  frustrated 
by  a  counter  advance  made  by  a  disobliging  enemy  at  3 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day  ! 

Truly  "  the  case  is  a  difficult  one,"  but  we  need  not  lose 
hope,  for  the  General  will  do  his  best  to  "  out-manoeuver, 
out-wit  and  out-fight  the  enemy." 

With  an  army  of  100,000  men  present  for  duty — an  enemy 
divided  into  two  portions,  even  if  "  greatly  superior  in  num- 
ber," we  would  fancy  something  might  be  done,  even  had  we 
not  this  voluntary  pledge  of  brilliant  generalship.  Indeed  it 
has  been  our  notion  that  these  were  just  the  circumstances 
that  called  for  energetic  action — a  prompt  and  bold  initiative 
on  the  part  of  a  general. 

Admitting  that  the  enemy  really  numbered,  (as  is  stated 
on  the  authority  of  the  "  secret  service,")  180,000  men,  and 
admitting  that  the  "  advance  "  on  Richmond  had  ceased  to 
be  practicable,  and  that  a  retreat  to  the  James  River  had 
become  the  best  course,  why  amuse  us  in  this  official  Report 
of  past  events  with  the  pretence,  kept  up  till  the  25th,  nay, 
to  the  26th,  of  a  "general  forward  movement?"  Such  a 
movement  was  surely  more  practicable  while  Jackson  was  at 
Gordonsville,  or  even  when  only  three  marches  off,  than 
when  he  arrived.  Why,  if  really  intended,  was  it  not  made  ? 

In  view  of  a  retreat  to  the  James  River  it  was  wise  to  hold 
the  position  at  Beaver  Dam  on  the  26th.  All  Porter's  baggage 
train  might  have  been,  (and  we  believe  was,)  brought  over 
on  that  day.  So  might  have  been  the  "  siege  guns."  It  was 
a  blunder  unparallelled  to  expose  Porter's  corps  to  fight  a 
battle  by  itself  on  the  27th  against  overwhelming  forces  of 
the  enemy.  With  perfect  ease  that  corps  might  have  been 
brought  over  on  the  night  of  the  26th,  and,  if  nothing  more 
brilliant  could  have  been  thought  of,  the  movement  to  the 
James  might  have  been  in  full  tide  of  execution  on  the  27th. 
A  more  propitious  moment  could  not  have  been  chosen,  for, 
besides  Jackson's  own  forces,  A.  P.  Hill's  and  Longstreet's 


38  THE   PENINSTTLAK   CAMPAIGN 

corps  were  on  the  south  (left)  bank  of  the  Chick  ahominy  on 
the  night  of  the  26th.  Such  a  movement  need  not  have 
been  discovered  to  the  enemy  till  far  enough  advanced  to  in- 
sure success.  At  any  rate  he  could  have  done  no  better  in 
preventing  it  than  he  actually  did  afterwards.  The  Prince 
de  Joinville,  conceding  the  necessity  of  the  movement  says, 
" there  was  a  vast  difference  between  making  this  retreat" 
(styling  it  very  properly  what  it  was,)  "  in  one's  own  time  and 
by  a  free,  spontaneous  movement,  and  making  it  hastily 
under  the  threatening  pressure  of  two  hostile  armies ;"  and 
surely  the  difference  became  vaster  when,  instead  of  being 
made  merely  under  pressure,  it  became  the  necessary  result 
of  a  decided  defeat. 

But  the  enemy  had  no  such  numbers,  nor  was  the  case 
so  hopeless.  The  "  secret  service,"  which  reported  the  in- 
credible number  of  100,000  men  under  Johnston,  at  Manas- 
sas,  is  authority  for  the  180,000  now  massed  against  Gen. 
McClellan ;  but  it  also  reports  the  force  made  up  of  two 
hundred  battalions  of  infantry  and  cavalry  and  eight  battal- 
ions of  "  independent  troops,"  five  battalions  of  artillery  and 
some  fragmentary  bodies.  Now,  500  men  to  a  battalion  was 
a  full  estimate,  and  so  recognized  by  the  "  secret  service." 
Out  of  the  organizations  enumerated  it  would,  therefore,  be 
hard  to  make  a  total  of  more  than  110,000  or  115,000  men, 
while  our  own  aggregate  (sick  and  well)  is  given  by  Gen. 
McClellan  (p.  11)  at  117,000.  Wm.  Henry  Hurlbert,  who 
had  been  in  Richmond  throughout  the  campaign,  and  had 
had  excellent  opportunities  of  judging,  gives  his  opinion 
that  Lee's  army  numbered  90,000,  and  Jackson's,  30,000, 
making  120,000  in  all.  Mr.  Hurlbert  also  says :  "  Yery 
few,  if  any,  of  his*  (Beauregard's)  troops  were  in  Virginia." 
In  other  words,  he  knew  of  none  at  all,  and  there  has  never 
been  furnished  a  particle  of  proof  that  a  single  man  of 
Beauregard's  army  was  there. 

But  even  Mr.  Hurlbert's  estimate  is  largely  in  excess. 
The  divisions  of  Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill  and  D.  H.  Hill,  and 
the  corps  of  Jackson,  were,  as  we  know,  engaged  in  the 
action  with  Porter  on  the  27th,  and  this  force  has  been  esti- 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS. 


39 


mated  from  60,000  to  70,000  men.  The  Eichmond  papers 
of  that  date,  describing  the  battle,  stated  it  at  65,000  men, 
and  the  probability  is  that  it  did  not  vary  much  from  that. 
The  enemy  made  his  effort  upon  our  right  under  Porter,  and 
naturally  concentrated  against  it  all  the  troops  he  could 
spare,  while  keeping  up  a  show  of  force  about  Richmond. 
Independently  of  such  an  inference,  we  have  the  fact  that 
Gen.  Magruder,  in  his  official  report,  describes  the  situation 
of  the  rebel  forces  left  on  the  Eichmond  side  as  "  one  of  the 
gravest  peril,"  and  states  that  "  there  were  but  25,000  men 
between  McClellan's  army  of  100,000  men  and  Eichmond." 
(13)  The  same  Eichmond  paper  which,  a  few  days  after  the 
battles,  mentioned  the  amount  of  Confederate  force  (as 
above  stated)  engaged  with  Porter,  speculated  upon  what 
might  have  happened  had  McClellan  on  the  27th  attacked 
Richmond.  The  rebel  Gen.  Stuart,  in  an  interview  with  a 
distinguished  officer  of  our  army  which  occurred  a  few 
weeks  after  these  events,  pledged  his  honor  that  the  Confed- 
erate force  did  not  exceed  90,000  men.  That  he  knew  what 
that  force  \vas  is  certain,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  he  would 
tell  a  gratuitous  falsehood.  Nothing  that  occurred  in  any 
of  the  encounters  during  the  seven  days,  or  afterwards, 
warrants  the  belief  that  the  Confederate  army  exceeded 
that  number.  The  very  same  corps  and  divisions  which,  on 
the  left  of  the  Chickahominy,  fought  Porter  at  Games' 
Mill,  turn  up,  with  Magruder  and  Huger  alone  added,  at  the 
fierce  and  momentous  combats  of  Glendale  and  Malvern  Hill. 
Conceding,  however,  to  Gen.  McClellan  an  adversary 
which  his  "  secret  service,"  aided  by  "  several  contrabands," 
had  conjured  up,  the  passive  inactivity  with  which  he  met 
this  crisis  forfeits  for  him  every  claim  to  generalship  even  of 
the  most  indifferent  character.  With  an  enemy  180,000 
strong,  divided  into  two  distinct  portions,  we  believe  that 
there  might  have  been  found  some  way  of  displaying  gen- 
eralship ;  at  least,  with  intrenchments  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy  which  20,000  men  could  have  held 
against  100,000,  he  need  not  have  permitted  one-third  of  his 
army  to  be  defeated  on  the  other  bank,  within  sight  and 


40  THE   PENINSULAS   CAMPAIGN 

cannon  range  of  the  other  two-thirds.  But,  considering  the 
real  strength  of  his  enemy,  (as  we  believe  it  to  have  been,)  a 
more  lamentable  failure  to  fulfill  "  hopes  formerly  placed  in 
him,"  a  more  striking  instance,  not  so  much  of  being  "  out- 
witted" as  of  destitution  of  "  wit,"  and  of  unreadiness  in 
action,  is  scarcely  to  be  found  in  military  annals. 

The  enemy  having  been  checked  at  Beaver  Dam  Creek  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  no  time  should  have  been  lost  in 
withdrawing  from  this  position  and  in  bringing  Porter  over 
the  Chickahominy,  as  could  have  been  done  with  the  great- 
est ease  the  night  of  the  26th.  If  it  had  been  determined, 
however,  to  fight  on  that  side,  he  should  have  been  with- 
drawn in  the  night  to  the  position  selected,  and  at  the  same 
time  reinforced  with  the  whole  of  our  wgkkwing,  except 
20,000  men  to  hold  the  intrenchments  and  Bottom's  Bridge, 
and  to  guard  the  passages  of  the  White  Oak  Swamp.  Thirty 
or  forty  thousand  men  should  have  been  sent  over  to 
Porter.  (14) 

Gen.  McCall,  who  commanded  the  force  at  Beaver  Dam 
Creek  which  received  the  rebel  attack  under  A.  P.  Hill  on 
the  26th,  says,  in  reference  to  the  order  to  withdraw :  "  This 
order,  I  confess,  gave  me  some  concern.  Had  it  reached  me 
at  midnight,  the  movement  might  have  been  made  without 
difficulty  and  without  loss ;  but  now  it  would  be  daylight 
before  the  movement  which,  under  fire,  is  one  of  the  most 
delicate  and  difficult  in  the  art  of  war,  could  be  com- 
menced." 

The  movement,  ordered  at  nightfall  of  the  2(5th,  could 
have  been  executed  without  risk  or  damage.  Delayed  till 
morning,  it  involved  the  risk  of  the  utter  destruction  of 
Porter's  corps  of  27,000  men.  ISTot  a  slight  risk  merely, 
such  as  we  must  constantly  incur  in  making  war,  but  a  seri- 
ous risk,  and,  moreover,  a  totally  unnecessary  one.  Porter 
acknowledged  his  hesitation  to  give  the  order  for  withdraw- 
ing his  force,  and  even  seemed,  when  morning  came,  inclined 
to  suspend  it,  alleging  the  fear  that  McCall's  division  would 
be  cut  to  pieces.  Not  only  HcCall's  division,  but  Porter's 
whole  command,  were  in  fearful  risk  of  being  "  cut  to 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  41 

pieces"  or  captured,  by  being  where  they  were  that  morning 
of  the  27th,  as  we  shall  show. 

Gen.  Stoneman,  with  a  small  command  of  infantry  and 
cavalry,  had  been  sent  towards  "  Old  Church"  to  obstruct 
roads,  destroy  bridges,  and  prevent,  as  far  as  possible,  Porter's 
right  from  being  turned.  Jackson,  who,  in  marching  from 
Hanover  C.  II.,  kept  well  towards  the  Pamunkey,  with  the 
obvious  intention  of  turning  Porter's  right,  on  coming  in 
sight  of  Stoneman's  troops  near  "  Old  Church,"  bore  off 
towards  Mechanicsville.  His  troops  filed  past  in  full  view 
of  Stoneman  from  4  P.  M.  till  after  dark,  and  were  estima- 
ted by  him  at  35,000  strong.  (Jackson  now  had,  besides  his 
own  troops,  those  "  reinforcements"  which  we  have  seen 
were  sent  a  week  or  two  ago,  out  of  Richmond,  to  join  him.) 
Let  us  suppose  that  Jackson,  instead  of  being  diverted  from 
his  course  by  the  handful  of  troops  of  Stoneman,  (and  it  is 
astonishing  that  he  should  have  been,)  had  kept  on  towards 
Cold  Harbor.  Porter's  case  would  have  been  hopeless. 

He  bore  off  towards  Mechanicsville,  and  encamped  some- 
where near  Shady  Grove  Church.  Had  he  put  his  troops  in 
motion  before  dawn  and  marched  parallel  to  Porter's  line 
of  retreat,  he  could  have  attacked  his  retiring  columns  and 
rendered  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  him  to  reach  the  po- 
sition where  he  actually  gave  battle.  Finally,  that  the  force 
of  Porter  was  not  utterly  destroyed  by  its  defeat,  is  due 
simply  to  the  fact  (not  to  have  been  expected)  that  the 
enemy  did  not  commence  his  attack  till  3^  P.  M.,  and  did 
not  accomplish  his  victory  until  after  nightfall.  These,  it 
may  be  urged,  were  risks  incidental  to  war ;  but  they  were 
risks  of  the  gravest  character,  and  we  are  unable  to  see  what 
equivalent  risks  (rather  than  positive  advantages)  would 
have  attended  the  withdrawal  of  Porter  the  night  of  the  26th. 

Gen.  McClellan  announces  that  "  the  object  we  sought  for 
had  been  obtained."  "  The  enemy  was  held  at  bay."  (But 
why  incur  a  disastrous  defeat  to  hold  him  "at  bay"  in  a  po- 
sition where  he  could  not  attack  us  unless  we  chose  to  be 
attacked.)  "  Our  siege  guns  and  materials  were  .saved." 
(Everything  was  brought  over  on  the  26th  except  the  siege 


42  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

guns,  and  they  might  have  been,)  "  and  the  right  wing  now 
joined  the  main  body  of  the  army,"  (which  it  might  have 
done  the  night  of  the  26th.") 

Per  contra,  we  lost  twenty-two  guns  "  captured  by  the 
enemy,"  (better  have  abandoned  and  spiked  the  "  siege  artil- 
lery "  than  to  have  lost  in  battle  twenty  two  guns.)  "We  lost 
in  killed  and  wounded  9,000  men,  when  Porter  might  have 
been  withdrawn  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  and  we  incurred 
a  disheartening  defeat  besides.  (15) 

As  to  the  answers  of  the  corps  commanders  to  the  circular 
of  the  26th,  asking  if  they  could  spare  troops  to  reinforce 
Porter,  we  need  hardly  remark  that  when  circulars  of  this 
kind  are  sent  to  commanding  officers,  one  style  of  answer 
only  can  be  anticipated.  Each  commander,  without  precise 
knowledge  of  the  situation,  or  of  the  plans  of  the  general, 
feels  bound  to  provide  for  the  worst  possible  case.  No  one 
has  any  troops  to  spare.  It  is  for  the  commanding  general 
himself  to  decide,  in  view  of  his  own  plans,  how  many  men 
are  wanted  at  different  points,  and  with  how  many  each 
shall  be  held.  Now  it  may  be  safely  said  that  the  "  defen- 
sive works  "  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  could 
be  held  with  20,000  men  against  100,000.  They  were  built,  (as 
explained  by  Gen.  McClellan  himself,)  "  that  he  might  bring 
the  greatest  possible  numbers  into  action,"  and,  built  in  this 
view,  they  must  have  had  some  considerable  strength.  Gen. 
Barnard  describes  these  lines  as  consisting  of  six  redoubts, 
connected  by  rifle  pits  or  barricades.  These  rifle  pits  were 
in  fact  infantry  parapets,  raised  to  the  height  of  the  breast 
above  the  natural  surface,  the  ditch  or  excavation  being  on 
the  outside.  The  redoubts  were  arranged  with  embrasures 
and  had  in  several  cases  magazines  provided.  The  woods 
outside  the  lines  were  felled  and  formed,  along  the  greater 
portion,  an  obstacle  impossible  to  be  passed  under  fire  of  the 
works.  Gen.  McClellan,  in  his  brief  report  of  July  loth, 
(which  he  has  not  inserted  in  this  volume)  saw  fit  to  style 
these  defences  "slight  earthworks," — a  term  which  one 
would  apply  to  such  works  as  troops  could  throw  up  in  a 
night.  On  these  our  troops  had  been  working  for  twenty 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  43 

five  days,  and  he  himself  has  stated  the  object  of  their  con- 
struction, (p.  118,)  and  by  his  manner  of  speaking  of  them 
has  indicated  that  they  were  not  a  night's  work,  but  a  seri- 
ous labor.  (16)  Why  he  afterwards  styles  them,  dispara- 
gingly, "  slight  earthworks  "  is  very  apparent.  It  would  be 
otherwise  unintelligible  why  70,000  effective  men  lay  idle 
behind  them,  while,  within  cannon  shot,  27,000  were  under- 
going a  disastrous  defeat. 

Two  defensive  battles  have  now  been  fought  on  the  Ohick- 
ahominy,  and  Gen.  McClellan  has  either  blundered  into 
fighting  them,  or  been  compelled,  by  the  circumstances  of 
his  position,  to  fight  them,  the  first  with  about  one-half,  the 
second  with  less  than  one-third,  of  his  force ;  and  now,  (not 
a  single  offensive  action  having  occurred  during  this  invasive 
campaign,)  with  a  "  splendid  army,"  as  he  rightly  styles  it, 
he  is  forced,  though  still  superior,  or  at  least  equal  in  num- 
bers, to  "  change  his  base,"  or,  in  other  words,  to  beat  a  re- 
treat. 

He  has  spent  weeks  in  building  bridges  which  establish  a 
close  connection  between  the  wings  of  his  army,  and  then 
fights  a  great  battle  with  a  smaller  fraction  of  his  army  than 
when  he  had  a  single  available  bridge,  and  that  remote. 
He,  with  great  labor,  constructs  "  defensive  works  "  in  order 
that  he  "may  bring  the  greatest  possible  numbers  into 
action,"  and  again  exhibits  his  ability  to  utilize  his  means 
by  keeping  65,000  men  idle  behind  them,  while  35,000,  un- 
aided by  "  defensive  works  "  of  any  kind,  fight  the  bulk  of 
his  adversary's  forces,  and  are  of  course  overwhelmed  by 
"  superior  numbers." 

We  believe  there  were  few  commanding  officers  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  who  did  not  expect  to  be  led  offen- 
sively against  the  enemy  on  the  26th  or  27th.  (17)  Had 
such  a  movement  been  made  it  is  not  improbable  that,  if 
energetically  led,  we  should  have  gone  into  Richmond. 
Jackson  and  A.  P.  Hill  could  not  have  got  back  in  time  to 
succor  Magruder's  command,  if  measures  of  most  obvious 
pr9priety  had  been  taken  to  prevent  them.  "We  might  have 
beaten  or  driven  Magruder's  25,000  men  and  entered  Rich- 


44  THB   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

mond,  and  then  reinforced  by  the  great  moral  acquisition  of 
strength  this  success  would  have  given,  have  fought  Lee  and 
re-established  our  communications.  At  any  rate  something 
of  this  kind  was  worth  trying.  (18) 

The  story  of  the  campaign  is  nearly  told.  What  follows 
is  but  the  denouement.  The  retreat  to  the  James  River, 
considering  that  the  bulk  of  the  enemy  was  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Chickahominy,  and  that  he  had  a  long  march  before 
he  could  reach  our  flank,  was  not  very  difficult.  The  troops 
were  moved  judiciously,  and  were  put  in  position  at  the 
most  obvious  points ;  but  so  far  as  the  "  fighting "  is  con- 
cerned it  is  as  usual,  pellmell,  no  one  knowing  exactly  who 
and  where  his  neighbor  is,  and  what  is  worse,  no  common 
head  near  at  hand,  who  does  know  all,  to  direct  and  give 
coherence  and  unity  to  the  operations. 

On  the  30th  of  June  our  army  stretched  across  the  country 
from  "White  Oak  Swamp  bridge  to  the  James,  occupying  a 
line  about  eight  miles  long.  Franklin  held  the  right  at  the 
bridge,  Porter  and  Keyes  the  extreme  left.  Farther  than, 
midway  (five  miles  about)  from  the  James,  this  long  line  of 
battle  was  intersected  by  two,  (the  "  Charles  City  "  and  the 
"  New  Market "  or  "  Long  Bridge  ")  converging  roads.  Here 
was  the  decisive  point — if  the  line  should  be  broken  here  it 
would  be  the  destruction  of  our  army.  Here,  too,  the  enemy 
made  a  desperate  effort.  Lee  commanded  in  person,  and 
Longstreet's  and  A.  P.  Hill's  veteran  divisions,  numbering 
18  to  20,000  men,  made  the  attack.  Jeff  Davis  himself  was 
said  to  be  present.  (So  Gen.  McCall,  while  a  prisoner  that 
-evening,  was  informed).  It  was  an  eventful  day  and  an 
eventful  point ;  central,  too,  to  the  general  position  of  the 
army.  Where  was  the  Commanding  General  during  this 
battle  ?  At  the  very  extreme  left,  and  for  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  time  on  a  gunboat,  (see  p.  135,)  "  having  made 
arrangements  for  instant  communication  by  signals."  Read 
the  report  of  Gen.  McCall,  the  extracts  from  those  of  Sum- 
ner,  and  Heintzelman,  and  others,  and  their  testimony  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  see  how 
much  the  control  of  the  Commanding  General  was  needed ; 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  45 

his  knowledge  of  the  field  and  of  the  positions  of  the  differ- 
ent troops.  Then  think  of  the  disastrous  consequences  that 
would  have  followed  the  breaking  of  our  line  at  that  point, 
(Longstreet  informed  Gen.  McCall  that  Lee  had  70,000 
men  bearing  on  it,  all  of  which  would  arrive  before  mid- 
night,) and  let  each  one  form  his  own  conclusion  as  to 
whether  the  commanding  General  had  on  this  occasion  any 
appreciation  of  his  duties,  or,  if  he  had,  whether  he  dis- 
charged them. 

"  It  was  very  late  at  night,"  says  Gen.  McClellan,  "  before 
my  aids  returned  to  give  me  the  results  of  the  day's  fighting 
along  the  whole  line,  and  the  true  position  of  affairs"  It 
may  well  be  doubted  whether,  in  all  the  recorded  reports  or 
"  dispatches  "  of  military  comnianders,  a  parallel  to  this  ex- 
traordinary avowal  can  be  found.  We  supposed  it  the  es- 
pecial business  of  a  general  to  know,  at  each  moment,  "  the 
true  position  of  affairs,"  and  to  have  some  agency  in  ruling 
it.  Here  we  find  the  "  day's  fighting  "  all  done,  the  results, 
for  better  or  worse,  accomplished,  and  "  very  late  at  night " 
the  commanding  General  just  learning  about  them  !  "  Very 
late  at  night "  Gen.  Franklin  concluded  he  could  no  longer 
hold  his  position  and  retired,  sending  word  to  Gens.  Sumner 
and  Heintzelman.  These  officers,  though  they  assert  they 
received  no  such  message,  heard  of  the  movement,  somehow, 
and  wisely  concluded  that  they  must  retire,  too.  Here 
again  was  a  matter  of  the  gravest  importance,  which,  that  it 
should  be  decided  at  the  proper  time,  required  the  com- 
manding General  to  be  at  hand — to  know,  promptly,  "  the 
situation"  and  the  "results  of  the  day's  fighting."  Gen. 
McClellan  makes  no  pretence  that  he  gave  any  orders  to 
Franklin,  nor  that  he  would  have  given  any  to  the  other 
corps  commanders  had  not  Franklin,  without  orders,  fallen 
back.  He  affirms  that  on  learning  of  Franklin's  withdrawal 
he  sent  orders  to  Sumner  and  Heintzelman  to  withdraw,  but 
admits  that  they  were  both  in  motion  without  his  orders.  (19) 
Now  had  not  this  withdrawal  taken  place  that  night,  the 
next  day  would  have  probably  witnessed  the  destruction  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Lee,  as  we  have  seen,  was  at  the 


46  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

very  central  point,  ready  to  break  in,  with  a  force  of  70,000 
men,  as  stated  by  Longstreet  to  Gen.  McCall.  The  salvation 
of  the  army  was  due,  not  to  McClellan's  arrangements  or 
foresight,  but  to  Gen.  Franklin's  fortunate  decision  to  with- 
draw. The  army  was  saved  in  spite  of  Gen.  McClellan's 
ignorance  of  the  "  position  of  affairs "  and  "  results  of  the 
day's  fighting,"  and  consequent  incapacity  to  give  intelligent 
orders.  (20) 

Our  army  is  now  concentrated  on  the  James  ;  but  we  have 
another  day's  fighting  before  us,  and  this  day  we  may  expect 
the  concentrated  attack  of  Lee's  whole  army.  We  know  not 
at  what  hour  it  will  come — possibly  late,  for  it  requires  time 
to  find  out  our  new  position  and  to  bring  together  the  at- 
tacking columns — yet  we  know  not  when  it  will  come. 
"Where,  this  day,  is  the  commanding  General  ?  Off,  with 
Capt.  Rodgers,  to  select  "  the  final  positions  of  the  army  and 
its  depots."  He  does  not  tell  us  that  it  was  on  a  gunboat, 
and  that  this  day  not  even  "  signals"  would  keep  him  in 
communication  with  his  army,  for  his  journey  was  ten  or 
fifteen  miles  down  the  river ;  and  he  was  thus  absent  till  late 
in  the  afternoon.  (21) 

This  is  the  first  time  we  ever  had  reason  to  believe  that 
the  highest  and  first  duty  of  a  general,  on  the  day  of  battle, 
was,  separating  himself  from  his  army,  to  reconnoitre  a  place 
of  retreat !  However  that  may  be,  that  night  and  the  day 
following,  the  whole  army,  with  the  exception  of  Gen.  Keyes' 
corps,  marched  into  a  cul-de-sac  from  which  it  could  not 
have  been  extricated  had  the  enemy  been  able  promptly  to 
follow  us  up. 

We  think  it  will  now  be  understood  why  "  a  large  number 
of  Gen.  McClellan's  highest  officers — indeed  a  majority  of 
those  whose  opinions  have  been  reported  to  me,"  (see  Gen. 
Halleck's  letter,  p.  157)  are  in  favor  of  "  the  withdrawal  from 
the  James."  If  the  enemy  was  indeed,  as  Gen.  McClellan 
estimated,  (Gen.  Halleck's  letter,  p.  156)  200,000  strong,  and 
daily  increasing,  a  renewal  of  an  offensive  campaign  from 
the  James  was  simple  madness.  Once,  by  his  own  accounts, 
he  had  been  foiled  and  driven  back,  with  no  little  hazard  of 


AND   ITS   ANTECEDENTS.  4:7 

the  ruin  of  his  army,  by  "  superior  numbers,"  and  now  he 
proposes  to  march  again  with  120,000  (about  what  his  army 
would  have  numbered  with  the  30,000  reinforcements  he 
asked)  against  Richmond,  held  by  200,000  men.  No  one 
who  has  read  attentively  the  report  before  us,  and  the  dis- 
patches therein  contained,  will  be  surprised  at  the  want  of 
logical  sequence  in  any  particular  plan,  statement  or  argu- 
ment, since  complete  destitution  of  such  a  quality  is  the 
characteristic  of  the  whole ;  but  any  intelligent  reader  will 
understand  that  there  were  no  rational  chances  of  success, 
particularly  after  recent  experiences,  in  "  advancing  on  Rich- 
mond" defended  by  an  army  of  200,000  men  inured  to  bat- 
tles and  elated  by  success,  with  but  120,000  men.  (22)  He 
can  understand,  too,  that  another  disastrous  repulse  in  this 
region  was  likely  to  result  in  the  loss  of  the  army  and  the 
-capture  of  Washington — indeed,  the  ruin  of  the  cause. 

If  the  enemy  had  200,000  men  it  was  to  be  seriously  ap- 
prehended that,  leaving  50,000  behind  the  "  strong  works" 
of  Richmond,  he  would  march  at  once  with  150,000  men  on 
Washington.  Why  should  he  not?  Gen.  McClellan  and 
his  eulogists  have  held  up  as  highly  meritorious  strategy  the 
leaving  of  Washington  defended  by  less  than  50,000  men, 
with  the  enemy  in  its  front  estimated  to  be  120,000  to 
150,000  strong,  and  moving  off  to  take  an  eccentric  line  of 
operations  against  Richmond ;  and  now  the  reverse  case  is 
presented,  but  with  an  important  difference.  The  enemy  at 
Manassas,  on  learning  Gen.  McClellan's  movement,  could 
either  fly  to  the  defence  of  Richmond  or  attack  Washington. 
Gen.  McClellan  says  that  this  latter  course  ivas  not  to  be 
feared.  McClellan  on  the  James,  on  learning  that  Lee 
with  150,000  men  is  marching  on  Washington,  can  only 
attack  Richmond ;  by  no  possibility  can  he  fly  to  the  defence 
of  Washington.  Besides,  he  is  inferior  in  numbers  (accord- 
ing to  his  own  estimate)  even  to  Lee's  marching  army.  Here, 
in  a  nutshell,  is  the  demonstration  of  the  folly  of  the  grand 
strategic  movement  on  Richmond,  as  given  by  its  own 
projector. 

If  the  enemy  had  nothing  like  200,000  men — (and  a  very 


48  THE   PENINSULAR   CAMPAIGN 

reliable  estimate  put  his  forces  in  the  early  part  of  August 
at  about  55,000  around  Richmond,  and  the  rest  with  Jackson 
confronting  Pope,  probably  not  more  lhan  40,000) — if  he 
never  had  had  more  than  90,000,  or  at  the  utmost  120,000 — if 
Gen.  McClellan  had  been  driven  away  from  Richmond  by 
equal  or  inferior  numbers,  there  were  still  strong  reasons, 
(which  we  need  not  indicate,)  after  the  recent  experience 
undergone,  for  not  permitting  him  to  incur  the  hazard  of 
another  advance. 

The  critical  situation  of  affairs  at  this  period,  the  urgent 
necessity  of  providing  for  the  safety  of  Washington  and  of 
effecting  the  reunion  into  one  whole  of  our  shattered  and 
reduced  armies  in  Virginia," demanded  imperatively  the  with- 
drawal from  the  James.  The  great  misfortune  was  that  the 
order  was  not  given  immediately  on  our  reaching  Harrison's 
Landing. 

Had  Gen.  McClellan  made  his  "  reports "  of  the  various 
actions  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  they  occurred,  he 
would  probably  have  done  himself  more  credit,  (though  the 
slight  specimen  we  have  in  his  report  made  July  15th,  of 
the  seven  days'  battles  hardly  warrants  this  opinion,)  than 
he  has  by  this  laborious  but  disingenuous  production.  He 
has,  however,  done  the  country  and  done  history  a  service. 
In  giving  so  many  of  his  own  dispatches  he  has  furnished 
the  truest  tests  of  his  actual  abilities  as  a  general  and  a 
thinker,  and  in  the  matter  and  in  the  arrangement  of  it  he  has 
given  us  an  illustration  of  his  animus  as  a  historian.  In  this 
point  of  view  the  Report  may  be  safely  recommended  to 
readers  of  all  classes  and  all  parties.  In  taking  leave  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  he  somewhat  ostentatiously  promised 
to  make  himself  the  historian  of  its  exploits,  and  we  have 
before  us  now,  in  the  pages  we  have  just  examined,  the  re- 
sult of  his  six  months'  incubation  on  such  a  theme. 

"  Whoever  has  committed  no  faults  has  not  made  war  " 
was  the  remark  of  one  of  the  great  marshals  of  France  when 
questioned  as  to  the  cause  of  a  defeat,  and  acknowledging  it 
to  have  been  the  result  of  his  own  mistakes ;  and  there  would 
have  been  no  lack  of  indulgence  and  charity  for  the  failure  of 


AND   IT8   ANTECEDENTS.  49 

an  inexperienced  subaltern  suddenly  converted  into  a  general, 
and  called  upon  to  plan  campaigns  and  direct  armies  of  such 
unusual  magnitude,  under  circumstances  of  no  ordinary 
difficulty,  were  they  presented  to  us  in  the  spirit  of  Marshal 
Turenne's  avowal ;  but  when  exactly  the  reverse  is  the  case, 
when  the  claim  to  eminent  generalship  is  arrogantly  asserted, 
when  plans  which  we  have  shown  to  be  lacking  in  the  essen- 
tial elements  of  consistency  in  themselves,  and  of  concert 
with  those  who  must  be  depended  upon  to  carry  them  out, 
are  held  up  for  our  admiration,  when  all  faults  are  denied 
and  the  burden  of  each  particular  mishap,  and,  in  the  end, 
of  the  failure  of  the  whole  campaign,  is  thrown  upon  the  ad- 
ministration ;  -when,  in  short,  the  whole  Report  is  one  inces- 
sant complaint  against  the  President  and  the  War  Depart- 
ment, culminating  at  length  in  the  outrageous  charge  ad- 
dressed to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  eve  of  Porter's  defeat, 
(a  fit  finale  to  the  two  days'  blundering,)  "  You  have  done 
your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army,"  we  think  charity  should 
withdraw  her  mantle  from  the  errors  and  inconsistencies  and 
incapacity  which  we  here  exhibit. 


APPENDIX 


THE  interest  attached  to  the  origin,  motives,  and  causes  of  that 
plan  of  campaign  which  removed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
its  primitive  base  to  the  lower  Chesapeake,  induces  me  to  add  the 
following  "  Memoranda"  furnished  to  Gen.  McClellan. 

On  one  of  the  last  days  of  November,  1861,  I  was  at  Gen. 
McClellan's  Head-quarters,  and  found  myself  alone  with  him. 
Casually,  apparently,  he  mentioned  the  plan  he  had  recently  con- 
ceived of  moving  the  army,  by  water,  to  the  Rappahannock.  The 
features  of  the  plan,  as  I  now  recollect,  were,  principally,  these :  to 
carry  the  whole,  or  at  least  the  greater  part,  of  the  army,  to  Ur- 
banna,  by  water,  and  by  a  rapid  march  to  cut  off  and  "  bag"  Ma- 
gruder's  force  on  the  peninsula — seize  Richmond,  all  before  John- 
ston's force  from  Manassas  could  arrive  to  succor  it.  To  prevent, 
or  at  least  delay  the  arrival  of  that  army,  the  "  railroad  bridges"  of 
the  different  roads  between  Richmond  and  Manassas  were,  at  the 
proper  moment,  to  be  destroyed.  The  General  intimated  that  he 
had  agents  to  do  this  work  upon  whom  he  could  rely.  (23) 

The  "  memoranda"  following,  of  the  5th  and  6th  of  December, 
are  the  results  of  my  reflections  on  that  plan. 

About  the  middle  of  January  1862 1  was  directed  to  see  Col.  Ingalls 
in  reference  to  water  "  transportation"  for  troops.  The  memoran- 
dum of  January  13th  was  written  after  consultation  with  that  officer. 
The  tenor  of  the  paper  will  show  that  I  had  no  positive  knowledge 
of  the  object  for  which  such  transportation  was  to  be  collected  ;  but 
suspecting  that  object,  I  took  occasion  to  repeat  my  strong  convic- 
tions of  the  injudiciousness  of  such  a  step. 

When,  early  in  March,  1862,  I  formed  one  of  a  council  of  war 
of  twelve  general  officers  to  whom,  by  order  of  the  President,  this 
important  question  was  submitted,  I  had  no  other  intimation  of  a 
serious  intention  to  make  such  a  movement  than  the  casual  mention 
of  it  to  me  by  Gen.  McClellan,  in  the  latter  part  of  November. 
Not  having  any  reason  to  suppose  that  any  officer  of  the  council  had 


52  APPENDIX. 

any  more  intimate  knowledge  of  the  intention  than  myself,  and 
knowing  how  much  thought  the  slight  intimation  I  had  received  had 
cost  me,  I  naturally  expected  deliberation  and  discussion.  To  my 
great  surprise,  eight  of  the  twelve  officers  present  voted,  offhand, 
for  the  measure,  without  discussion  ;  nor  was  any  argument  on  my 
part  available  to  obtain  a  reconsideration. 

Memorandum  for   General  McClellan  (written  and  sent  5th   of 
December,  1861). 

The  idea  of  shifting  the  theatre  of  operations  to  the  James,  York, 
or  Rappahannock  has  often  occurred.  The  great  difficulty  I  have 
found  in  this  matter  is  that  of  moving  a  body  as  large  as  necessary 
rapidly,  and  of  making  the  necessary  preparations  for  such  a  move- 
ment so  that  they  should  not,  in  themselves,  give  indications  of  the 
whereabouts  of  the  intended  operations  in  time  to  meet  them. 

The  first  thing  to  be  considered  is  the  old  danger  attending  all 
similar  operations.  In  cutting  the  enemy's  line  of  operations  you 
expose  yourself — and  a  bold  and  desperate  enemy,  seeing  himself 
anticipated  at  Richmond,  might  attempt  to  retrieve  the  disaster  by 
a  desperate  effort  upon  Washington.  Leaving,  then,  as  we  should 
do,  the  great  mass  of  the  enemy  in  front  of  Washington,  it  would 
not  be  safe  to  leave  it  guarded  by  less  than  100,000  men — that  is, 
until  we  became  certain  that  he  had  withdrawn  from  our  front,  so 
far  as  to  render  his  return  upon  it  impracticable.  It  seems  to  me 
too,  that  the  full  garrisoning  of  the  works  up  to  the  standard  fixed 
upon  should  be  completed  without  delay.  These  works  will  but 
imperfectly  serve  their  purpose  if  they  are  not  defended  by  troops 

who  have  some  familiarity  with  their  positions. 

******** 

I  dwell  on  this  matter  somewhat,  since  if  the  army  moves — par- 
ticularity if  it  makes  a  flank  movement  leaving  the  enemy  in  front — 
the  measures  for  defence  of  the  city  can  not  be  too  carefully  taken. 

Now  as  to  the  expedition.  Considering  the  great  difficulty  of 
transporting,  at  one  time,  large  numbers — the  confusion  which  will 
attend  the  landing,  and  consequent  difficulty  of  getting  the  columns 
into  prompt  marching  order  after  landing,  with  our  new  troops,  if 
the  numbers  are  great — I  should  be  disposed  to  make  the  first  de- 
scent with  a  comparatively  small  but  select  corps — not  over  20,  at 
outside  30,000  men. 


APPENDIX.  53 

Let  it  be  supposed  the  latter  number  is  adopted — how  shall  the 
movement  be  made  so  as  to  attract  least  attention  in  its  prepara- 
tions and  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  their  object  ? 

Gen.  Burnside's  force  I  suppose  to  be  about  10,000  men.  His 
flotilla,  including  his  seven  sailing  vessels  and  five  "  floating  bat- 
teries," will  carry  that  number.  (In  my  former  memorandum  I 
estimated  14,350,  but  I  now  exclude  the  "  surf  boats"  and 
"  launches,"  and  diminish  the  numbers,  as  I  then  estimated  for  a 
short  voyage  not  leaving  the  Potomac.) 

I  suppose  there  would  be  three  batteries  and  say  1,000  cavalry 
accompanying  this  division.  I  suppose  that  among  the  large 
steamers  about  Baltimore  the  additional  transportation  for  this  ar- 
tillery and  cavalry  could  be  found.  If  so,  we  have  a  force  of 
10,000  or  11,000,  with  artillery  and  cavalry,  provided  for. 

For  a  second  column,  I  think  I  would  embark  it  from  the  Port 
Tobacco  River.  The  concentration  of  troops  under  Hooker  would 
cover  a  movement  that  way,  and  it  would  threaten  the  Potomac 
batteries. 

Now  for  additional  numbers.  I  am  inclined  to  think  it  is  easier 
to  carry  troops  to  New  York  (12  hours) — embark  them  there,  and 
make  but  one  thing  of  it — than  to  bring  the  shipping  to  Annapolis 
or  the  Potomac. 

However  that  may  be,  if  it  is  determined  that  the  additional 
number  shall  be  10,000  men,  or  20,000  men,  or  more,  I  would 
command  the  transportation  at  once  in  New  York — the  place  where 
every  thing  can  be  had  in  unstinted  quantities  and  of  the  most  suit- 
able kind.  All  sea  steamers  (not  otherwise  chartered),  the  large 
Sound  steamers,  the  large  North  River,  Sound  and  coasting  propel- 
lers, can  be  had  there,  and  there  all  the  appliances  to  fit  them  for 
troops,  horses,  etc.,  can  be  quickest  made. 

Perhaps  the  best  way,  therefore,  would  be  to  commence  at  once 
and  send  the  troops,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  to  Fort  Monroe — to 
hold  themselves  ready  for  shipment  at  a  moment's  notice — to  order 
the  transportation  necessary  in  New  York. 

According  to  the  foregoing  propositions,  there  would  be  three 
columns  ready  for  a  simultaneous  movement — 10,000  at  Annapolis, 
10,000  at  Port  Tobacco  River,  and  10  or  20,000  at  Fort  Monroe. 
The  times  of  starting  could  be  arranged  so  that  the  times  of  arrival 
should  be  as  desired.  Probably  it  would  be  better  to  have  more 
than  one  point  of  debarkation. 


54  APPENDIX. 

As  soon  as  the  first  columns  were  landed,  the  transports  could  go 
immediately  to  Annapolis  or  Baltimore  for  more. 

The  arrangements  give  no  indication  of  the  intended  point  of 
attack.     They  threaten  the  Potomac,  or  Norfolk,  or  the  Southern 
coast,  as  much  as,  or  more  than,  the  Rappahannock. 

I  presume  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  sending  our  steamers 
down  to  Port  Tobacco — whether  there  would  be  in  towing  the 
barges  there  I  do  not  know.  This  Potomac  column  does  not  satisfy 
me  as  well  as  the  others,  for  the  collection  of  troops  at  Port  To- 
bacco, in  connection  with  collections  at  Fort  Monroe  and  Annapolis, 
would  rather  indicate  an  operation  in  the  lower  Chesapeake. 

Distances  of  points  mentioned  to  Urbanna.  Annapolis  120 
miles— Port  Tobacco  90— Fort  Monroe  60. 

Eespectfully  submitted, 

J.  G.  B. 

Memorandum. 

i 

WASHINGTON,  December  6,  1861. 
MY  DEAR  GENERAL:— 

When  you  suggested  to  me  a  Southern  movement  I  told  you 
that  my  ideas  had  turned  towards  Norfolk. 

Its  capture  would  not  be  so  great  an  operation  as  the  successful 
execution  of  the  project  you  propose — still  it  seems  to  me  worthy 
of  consideration  as  attended  with  less  risk.  To  execute  successfully 
the  operation  you  propose  with  a  moderate  army  (say  20  or  30,000 
men)  to  be  afterwards  reinforced,  depends  upon  auxiliary  aids 
which  may  fail. 

If  the  railroad  bridges  are  not  destroyed — or  but  imperfectly — 
the  enemy  may  overwhelm  our  expeditionary  army — while  to  exe- 
cute the  difficult  operation  of  transferring  at  once  a  large  army — say 
100,000  men  to  that  line,  I  look  upon  as  impracticable,  if  not  other- 
wise imprudent. 

There  is  one  very  important  consideration  in  this  matter  of 
changing  the  line  of  operations.  The  army  of  the  Potomac  has  an 
object  of  immense  importance  to  defend — the  Capital,  to  lose  which 
would  be  almost  to  loso  everything. 

We  cannot  withdraw  the  bulk  of  the  army  from  Washington 
with  the  enemy  in  our  front — I  would  not  trust  enough  to  its  fortifi- 
cations for  that. 

On  the  other  hand  the  enemy  in  front  has  nothing  to  defend.     If 


APPENDIX.  55 

we  throw  30  or  50,000  men  on  to  the  Rappahannock,  he  can  abandon 
entirely  his  position  at  Manassas,  and  have  object  enough  to  do  so 
in  the  hope  of  overwhelming  our  force — and  I  think  it  is  too  great 
a  hazard  to  risk,  upon  the  expectation  of  his  railroad  bridges  being 
destroyed. 

There  is  another  operation  which  I  should  think  well  worthy  of 
weighing.  To  throw  an  army  of  30,000  men  on  to  Norfolk,  landing 
between  the  Elizabeth  and  Nansemond.  The  enemy's  army  at 
Norfolk  would  be  cut  off.  The  Nansemond  and  Dismal  Swamp 
would,  I  should  judge  by  the  map,  give  us  a  defensive  line  against 
the  enemy's  reinforcements,  (breaking  the  railroad  as  far  as  pos- 
sible) and  the  capture  of  Norfolk  would  be,  if  not  so  brilliant  and 
decisive  as  what  you  propose,  yet  a  great  blow,  particularly  if,  at 
the  same  time,  we  captured  its  army.  At  the  same  time  a  demon- 
stration in  force  on  the  enemy  in  our  front  would  either  prevent 
his  making  detachments,  or  compel  him  to  abandon  his  position  and 
his  batteries  on  the  Potomac. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

J.  G.  BARNARD. 

Memorandum  for  General  Me  Clellan. 

WASHINGTON,  January  13th,  1862. 

On  consultation  with  Col.  Ingalls,  who  says  he  has  been  engaged 
in  investigating  this  subject  for  several  weeks,  and  has  visited  the 
Northern  cities,  he  tells  me  that  for  an  expedition  to  be  made  in 
smooth  water  (such  as  the  Potomac  or  even  the  Chesapeake)  trans- 
portation can  be  collected  at  Annapolis  for  one  division  of  12  regi- 
ments infantry — 1  regiment  (1000)  (Javalry  with  horses — 4  bat- 
teries artillery  horses  and  men — one  ponton  bridge  train,  say  70 
six-horse  wagons,  horses,  drivers  and  2  companies  pontoniers — and 
250  quarter-master  wagons,  ambulances,  with  provisions  for  one 
week — in  three  weeks'  time. 

He  thinks  that  more  than  one  division  could  not  be  simul- 
taneously embarked  without  withdrawing  vessels  in  service  of  the 
Government  elsewhere. 

In  this  estimate,  however,  Col.  Ingalls  does  not  include  some  10 
or  15  clipper  ships  which  could  be  had  and  which  draw  too  much 
water  to  approach  the  shore,  or  to  enter  shallow  bays  or  rivers.  I 
should  not  think  this  objection  decisive,  since  there  is  water  enough 


56  APPENDIX. 

in  the  Chesapeake,  Potomac,  Rappahannock  or  York,  for  such  ves- 
sels, and  they  need  not  approach  the  shores  ;  the  landing  of  troops 
can  be  effected  through  the  aid  of  the  lighter  vessels  of  the  other 
division. 

If  these  ships  are  employed,  as  well  as  lighter  vessels,  another 
division — two  in  all  can  be  simultaneously  embarked — and  it  would 
require  four  (4)  weeks  to  have  them  all  at  Annapolis  ready  to 
receive  troops. 

In  this  estimate,  I  understand,  are  included  Sound  steamers 
North  River  steamers,  propellers,  canal  barges  and  tow  boats  (from 
New  York  and  Philadelphia),  and,  in  fact,  everything  that  would  be 
available  in  a  limited  time,  fit  for  the  purpose. 

As  Col.  Ingalls  has  made  this  subject  his  study,  I  presume  I  am 
justified  in  saying  that  transportation  for  two,  and  only  two,  divi- 
sions can  be  assembled  at  Annapolis  in  four  weeks.  If  craft  of 
light  draught  alone  are  demanded,  transportation  for  only  one  can 
be  had,  and  that  can  be  furnished  in  three  weeks. 

With  reference  to  what  can  be  found  here,  I  have  stated  in  my 
memorandum  of  December  that  the  Navy  had  (or  did  have  not 
long  ago)  four  side-wheel  steamers  and  the  steamer  "  Stepping 
Stones"  capable  of  carrying  3,500  men,  and  the  quarter-master's 
department  had  two  large  steamers  and  some  smaller  ones  capable  ot 
carrying  (as  stated  to  me  by  Col.  Rucker)  5,000  men,  besides  sev- 
eral large  Schuylkill  barges.  I  learn  that  there  are,  on  the  Chesa- 
peake and  Ohio  Canal,  between  here  and  Cumberland,  from  250  to 
300  good  canal  boats,  90  feet  long,  14£  beam,  and  about  6  feet 
depth;  they  will  carry  150  to  200  men  each. 

During  the  present  mild  weather  these  boats  could  be  got  down 
the  canal,  and  they  would  carry  troops,  but  they  are  ill  adapted  to 
carrying  horses.  Besides  these  canal  boats  and  vessels  in  employ 
of  the  Government,  there  is  very  little  else  to  be  found  here  now. 

But  it  is  impracticable  to  move  large  bodies  of  men,  on  vessels 
of  this  kind,  past  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  Potomac,  and  hence, 
troops  could  be  moved  from  here  only  to  points  above  such  bat- 
teries. 

If  Col.  Ingalls'  statement  is  taken  as  a  basis  of  our  resources  in 
this  matter,  it  ensues  that  without  withdrawing  vessels  from  other 
service  of  the  Government,  the  means  cannot  be  obtained,  that  is, 
speedily,  to  transport  four  or  five  divisions  at  one  time. 

It  seems  likely  that  two  divisions  could  be  simultaneously  trans- 


APPENDIX.  57 

ported,  and  the  same  means  be  used  to  bring  on  very   speedily 
thereafter  two  more  divisions,  &c. 

The  proposition  to  move  four  or  five  divisions  by  water,  seems 
to  imply  the  transfer  of  the  base  of  active  operations  from  here  to 
some  other  point,  as  the  Rappahannock  or  York  Rivers. 

On  this  point  I  would  refer  to  memoranda  of  December  5th 
and  6th.  This  investigation  of  the  matter  of  water  transportation 
has  confirmed  my  previous  impressions  of  the  difficulty  of  making 
such  a  transfer  without  unmistakable  indications  which  would 
enable  the  enemy,  in  great  measure,  to  prepare  for  it.  The  cost  of 
such  a  transfer  cannot  be  less  than  one  or  two  millions.* 

We  have  now  our  base  established  here.  In  operating  upon  the 
enemy's  centre  at  Occoquan  we  cannot  fail  to  break  it,  or  force  him 
to  abandon  Northern  Virginia,  or  give  us  battle.  On  this  line 
we  have  the  Potomac  by  which  to  do  most  of  our  heavy  transpor- 
tation, thus  palliating  the  winter  difficulty  of  bad  roads.  We  have 
the  Potomac  flotilla  to  aid  our  operations.  (If  a  few  of  the  new 
regular  gunboats  could  be  added,  it  would  be  a  great  advantage.) 

Forcing  the  line  of  the  Occoquan  we  shall  at  once  clear  the  Po- 
tomac of  the  enemy's  batteries,  and  from  Aquia  and  Fredericks- 
burg,  have  a  convenient  base  of  operations  against  Richmond. 

Simultaneously  with  the  passage  of  the  Occoquan,  Sickles' 
brigade  might  cross  to  Mathias  Point ;  that  position  is,  I  should 
judge,  very  defensible,  and  from  it,  if  circumstances  favored,  the 
batteries  at  Potomac  and  Aquia  Creek  could  be  captured. 

J.  G.  B. 

*  The  actual  cost  of  the  transfer  of  the  army  to  the  Peninsula  was  many  times 
this  conjectural  amount. 


NOTES. 


NOTE  1. — PAGE  4. 

THE  following  paragraphs  from  the  well-known  letter  of  Lord 
Lyons,  to  his  government,  dated  Washington,  November  It,  1862, 
very  clearly  illustrate  the  identification  of  Gen.  McClellan  with  the 
party  to  which  I  allude ;  and  they  illustrate  too,  the  views  and  ob- 
jects of  "  leaders  "  of  that  party. 

That  Gen.  McClellan's  dismissal  "  dashed  their  hopes  "  in  more 
senses  than  one  is  very  true — for,  from  the  very  beginning,  it  was 
through  his  influence  over  the  army  that  it  was  intended  and  hoped 
that  that  powerful  political  element  should  be  wielded  against  the 
administration.  Whether  or  not  the  administration  had  thrown 
itself  into  the  hands  of  the  "  extreme  Radical  party,"  it  is  very 
evident  that  it  had  ample  cause  to  desire  no  longer  the  services  of 
Gen.  McClellan  (as  will  clearly  appear  in  the  text  of  this  review), 
especially  as  that  officer  himself  had  "  thrown  himself  into  the 
hands  "  of  its  political  opponents. 

"  On  the  following  morning,  however,  intelligence  arrived  from 
Washington  which  dashed  the  rising  hopes  of  the  conservatives.  It 
was  announced  that  Gen.  McClellan  had  been  dismissed  from  the 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  ordered  to  repair  to 
his  home  ;  that  he  had,  in  fact,  been  removed  altogether  from  active 
service.  The  General  had  been  regarded  as  the  representative  of 
conservative  principle  in  the  army.  Support  of  him  had  been  made 
one  of  the  articles  of  the  conservative  electoral  programme.  His 
dismissal  was  taken  as  a  sign  that  the  President  had  thrown  himself 
entirely  into  the  arms  of  the  extreme  Radical  party,  and  that  the 
attempt  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  that  party  would  be  persisted  in. 
The  irritation  of  the  Conservatives  at  New  York  was  certainly  very 
great ;  it  seemed,  however,  to  be  not  unmixed  with  consternation 
•and  despondency. 

"  Several  of  the  leaders  of  the  Democratic  party  sought  inter- 
views with  me,  both  before  and  after  the  arrival  of  the  intelligence 


NOTES.  59 

of  Gen.  McClellan's  dismissal.  The  subject  uppermost  in  their 
minds  while  they  were  speaking  to  me  was  naturally  that  of  for- 
eign mediation  between  the  North  and  South.  Many  of  them 
seemed  to  think  that  this  mediation  must  come  at  last ;  but  they 
appeared  to  be  very  much  afraid  of  its  coming  too  soon.  It  was 
evident  that  they  apprehended  that  a  premature  proposal  of  foreign 
intervention  would  afford  the  Radical  party  a  means  of  reviving  the 
violent  war  spirit,  and  of  thus  defeating  the  peaceful  plans  of  the 
Conservatives.  They  appeared  to  regard  the  present  movement  as 
peculiarly  unfavorable  for  such  an  offer,  and,  indeed,  to  hold  that  it 
would  be  essential  to  the  success  of  any  proposal  from  abroad  that 
it  should  be  deferred  until  the  control  of  the  Executive  Government 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Conservative  party. 

"  I  gave  no  opinion  on  the  subject.  I  did  not  say  whether  or  not 
I  myself  thought  foreign  intervention  probable  or  advisable ;  but  I 
listened  with  attention  to  the  accounts  given  me  of  the  plans  and 
hopes  of  the  Conservative  party.  At  the  bottom  I  thought  I  per- 
ceived a  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  the 
Southern  States  altogether  ;  but  it  was  plain  that  it  was  not  thought 
prudent  to  avow  this  desire.  Indeed,  some  hints  of  it,  dropped  be- 
fore the  elections,  were  so  ill  received  that  a  strong  declaration  in 
the  contrary  sense  was  deemed  necessary  by  the  Democratic  leaders. 

"  At  the  present  moment,  therefore,  the  chiefs  of  the  Conservative 
party  call  loudly  for  a  more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  and 
reproach  the  Government  with  slackness  as  well  as  with  want  of 
success  in  its  military  measures." 


NOTE  2. — PAGE  12. 

In  his  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War 
we  find  the  following : 

"  Question.  Would  not  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac  have 
been  a  great  point  gained,  and  have  rendered  the  movement  upon 
Richmond,  by  way  of  the  James  or  York  Rivers,  very  much  more 
safe  ?" 

"  Answer.  As  things  turned  out,  yes.  But  I  do  not  think  that 
the  importance  of  the  Merrimac  was  appreciated  until  she  came 
out.  I  remember  very  well  that  the  Navy  Department  thought  that 


60  KOTES. 

the  Congress  and    Cumberland  -were  capable  of  taking  care  of  the 
Merriraac." 

That  two  sailing  vessels  lying  at  anchor  should  be  capable  of 
"  taking  care  "  of  a  powerful  iron-clad  steamer  is  an  idea  which 
ought  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  Navy  Department.  That  Depart- 
ment knew  of  the  conversion  of  the  Merrimac  into  an  iron-clad,  and 
had  painful  forebodings  of  the  consequences,  and  it  was  at  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Mr.  Fox,  that  I  drew  up,  for  him, 
in  February,  the  memorandum  on  the  "  taking  of  Norfolk,"  alluded 
to  in  the  following  letter  : 

Letter  of  Mr.  Fox. 

""WASHINGTON,  April  30,  1864. 

"  DEAR  SIR — I  have  the  honor  of  enclosing  herewith  copies  of  a 
letter  from  the  senior  officer  at  Hampton  Roads,  called  for  with 
reference  to  the  anxiety  of  this  Department  constantly  manifested 
to  attack  Norfolk  and  thereby  get  rid  of  the  Merrimac.  Also  a 
letter  of  Bear-Admiral  Goldsborough,  which  will  acquaint  you  with 
the  Navy  impression  as  to  the  Merrimac. 

"  The  frigate  Congress,  having  half  a  crew,  was  ordered  to  leave 
Newport  News,  but  at  the  earnest  request  of  Gen.  "Wool,  who  put 
men  on  board  from  the  marine  brigade,  she  was  detained,  but  the 
steam-tugs  to  attend  the  Congress  and  Cumberland  in  case  of  an 
attack  were  not  on  hand  when  she  came  out. 

"  My  impression  of  your  memorandum  about  the  taking  of  Nor- 
folk is,  that  it  was  made  at  my  request,  that  our  design  of  taking 
Norfolk  should  receive  the  weight  of  your  judgment  when  presented 
to  Gen.  McClellan.  The  General  admitted  its  force,  but  took  no 
action.  Yours,  very  truly, 

(Signed]        G.  V.  Fox. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  JOHN  G.  BARNARD,  U.  S.  Army. 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Extract  from  a  Letter  of  Admiral  Goldsborough. 

"(Confidential.)  U.  S.  FLAG-SHIP  MINNESOTA, 

HAMPTON  ROADS,  October  17,  1861. 

SIR — I  have  received  further  minute  reliable  information  with  re- 
gard to  the  preparation  of  the  Merrimac  for  an  attack  on  Newport 


NOTES. 


61 


News  and  these  roads,  as  I  am  now  quite  satisfied  that  unless  her 
stability  be  compromitted  by  her  heavy  top  works  of  wood  and  iron, 
and  her  weight  of  battery,  she  will,  in  all  probability,  prove  to  be 
very  formidable.  The  supposition  of  the  insurgents  is  that  she  will 
be  impregnable,  and  a  trial  of  her  sufficiency  to  resist  shot  of  the 
heaviest  calibre,  at  a  short  range,  is  to  take  place  before  she  is  sent 
out  to  engage  us.  She  is  still  in  the  dry-dock  at  Norfolk,  and  yet 
needs  a  goodly  quantity  of  iron  to  complete  her  casing,  all  of  which 
is  furnished  from  Richmond.  She  has  her  old  engines  on  board, 
and  they  have  been  made  to  work  tolerably  well.  They  are  not 
expected,  however,  I  understand,  to  afford  anything  more  than  a 
moderate  velocity. 

"  On  coming  out,  she  must,  necessarily,  proceed  as  low  down  as 
about  Sewall's  Point  before  she  can  shape  her  course  to  the  west- 
ward for  Newport  News,  and  this  will  bring  her  within  three  and  a 
half  miles  of  us.  My  present  purpose  is  to  let  her  get  well  over 
towards  the  Congress  and  Cumberland,  off  Newport  News,  and 
then  to  put  at  her  with  this  ship  and  every  thing  else  that  may  be  on 
hand  at  the  time,  with  a  view  of  bringing  her  between  the  fire  of 
those  ships  and  these,  and  cutting  off  all  retreat  on  her  part.  It  is 
understood  that  she  is  to  be  assisted  by  the  two  steamers  up  James 
River,  but  as  they  cannot  be  made  very  powerful,  I  attach  no  very 
great  consequence  to  this  intention. 

"  Nothing,  I  think,  but  very  close  work  can  possibly  be  of  service 
in  accomplishing  the  destruction  of  the  Merrimac,  and  even  of 
that  a  great  deal  may  be  necessary.  From  what  I  gather,  boarding 
is  impracticable,  as  she  can  only  be  assailed  in  that  way  through  the 
ports,  of  which  she  has,  in  all,  but  fourteen. 

If  I  could  be  furnished  with  a  couple  of  tugs  or  small  steamers, 
to  attend  upon  the  Congress  and  Cumberland,  in  season,  so  as  to 
tow  these  promptly  into  position  in  case  of  necessity,  they  might 
prove  of  very  great  service.  It  will  be,  I  infer,  at  least  a  fortnight 
before  the  Merrimac  will  make  her  attempt ;  but  in  the  meantime 
I  could  employ  those  tugs  or  steamers  very  advantageously  in  the 
way  of  guard  vessels  at  night,  despatch  and  tow  vessels  by  day,  etc., 

"  Your  most  obdt.  servant, 

(Signed,)         "  L.  M.  GOLDSBOROUGH, 

«  To  the  Hon'ble  "  Flag  Officer.  - 

"THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY." 


62  NOTES. 

Extract  from  Letter  of  Copt.  John  Marston. 

''(Confidential)  "U.  S.  STEAMEE  ROASOKE, 

"HAMPTON  ROADS,  February  21,  1862. 
"  Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES, 

"  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 
"  SIR  :     *     *     *     By  a  dispatch  which    I  received  last  evening 
from  General  Wool,  I  learn  that   the   Merrimac  will   positively 
attack  Newport  News  within  five  days,  acting  in  conjunction  with 
the  Jamestown  and  Yorktown  from  James  River,  and  that  the  at- 
tack will  be  made  at  night,     I  can  only  regret  that  the  Roanoke 
should  be  without  an  engine,  and  has  a  deficiency  of  180  men  in 
her  crew  ;  but  you  may  be  assured  we  shall  do  our  best. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  obd't.  servant, 

"  (Signed,}         JOHN  MARSTON, 
"  Captain  and  Senior  Officer." 

By  the  last  extract  it  will  be  seen  that,  during  the  latter  part 
of  February  and  early  part  of  March,  the  attack  of  the  Merrimac 
was  daily  expected,  and,  by  Mr.  Fox's  letter,  so  far  from  the  Navy 
Department  depending  on  the  Congress  and  Cumberland  to  "  take 
care"  of  the  Merrimac,  the  Congress  had  actually  been  ordered 
away  from  Newport  News,  as  a  precaution,  in  consequence  of  her 
deficient  crew. 

This  was  exactly  the  period  when  General  McClellan  was  pre- 
paring to  fill  the  waters  of  the  "  lower  Chesapeake"  with  transports 
crowded  with  troops. 


NOTE  3. — PAGE  16. 

Col.  Lecomte's  remarks  are  noticed  only  on  account  of  the  in- 
spiration under  which  he  writes,  and  the  associations  which  he  has 
had.  In  the  published  translation  of  a  former  work  of  his,  entitled, 
"  The  War  in  the  United  States,"  his  account  of  "  the  Federal  artil- 
lery" is  thus  characterized,  in  a  foot  note  (p.  59),  by  Gen.  Barry  : 
"  It  would  be  scarcely  possible  to  collect  more  errors  in  so  small 
a  space."  He  has  demonstrated  the  possibility,  however,  in  his  ac- 
count of  the  fortifications  of  Washington.  Looking  over  the  map 
of  the  defences  as  it  is,  or  as  it  was  during  Col.  Lecomte's  service 


NOTES.  53 

here,  I  find  but  one  single  one  which  was  not  primarily  selected 
either  by  myself  or  by  subordinates  charged  with  carrying  out  my 
views  in  reference  to  the  general  design.  That  single  exception 
was  a  site  so  prominent  and  so  excellent  that  it  was  strange  it  had 
been  thus  far  overlooked  by  us,  and  that  its  primary  selection  should 
be  due  to  another — the  late  and  lamented  General  Eichardson. 
Some  of  the  sites  selected  were  examined  by  Gen.  McClellan,  and, 
in  general,  all  were  known  and  approved  by  him  previous  to  com- 
mencement. That  the  individual  works  were  models  of  engineering 
skill  (and  it  is  in  this  point  of  view  alone  that  our  critic  deigns  to  pay 
us  a  compliment)  is  not  pretended.  As  individual  works  they  were 
very  defective,  and  have  required  numerous  alterations.  The  pres- 
sure was  too  great  to  admit  of  matured  plans  or  elaborate  construc- 
tion. The  line  remains  to  this  day  essentially  as  it  was  established 
in  the  months  of  August  and  September,  1861,  and  though  not 
throughout  absolutely  the  best,  perhaps,  that  could  be  selected,  is 
so  nearly  so  as  to  surprise  those  who,  understanding  the  enormous 
difficulties  of  fixing  such  a  line  in  so  short  a  time,  in  a  country  so 
broken  and  covered  with  woods,  have  carefully  examined  it. 

In  another  place  Col.  Lecomte  has  given  additional  evidence  of 
the  extraordinary  talent  which  so  astonished  Gen.  Barry.  In  refer- 
ence to  our  ignorance  concerning  the  topography  of  the  Peninsula, 
affirmed  by  me  in  my  official  report,  and  confirmed  by  Gen.  McClel- 
lan, he  sapiently,  and  with  a  high  spirit  of  justice  doubtless,  re- 
marks, "  The  blame  must  chiefly  rest  upon  Gen.  Barnard  himself, 
who,  as  commander  of  the  engineers,  was  bound  to  procure  in 
advance  all  possible  information  as  to  topography  and  hydrography 
of  the  country." 

Col.  Lecomte's  business  in  this  country  was  to  observe  the  war 
and  to  study  the  organization,  etc.,  of  the  armies  of  the  United 
States.  As  a  member  of  Gen.  McClellan's  staff*  he  had  peculiar 
facilities  for  studying  the  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
— then  a  type  of  our  organizations  elsewhere.  Shall  we  impute  it 
to  ignorance  that,  in  his  three  or  four  months  of  service,  he  did 
not  learn  that  there  were  on  the  staff  of  that  army  two  distinct 
Chiefs  of  Engineers — the  one  of  engineers  proper,  and  the  other  of 
Topographical  engineers?  that  it  was  the  province  of  the  latter  to 
collect  the  information  which  he  specifies  ?  This  supposition  seems 
incredible.  It  is,  moreover,  negatived  by  a  foot-note,  which  he  has 
adopted  as  his  own  to  the  translation  of  his  book,  by  which  he  re- 


64:  NOTES. 

cognizes  the  existence  (at  the  time)  of  a  Corps  of  Topographical 
Engineers. 

It  was  the  function  of  the  Chief  of  Topographical  Engineers  to 
obtain  the  topographical  information  for  the  intended  campaign ; 
but  neither  he  nor  any  one  else  could  do  it  without  an  intimation 
as  to  where  such  researches  were  required,  and  Gen.  McClellan  has 
exhibited  the  sources  of  the  (worse  than  useless)  information  that  he 
had,  and  has  relieved  everybody  but  himself  from  the  blame  of 
something  worse  than  neglect  of  duty. 

As  to  the  real  value,  at  that  time,  of  the  works  for  defending 
Washington,  the  following  is  General  McClellan's  testimony 
(p.  427) : 

"  I  regarded  the  defences  of  Washington  as  adequate  for  its  pro- 
tection, and  that  the  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would 
necessarily  draw  from  in  front  of  Washington  the  force  that  had 
previously  threatened  it.  My  mind  had  always  been  clear  and 
distinct  that  the  moment  the  army  moved  on  any  line  from  the 
lower  Chesapeake,  the  rebels  must  necessarily  abandon  Manassas. 
I  never  doubted  that  a  second — always  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
defences  of  Washington  were  complete." 

I  have  made  some  statements  elsewhere  as  to  the  degree  of  com- 
pleteness, containing  my  written  official  opinion  given  Dec.  6,  1861 
(in  connection  with  this  very  matter),  that  it  "  would  not  be  safe 
to  leave  Washington  guarded  by  less  than  100,000  men — that  is, 
until  we  had  become  certain  that  the  enemy  had  withdrawn  from 
our  front  so  far  as  to  render  his  return  upon  it  impracticable."  (See 
Appendix.) 

My  argument  was  precisely  the  reverse  of  that  above  quoted 
from  Gen.  McClellau.  If  the  enemy  had  100,000  men  at  Manas- 
sas, and  our  army  moved  on  any  line  from  the  lower  Chesapeake 
(leaving  Washington  guarded  by  much  less  than  100,000  men)  he 
would  not  abandon  Manassas,  but  attack  Washington. 


NOTE  4. — PAGE  19. 

"  Knowing  that  Gen.  Huger  could  easily  spare  some  troops  to 
reinforce  Yorktown,  that  he  had  indeed  done  so,  and  that  Johnston's 
army  of  Manassas  could  be  brought  rapidly  by  the  James  and 


NOTES.  65 

York  Rivers  to  the  same  points,  I  proposed  to  invest  that  town 
without  delay. 

"The  accompanying  map  of  Col.1  Cram,  U.  S.  Topographical 
Engineers  attached  to  Gen.  Wool's  staff,  given  to  me  as  the  result 
of  several  months'  labor,  indicated  the  feasibility  of  the  design." 


NOTE  5.— PAGE  20. 

Nor  did  the  Navy  Department  ever  undertake  to  reduce  the  bat- 
teries at  Yorktown. 

The  following  extract  from  the  testimony  of  Ass't.  Sec'y  Fox, 
Admiral  Goldsborough,  and  Major-Gen.  Hitchcock,  are  important 
to  a  full  understanding  of  this  matter. 

A  letter  had  been  addressed  by  me  by  order  of  Gen.  McClellan 
to  Mr.  Fox  concerning  the  Merrimac.  Mr.  Fox  testifies : 

"  To  this  dispatch  I  sent  the  following  reply : 

"  '  NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  March  13,  1862. 

" '  The  Monitor  is  more  than  a  match  for  the  Merrimac,  but  she 
may  be  disabled  in  the  next  encounter.  I  cannot  advise  so  great  a 
dependence  upon  her. 

"  '  Burnside  and  Goldsborough  are  very  strong  for  the  Chowan 
River  route  to  Norfolk,  and  I  brought  up  maps,  explanations,  &c. 
It  turns  everything  and  is  only  27  miles  to  Norfolk  by  two  good 
roads.  Burnside  will  have  Newbern  this  week. 

"  '  The  Merrimac  must  go  into  dock  for  repairs.  The  Monitor 
ma}r,  and  I  think  will  destroy  the  Merrimac  in  the  next  fight,  but 
this  is  hope,  not  certainty. 

"  '  G.  V.  Fox, 
"  *  Assistant  Secretary. 
" '  MAJOR-GEN.  G.  B.  MCCLELLAU, 

" '  Fairfax  Court  House.' 

"  Then  I  got  a  private  note  from  Gen.  McClellan  dated,  '  Fairfax 
Court  House,  March  14,'  in  which  he  says  : 

" '  From  all  accounts  received  I  have  such  a  living  faith  in  the 
gallant  little  Monitor  that  I  feel  that  we  can  trust  her;  so  I  have 
determined  on  the  Fort  Monroe  movement.' 


66  NOTES. 

"  That  is  all  the  correspondence  there  was  with  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment upon  that  subject.  It  shows  that  this  plan  of  Gen.  McClellan 
was  changed  between  the  time  I  arrived  at  Old  Point  Comfort, 
which  was  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  March,  and  the  time  when 
I  got  back  to  Washington,  which,  I  think,  was  on  the  12th.  It  was 
determined  that  the  army  should  go  by  way  of  Fort  Monroe.  The 
Navy  Department  never  was  consulted  at  all,  to  my  knowledge,  in 
regard  to  anything  connected  with  the  matter.  No  statement  was 
ever  made  to  us,  why  they  were  going  there  beyond  this.  All  that 
we  were  told  about  it  is  what  I  have  read  here.  Admiral  Golds 
borough  was  put  in  communication  with  Gen.  McClellan  and  di- 
rected to  cooperate  with  him ;  and  all  the  force  we  had  available 
was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  admiral.  I  have  no  knowledge 
that  anything  that  Gen.  McClellan  wanted  in  the  way  of  attack  or 
defence  was  ever  neglected  by  our  people.  No  complaint  was  ever 
made  to  the  Navy  Department.  There  was  never  any  plan  devised 
by  the  War  Department  that  I  know  of,  that  required  the  navy  to 
operate.  The  Secretary  simply  ordered  the  ships  there  to  do  what 
they  could  as  the  exigencies  arose.  In  the  private  letter  from  which 
I  have  read,  Gen.  McClellan  speaks  of  operations  against  Yorktown 
and  Gloucester.  But  I  do  not  think  any  of  the  army  officers  ex- 
pected those  places  to  be  attacked  by  ships.  Yorktown  is  sixty  or 
seventy  feet  above  the  water;  the  vessels  could  not  reach  the  bat 
teries  on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and  therefore  they  would  be  exposed 
to  destruction  without  being  able  to  return  the  fire.  Admiral 
Goldsborough  was  in  constant  communication  with  Gen.  McClellan, 
and  they  were  very  well  disposed  towards  each  other  to  the  last 
moment  sojar  as  I  ever  knew. 

"  Question.  It  has  been  said  that  one  reason  for  the  failure  of  the 
Peninsula  campaign  was  the  detention  of  the  army  before  the  lines 
of  Yorktown  a  whole  month,  in  consequence  of  the  navy  not  being 
able  to  co-operate  and  secure  to  us  the  free  navigation  of  the  York 
and  James  Rivers.  Will  you  state  what  you  know  in  relation  to 
that  matter  ?" 

*'  Answer.  So  far  as  I  know  all  the  vessels  that  Gen.  McClellan 
required  in  his  operations  against  Yorktown,  were  placed  at  his  dis- 
posal by  Admiral  Goldsborough.  I  am  not  aware  that  'he  ever 
required  that  we  should  attack  Yorktown,  or  that  it  was  ever 
expected  that  we  should  do  so.  All  the  avenues  of  supply  to  the 
army  there  were  free  and  open  as  far  as  the  army  had  possession. 


NOTES.  67 

Gen.  McClellan  expected  the  navy  to  neutralize  the  Merrimac,  and 
I  promised  that  it  should  be  done,  and  that  she  should  never  pass 
Hampton  Roads." 

Admiral  Goldsborough  testifies  : 

"  With  regard  to  that  campaign  no  naval  authority  whatever  to 
my  knowledge  was  ever  consulted  until  after  a  considerable  part  of 
the  army  got  down  there.  The  whole  matter  was  arranged  here  in 
Washington  by  officers  of  the  army,  as  I  understood.  I  believe 
they  never  said  a  word  even  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Cer- 
tainly nothing  was  ever  said  to  me  till  the  eleventh  hour.  Then  it 
was  that  I  heard  that  they  expected  the  navy  to  cooperate  with 
them.  The  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Watson,  came  down 
to  see  me  in  behalf,  as  he  said,  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the 
President  of  the  United  States.  He  told  me  of  the  great  anxiety 
felt  in  Washington  in  regard  to  the  Merrimac ;  that  they  were 
apprehensive  that  she  might  get  up  the  York  River  and  entirely 
disconcert  all  the  movements  of  the  army.  I  told  Mr.  Watson 
that  the  President  might  make  his  mind  perfectly  easy  about  the 
Merrimac  going  up  the  York  River ;  that  she  never  could  get  there, 
for  I  had  ample  means  to  prevent  that.  This  was  in  the  latter  part 
of  March,  1862.  The  army  at  that  time  was  about  assembling  at 
Old  Point  Comfort.  Gen.  McClellan  had  not  then  arrived.  I  recol- 
lect making  such  observations  to  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War  as 
I  think  left  him  perfectly  well  satisfied  that  the  Merrimac  could 
never  get  up  the  York  River.  The  plan  of  going  up  the  York  River 
was  a  matter  decided  upon  here  in  Washington. 

"  Question.  Were  you  ever  requested  by  Gen.  McClellan  to  per- 
form any  naval  service  in  connection  with  the  operations  of  the 
army  that  you  did  not  perform  ? 

"  Answer.  No  sir.  I  was  requested  to  perform  services  in  con- 
nection with  the  army,  and  every  thing  was  done  that  was  asked. 
Gen.  McClellan,  before  coming  down  himself  sent  Col.  Woodbury 
to  consult  me  in  regard  to  the  best  plan  of  attacking  Yorktown.  I 
pointed  out  to  that  officer,  what  I  considered  the  best  mode.  A  day 
or  two  afterwards  Gen.  McClellan  sent  down  Gen.  Barnard  to  con- 
sult me.  I  told  him  that  I  had  already  explained  my  views  very 
fully  to  Col.  Woodbury  and  repeated  them  to  him.  Some  short 
time  after  that  Gen.  Hitchcock  came  down ;  whether  sent  by  any- 


68  NOTES. 

body  I  don't  know.  He  came  on  board  my  ship  to  consult  me 
about  the  matter,  and  I  pointed  out  to  him  what  I  thought  the  best 
plan,  and  he  as  well  as  the  other  two  officers,  seemed  to  agree  with 
me  perfectly.  When  Gen.  McClellan  came  down,  he  did  not  go  on 
shore  the  first  day,  but  immediately  came  on  board  my  ship  to  con- 
sult with  me  as  to  the  best  mode  of  attacking  Yorktown.  The 
approach  to  Richmond  was  to  be  up  the  York  River ;  the  approach 
up  the  James  River  was  never  mentioned." 

General  Hitchcock  goes  at  great  length  into  the  merits  of  the 
plan  of  campaign,  and  into  the  causes  which  caused  McDowell's 
corps  to  be  retained.  (Franklin's  division  was  sent,  however,  and 
afterwards  McCall's,  so  that  on  the  Chickahominy  Gen.  McClellan 
had  all  the  troops  he  ever  counted  upon  having,  except  King's  divi- 
sion, which  was  replaced  by  troops  received  from  Fortress  Monroe 
and  elsewhere.)  Though  necessarily  long,  Gen.  Hitchcock's  testi- 
mony should  be  read,  and  most  of  it  is  introduced  here. 

"  A  military  objection  to  the  plan  was  his  separating  his  army 
from  its  proper  base,  which  was  Washington,  and  transferring  it  to 
a  point  from  which  it  could  not  return  in  case  of  disaster  without 
great  danger.  That  is  a  military  principle  which  Gen.  McClellan 
himself  recognized  in  a  communication  to  the  President  in  objection 
to  a  plan  of  the  President,  as  I  understood.  That  military  objection 
is  substantially  this  :  that  in  taking  the  army  up  the  Peninsula  Gen. 
McClellan  made  two  points  of  defence,  one  the  city  of  Washington 
and  the  other  the  position  he  assumed  on  the  Peninsula.  These  two 
points  were  widely  separated,  and  did  not  communicate  with  each 
other.  He  thus  gave  the  enemy  an  opportunity  of  concentrating 
upon  either  of  them,  while  it  obliged  the  Union  forces  to  be  divided 
in  order  to  secure  the  defence  of  the  military  point  here  at  Wash- 
ington. That,  among  military  men,  I  believe,  is  considered,  to  be 
one  of  the  most  dangerous  conditions  in  which  a  body  of  troops  can 
be  placed.  It  is  particularly  illustrated  in  the  history  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  who  destroyed  in  succession  three  armies  which  were 
separated,  and  not  in  communication  with  each  other,  and  gained 
his  chief  military  glory  from  that  fact.  My  objection  to  the  whole 
of  that  plan  was  very  serious,  and  I  should  on  no  account  have 
acquiesced  in  it  had  I  been  consulted. 

"  When  the  President  issued  his  order  acquiescing  in  the  move- 
ment proposed  by  Gen.  McClellan,  he  required,  as  that  order  will 


NOTES.  69 

show,  that  Washington  should  be  left  entirely  secure  in  the  opinion 
of  all  the  corps  commanders  then  there.  That  opinion,  as  appears 
by  the  report  of  their  council,  on  the  13th  March  last,  required, 
according  to  the  view  of  three  of  those  corps  commanders,  that  all 
the  forts  south  of  the  Potomac  should  be  fully  garrisoned  ;  the  forts 
north  of  the  Potomac  should  be  occupied,  and  iu  addition  to  that  a 
covering  force  of  25,000  men.  The  other  corps  commander,  Gen. 
Sumner,  was  of  the  opinion  that  40,000  men  would  be  sufficient  to 
make  the  city  secure,  indicating  nothing  in  regard  to  their  distribu- 
tion. 

"  There  is  a  feature  in  the  proceedings  of  that  council  which  is 
very  important  in  this  connection.  The  council  agreed  to  the  pro- 
posed movement  by  way  of  the  Peninsula,  provided  the  rebel  steamer 
Merrimac  could  be  neutralized,  and  they  were  unanimous  in  that 
opinion.  Gen.  McClellan  did  not  regard  that  part  of  their  report, 
but  proceeded  to  execute  his  plan  while  the  Merrimac  was  still  sup- 
posed to  be  in  good  condition,  with  a  power  that  no  one  can  very 
easily  estimate.  If  she  had  not  been  afterwards  destroyed,  she 
might  have  destroyed  all  of  the  navy  and  all  of  the  shipping  about 
Fortress  Monroe,  and  then  would  have  been  the  means  of  destroy- 
ing McClellan's  army,  cutting  it  off  from  supplies,  and  leaving  it 
helpless.  Subsequent  events  fortunately  relieved  Gen.  McClellan 
in  a  great  degree  from  the  consequences  of  disregarding  that  feature 
in  the  decision  of  the  council.  The  immediate  consequence  of  dis- 
regarding that  opinion  of  the  council  was,  that  the  navy  was  unable 
to  cooperate  to  its  full  extent  with  Gen.  McClellan  in  reducing 
Gloucester  Point  and  Yorktown,  being  held  at  Fortress  Monroe  to 
watch  this  single  vessel  the  Merrimac. 

"With  regard  to  the  opinion  of  the  council  as  to  what  was  re- 
quired for  the  defence  of  Washington,  I  consider  it  as  applying  to 
the  capital  itself,  to  Washington,  and  its  immediate  front  towards 
the  enemy,  and  as  not  extending  to  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  to  Har- 
per's Ferry,  or  to  Baltimore.  I  construe  the  opinion  of  the  council 
as  requiring  that  all  the  forts  in  the  neighborhood  of  Washington 
should  be  manned,  and  that,  over  and^ above  that,  there  should  be 
an  army  or  unit  of  force  of  25,000  men  as  a  covering  force  in  front 
of  the  city.  I  am  not  able  to  find  in  the  public  reports  connected 
with  these  proceedings  any  evidence  that  this  requirement  of  the 
council  was  complied  with. 

"  General  McClellan  made  a  report,  dated  steamer  Commodore, 


70  NOTES. 

April  1,  1862,  showing  a  certain  distribution  of  forces  for  the  de- 
fence of  Washington.  That  report  enumerates  18,000  men  left  at 
Washington  for  the  immediate  defence  of  the  capital.  It  speaks  of 
the  forces  under  Gen.  Abercrombie  and  Gen.  Geary  amounting  to 
7,780.  This  report  of  Gen.  McClellan  is  so  miscellaneous  in  its 
mode  of  statement  that  it  is  difficult  to  determine  with  any  accuracy 
the  precise  forces  left  at  the  various  points  referred  to  in  it.  It 
seems  to  count  Blenker's  division  as  a  part  of  the  force  in  front  of 
Washington,  and  yet  speaks  of  his  design  to  order  that  division 
from  Warrenton  to  Strasburgh.  It  was  ordered  from  Warrenton 
through  Strasburgh,  and  still  further  on  out  of  this  vicinity  entirely 
into  the  Mountain  Department.  It  speaks  of  Banks'  division  as  if 
in  front  of  Washington,  and  yet  that  division  was  ordered  into  the 
Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  in  consequence  of  the  attack  made  by 
Jackson  upon  Shields  at  Winchester,  so  that  both  Banks  and  Blen- 
ker  were  removed  from  in  front  of  Washington,  and  could  not  be 
considered  as  a  part  of  the  25,000  required  as  a  unit  of  force  in 
front  of  the  city. 

"  Making  that  deduction,  I  find  the  force  in  the  city  and  the  two 
guards,  for  they  were  little  ejse,  under  Abercrombie  and  Geary, 
altogether  make  less  than  25,000  men.  I  considered,  therefore,  that 
the  order,  of  the  President  with  respect  to  the  defence  of  the  capital 
had  been  '  neglected,'  to  use  his  own  phrase.  I  did  not  consider  the 
force  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  as  available  for  the  immediate  de- 
fence of  the  capital,  being  required  for  the  defence  of  that  Valley. 
The  report  made  by  Gen.  Wadsworth  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on 
the  2d  of  April,  which  I  understand  is  in  possession  of  the  Com- 
mittee, will  show  the  condition  and  character  of  the  troops  under 
his  command.  When  this  state  of  things  became  known  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  he  required  Gen.  Thomas  and  my- 
self to  make  a  report  upon  the  execution  of  the  President's  order, 
the  letter  of  Gen.  McClellan  of  the  1st  April,  the  report  of  Gen. 
Wadsworth  on  the  2d  April,  and  one  or  two  other  papers  con- 
nected with  them,  requiring  us  to  give  a  distinct  opinion  whether 
Gen.  McClellan  had  complied  or  not  with  the  requirements  of  the 
order  of  the  President.  On  examining  those  papers  we  were  of 
opinion  that  the  order  of  the  President  had  not  been  complied  with, 
and  so  reported.  This  report  of  course  went  to  the  President,  and 
on  the  next  day,  if  I  mistake  not,  the  3d  April,  the  President  came 
to  the  War  Office,  and  had  quite  a  long  conversation  with  the  chiefs 


NOTES.  71 

of  the  various  bureaus  of  the  War  Department,  the  Secretary  of 
War  being  present.  At  the  conclusion  of  that  consultation,  the 
President  himself  ordered  that  one  of  the  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  which  were  then  in  front  of  Washington,  should  be 
detained  for  the  defence  of  the  capital.  The  selection  was  left  with 
the  Secretary  of  War,  who  designated  the  corps  commanded  by 
Gen.  McDowell.  I  will  mention  that  Gen.  McDowell  himself  was 
not  present,  and  I  believe  knew  nothing  of  the  steps  which  led  to 
his  detention  here  until  after  the  order  was  issued.  As  soon  as 
General  McClellan  heard  of  this  he  complained  of  it.  He  wished 
the  whole  of  McDowell's  corps  sent  to  him.  If  he  could  not  get 
the  whole  of  it,  he  wanted  McCall's  and  Franklin's  divisions,  leaving 
one  division  only  here.  Failing  in  that,  he  wished  particularly  to 
have  Franklin's  division  ordered  to  join  him.  The  President  again 
came  to  the  War  Office  on  the  llth  April,  if  I  mistake  not,  and 
held  another  conference  of  considerable  length  with  the  same 
officers  as  before,  the  chiefs  of  bureaus,  and  the  Secretary  of  War. 
It  was  plain  that  the  President  was  extremely  anxious  to  gratify 
Gen.  McClellan  and  to  give  him  every  possible  support  in  his 
power,  not  losing  sight  of  his  imperative  duty  to  see  that  this  capi- 
tal was  sufficiently  guarded.  The  result  of  that  conference  was, 
that  he  ordered  Franklin  's  division  to  join  McClellan,  and  it  was 
accordingly  sent  down  to  him. 

****** 

"  Question.  Do  you  understand  now  the  movement  made  by 
General  McClellan  to  Fortress  Monroe  and  up  the  York  River  was 
in  compliance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  council  of  generals 
commanding  army  corps,  and  held  at  Fairfax  Court  House  on  the 
13th  March  last,  or  in  violation  of  it  1 

"  Answer.  I  have  considered,  and  do  now  consider  that  it  was  in 
violation  of  the  recommendation  of  that  council  in  two  important 
particulars  ;  one  particular  being  that  portion  of  their  report  which 
represents  the  council  as  agreeing  to  the  expedition  by  way  of  the 
Peninsula  provided  the  rebel  steamer  Merrimac  could  first  be 
neutralized.  That  very  important  proviso  General  McClellan  disre- 
garded. The  other  particular  that  he  disregarded  was  the  leaving  a 
force  for  the  safety  of  Washington.  He  did  not  leave  the  force 
which,  as  I  have  considered,  the  council  contemplated  in  that  report 
as  necessary. 


72  NOTES. 

"  By  the  Chairman. 

"  Question.  On  whom  did  the  responsibility  rest  for  the  violation 
of  those  orders  and  the  consequences  that  followed  that  violation  1 

"Answer.  I  had  occasion  a  few  days  since  to  answer  a  question 
similar  to  that  before  the  court  in  the  case  of  Gen.  McDowell.  I 
believe  that  among  military  men  it  is  a  settled  principle  that  when- 
ever a  subordinate  assumes  to  depart  from  a  strict  obedience  to  the 
orders  of  his  superior,  he  takes  upon  himself  the  entire  responsibility 
of  all  that  follows  ;  and  he  can  only  protect  himself  from  the  mili- 
tary penalties  of  disobedience  by  some  brilliant  success.  I  have 
considered  that  Gen.  McClellan  was  in  that  condition ;  that  in  de- 
parting from  the  original  instructions  received  from  the  President, 
he  took  upon  himself  the  entire  responsibility  of  that  whole  move- 
ment, and  when  subsequently  the  President  found  it  necessary  to 
detain  a  part  of  McClellan's  forces  in  front  of  Washington  to  make 
good  his  original  order,  he  performed  an  act  of  imperious  duty, 
and  Gen.  McClellan  had  no  right  to  complain  of  that  act  as  an  in- 
terference with  his  command  or  as  tending  to  embarrass  his  opera- 
tions. 

"  Situated  as  Gen.  McCllelan  was  in  front  of  Washington,  under 
the  orders  of  the  President,  his  first  duty  was  to  comply  with  these 
orders — and  having  done  that,  then  to  consider  whether  he  had 
sufficient  force  to  accomplish  the  expedition  he  contemplated.  If  he 
found  that  he  had  not  a  sufficient  force  for  that  purpose,  then  he 
should  have  so  represented  to  the  President,  and  then  the  relation 
of  the  parties  would  have  been  entirely  changed,  and  the  responsi- 
bility would  have  been  entirely  with  the  President.  But  inasmuch 
as  General  McClellan  did  not  adopt  that  course,  but  went  on  his 
expedition  of  his  own  motion,  following  a  plan  different  from  that 
of  the  President,  he  took  upon  himself  the  entire  responsibility  of 
all  that  followed.  The  President,  in  yielding  to  the  plan  of  Gen. 
McClellan,  put  him  under  very  explicit  orders  to  leave  Washington 
entirely  secure,  not  only  in  his  own  opinion,  but  in  the  opinion  of 
all  the  four  commanders  of  corps-d'armee.  These  four  commanders 
gave  an  opinion.  As  I  understand  the  matter,  Gen.  McClellan  did 
not  comply  with  that  opinion,  and  therein  Gen.  McCJellan  took 
upon  himself  the  responsibility  of  all  the  results  that  grew  out  of 
his  campaign." 


NOTES.  73 

NOTE  6.— PAGE  20. 

The  Council  of  Corps  Commanders  held  at  Fairfax  Court  House, 
March  13,  1862,  were  of  opinion  (vide  McClellan's  Report,  pp.  59 
and  60) : 

"  I.  That  the  enemy  having  retreated  from  Manassas  to  Gordons- 
ville  behind  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan,  it  is  the  opinion  of  the 
generals  commanding  army  corps  that  the  operations  to  be  carried 
on  will  be  best  undertaken  from  Old  Point  Comfort,  between  the 
York  and  James  Rivers. 

"  Provided, 

"  1st.  That  the  enemy's  vessel  Merrimac  can  be  neutralized. 
"  2d.  That  the  means  of  transportation,  sufficient  for  an  immediate 
transfer  of  the  force  to  its  new  base  can  be  ready  at  Washington 
and  Alexandria  to  move  down  the  Potomac  ;  and 

"  3d.  That  a  naval  auxiliary  force  can  be  had  to  silence,  or  aid  in 
silencing  the  enemy's  batteries  on  the  York  River. 

"  4th.  That  the  force  to  be  left  to  cover  Washington  shall  be 
such  as  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security  for  its  safety  from 
menace.  (Unanimous.) 

"  II.  If  the  foregoing  cannot  be,  the  army  should  then  be  moved 
against  the  enemy,  behind  the  Rappahannock,  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  and  the  means  for  reconstructing  bridges,  repairing  rail- 
roads, and  stocking  them  with  materials  sufficient  for  supplying  the 
army,  should  at  once  be  collected  for  both  the  Orange  and  Alexan- 
dria, and  Aquia  and  Richmond  Railroads.  (Unanimous.) 

"  N.  B.  That  with  the  forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac 
fully  garrisoned  and  those  on  the  left  bank  occupied,  a  covering 
force  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line  of  25,000  men  would  suffice, 
(Keys,  Heintzelman  and  McDowell.)  A  total  of  40,000  men  for 
the  defence  of  the  city  would  suffice.  (Sumner.)" 

It  is  to  be  particularly  observed  that,  if  the  four  conditions  or 
provisos  imposed  upon  the  adoption  of  the  first  plan  "  cannot  be," 
then  "  the  army  should  be  moved  against  the  enemy  behind  the 
Rappahannock,  &c." 

Now  the  "  enemy's  vessel,  the  Merrimac"  was  not  neutralized, 
and  nothing  was  established  concerning  her  further  than  that  she 
should  not  be  permitted  to  escape  from  Hampton  Roads. 

As  to  the  second  proviso,  the  council  does  not  fix  what  it  means 
by  an  "  immediate  transfer,"  but  it  is  well  known  that  only  trans- 


74  NOTE8. 

portation  for  part  of  the  army,  at  a  time,  could  b?<  furnished,  and 
that  three  weeks  were  consumed  in  getting  less  than  three  corps  to 
Fort  Monroe. 

As  to  the  third  proviso,  the  council  define  with  some  precision 
what  they  mean  by  their  emphatic  language  "  the  force  left  to  cover 
Washington  shall  be  such  as  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security  for 
its  safety  from  menace" 

If  these  conditions  cannot  be  fulfilled,  the  army  is  to  be  at  once 
"  moved  against  the  enemy  behind  the  Rappahannock."  The  con- 
ditions were  not  fulfilled,  nay  more,  they  were  completely  dis- 
regarded, and  in  his  conduct  in  thus  disregarding  the  counsels  of 
others  as  to  the  safety  of  Washington,  and  leading  his  army  into  a 
region,  of  which  he  had  no  knowledge,  Gen.  McClellan  exhibited  at 
least  infatuation  and  levity  of  conduct,  not  to  speak  of  the  graver 
aspect  of  his  course  as  a  positive  disobedience  of  orders. 


NOTE  7.— PAGE  23. 

The  following  English  criticism  may  properly  find  place  here. 
(United  Service  Magazine,  February,  1864)  : 

"  As  regards  the  value  of  the  plan,  in  a  merely  military  point  of 
view,  three  faults  may  be  enumerated  :  1st.  It  was  too  rash.  2d. 
It  violated  the  principles  of  war.  3d.  Its  application  was  too 
timid. 

"  1st.  An  army  of  130,000  volunteers  should  not  be  moved 
about  as  if  it  were  a  single  division. 

"2d.  The  choice  of  Fortress  Monroe,  as  a  secondary  basis,  involved 
the  necessity  of  leaving  Washington,  or  the  fixed  basis,  to  be  threat- 
ened, morally  at  least,  by  the  enemy.  The  communications  also 
between  these  two  places  were  open  to  an  attack  from  the  Merrimac, 
an  iron-plated  ship,  which  lay  at  Norfolk  on  the  south  side  of  Hamp- 
ton Roads. 

"  The  first  movement  to  Fortress  Monroe  was  the  stride  of  a 
giant.  The  second,  in  the  direction  of  Richmond,  was  that  of  a 
dwarf.  When  the  army  arrived  in  front  of  the  lines  at  Yorktown, 
it  numbered,  probably,  100,000  men,  and  here  there  was  no  timid 
President  to  interfere  with  the  command ;  nevertheless  McClellan 
suffered  himself  to  be  stopped  in  the  middle  of  an  offensive  cam- 


NOTES.  ID 

paign  by  Magruder  and  12,000  men.  His  previous  information, 
which  was  afterwards  found  to  be  incorrect,  had  stated  this  number 
at  20,000,  and  Magruder  made  such  skilful  dispositions  as  effectually 
completed  the  deception.  But  a  general  who,  as  Napoleon  used  to 
say,  knows  his  trade,  will  seldom  be  deceived.  Why  did  he  not 
take  means  to  ascertain  the  truth  ?  Supposing,  however,  that  his 
previous  information  had  been  correct,  he  should  not  have  wasted 
his  time  waiting  for  McDowell  when  every  moment  of  it  was  pre- 
cious. But  every  hour's  delay  after  he  had  heard  of  that  general's 
retention,  created  eighty  chances  to  one  against  his  ultimate  success. 
The  hour  of  his  arrival  in  front  of  the  lines  should  have  been  the 
hour  of  his  attack  upon  them.  Two  overwhelming  masses,  to  which 
life  and  energy  had  been  communicated,  should  have  been  hurled  on 
separate  points.  Magruder  not  only  defeated  but  destroyed !  The 
morale  of  the  Federal  army  raised !  The  result  of  the  campaign, 
although  it  might  not  have  been  decisive,  would  have  been  more 
honorable.'' 


NOTE  8.— PAGE  25. 

The  Prince  de  Joinville  alludes  as  follows  to  the  route  taken  : 
"  On  May  16th  "  (the  Prince  was  with  head-quarters)  "  we  reached 
the  White  House,  etc.  *  *  *  *  * 

"  At  AVhite  House  the  Pamunkey  ceases  to  be  navigable.  The 
York  Eiver  Railroad,  which  unites  Richmond  with  this  river,  crosses 
it  at  this  point  by  a  bridge,  which  the  enemy  had  destroyed,  and 
then  runs  in  almost  a  straight  line  to  the  Virginian  capital.  This 
road  had  been  scarcely  injured.  Having  neither  embankments  nor 
viaducts  it  was  not  easy  to  destroy  it.  A  few  rails  only  had  been 
removed,  and  were  soon  replaced ;  all  the  rolling  stock  had  been 
run  off,  but  the  Federal  army  had  locomotives  and  cars  on  board  of  its 
transports.  The  whole  flotilla  was  unloaded  at  White  House,  where 
a  vast  depot  was  established  under  the  protection  of  the  gunboats, 
and  all  the  bustle  of  a  seaport  soon  became  visible.  The  army  re- 
commenced its  march  to  Richmond,  following  the  line  of  the  rail- 
way, which  was  to  be  the  vital  artery  of  its  operations." 


76  NOTES. 

NOTB  9.— PAGE  28. 

General  Heintzelmau  testifies  as  follows  (pp.  351  and  352,  Report 
of  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War) : 

"  As  soon  as  I  had  found  the  attack  was  serious,  I  had  sent  an 
officer  over  to  inform  Gen.  Sumner  and  Gen.  McClellan.  Gen. 
McClellan  at  once  ordered  Gen.  Sumner  to  cross  his  troops  over  the 
Chickahominy.  However,  Gen.  Sumner,  as  soon  as  he  had  heard 
the  firing,  and  without  waiting  for  orders,  had  put  his  troops  under 
arms  and  marched  them  out  of  camp,  thus  saving  an  hour  or  so, 
which  was  of  great  service  to  us.  There  was  one  brigade  of  Gen. 
Casey's  division,  under  Gen.  Naglee,  on  our  extreme  right,  that 
held  its  position  pretty  well.  The  centre  gave  way,  and  fell  back 
some  distance.  We  succeeded  in  rallying  them  and  repulsed  the 
enemy.  My  right  held  its  ground  until  some  time  after  dark,  when 
it  fell  back  and  joined  us  in  the  field-works  we  had  thrown  up  a  little 
west  of  the  Chickahominy.  In  the  night  I  got  a  telegram  from  Gen. 
McClellan  that  he  wanted  to  see  me  at  the  railroad  station  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy.  I  got  on  a  locomotive  and 
went  down  there  and  saw  him.  I  told  him  what  had  occurred  and 
what  we  could  do.  He  said  that  he  relied  upon  my  holding  the 
position  we  then  occupied,  and  that  he  would  either  spend  that  night 
with  Gen.  Sumner,  or  come  over  the  next  morning  to  keep  rank  off 
me,  as  he  said  Gen.  Sumner  ranked  me.  When  I  got  back  I  got  a 
note  from  Gen.  Sumner,  saying  that  from  all  he  could  learn  he  ex- 
pected to  be  attacked  with  overwhelming  force  in  the  morning,  and 
wanted  me  to  assist  him.  I  replied  that  any  aid  I  could  give  him 
he  should  have. 

"  In  the  morning  I  went  to  the  front,  and  had  not  been  there  long 
before  I  heard  firing  in  the  direction  of  Gen.  Sumner's  forces.  I 
had  the  half  of  Gen.  Hooker's  division  there  ;  the  other  half  was  at 
Bottom's  Bridge.  I  immediately  sent  that  half  division  forward  in 
the  direction  of  the  firing.  They  soon  met  the  enemy,  who  were 
repulsed  by  Gen.  Sumner's  troops  and  mine.  The  whole  affair  was 
over  in  a  very  short  time. 

"  About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  Gen.  McClellan  came  over 
to  my  headquarters  and  congratulated  me  on  our  success  ;  and  said 
that  he  had  relied  upon  my  doing  what  I  had  promised  him." 

General  Sumner  testifies  (pp.  362  and  363) : 

"  On  reaching  Fair  Oaks  I  was  met  by  Gen.  Couch,  who  told  me 


NOTES. 


77 


that  he  had  been  separated  by  the  enemy  from  the  rest  of  the  army, 
and  was  expecting  an  attack  every  moment.  I  formed  this  division 
of  Sedgwick  together  with  Couch's  troops,  assuming  command  of 
the  whole  as  quickly  as  possible,  with  a  battery  of  artillery  between 
the  two  divisions.  Before  the  formation  was  completed  the  enemy, 
made  a  ferocious  attack  on  my  centre,  evidently  with  the  expectation 
of  getting  possession  of  my  battery.  My  forces  were  formed  in  two 
lines,  nearly  at  right  angles.  I  had  six  regiments  in  hand  on  the 
left  of  the  battery.  After  sustaining  a  very  severe  fire  for  some 
time,  those  six  regiments  charged  directly  into  the  woods,  crossing 
a  broken-down  fence  in  doing  so.  The  enemy  then  fled,  and  the 
action  was  over  for  that  day.  During  that  night,  Saturday  night,  I 
succeeded  in  getting  yp  Richardson's  division  and  formed  it  parallel 
with  the  railroad.  About  7|-  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning  the  troops 
became  engaged  on  the  railroad.  It  is  not  exactly  certain  which 
party  fired  first.  A  very  severe  fight  continued  then  for  the  space 
of  three  or  four  hours,  in  which  I  lost  many  valuable  officers  and 
men  ;  the  enemy  were  then  entirely  routed,  and  fled.  There  was 
fighting  on  the  same  day  on  my  left  by  a  portion  of  Gen.  Heintzel- 
man's  troops,  but  that  was  at  such  a  distance  that  I  have  myself  no 
knowledge  of  the  circumstances.  There  was  no  communication  at 

that  time  between  us. 

****** 

"  Question.  Who  had  the  command  at  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  or 
Seven  Pines  ]  They  are  the  same  thing  under  those  two  names,  I 
understand. 

"  Answer.  No,  sir,  they  were  two  distinct  places.  The  battle  in 
which  I  commanded  on  Saturday  and  Sunday  was  at  Fair  Oaks. 
The  battle  of  Seven  Pines  was  a  separate  battle  some  miles  from 
Fair  Oaks.  Gen.  Heintzelman  was  in  command  at  Seven 
Pines." 

"  Question.  Where  was  Gen.  McClellan  during  those  battles  ? 

"  Answer.  Gen.  McClellan  came  over  to  me  at  Fair  Oaks  about 
12  o'clock  on  Sunday.  The  action  of  Sunday  had  then  ceased.  I 
asked  him  at  once  if  he  had  any  orders  to  give.  He  said  no  ;  that 
he  had  no  changes  to  make ;  that  he  was  satisfied  with  what  had 
been  done." 

So  incoherent  was  the  whole  affair,  that  Gen.  Sumner  states  that 
the  battle  of  the  Seven  Pines  was  "  a  separate  battle"  from  that  at 
which  he  commanded  ("  Fair  Oaks").  He  is  mistaken,  however, 


78  NOTES. 

in  his  assertion  that  it  was  "  several  miles"  from  Fair  Oaks  ;  it  was 
scarcely  more  than  a  mile. 

The  railroad  station  on  the  other  side  "  of  the  Chickahominy"  at 
which  Gen.  Heintzelman  had  his  interview  with  Gen.  McClellan  on 
Saturday  night,  was  just  about  seven  miles  by  railroad  from  the  two 
fields,  and  about  7.30  Sunday  morning  the  fighting  was  resumed 
at  Fair  Oaks,  and  a  "  severe  fight  continued  there  for  the  space  of 
three  or  four  hours."  Gen.  McClellan  made  his  presence  on  the 
field  known  to  Gen.  Sumner  at  12  M.  and  to  Gen.  Heintzelman  at 
2  P.  M.  He  had  told  Gen.  Heintzelman  that  he  would  be  on  the 
field  the  same  night  or  "  the  next  morning,"  to  "  keep  rank  off  him" 
(Heintzelman).  It  would  appear,  therefore,  that,  failing  to  notify 
Heintzelman  that  he  was  to  be  under  the  orders  of  Sumner — posi- 
tively encouraging  him  to  feel  himself  independent  of  Sumner — he 
failed  to  appear  himself,  and  left  the  two  generals  to  do  their  own 
fighting  "  on  their  own  hook." 


NOTE  9;J.— PAGE  28. 

In  reference  to  this  paragraph,  it  is  proper  to  say  that  the  way  of 
getting  the  right  wing  over  the  Chickahominy  (in  other  words  of 
"  uniting  the  two  wings  of  the  army")  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
battle,  "  make  a  vigorous  pursuit,"  or  to  do  whatever  else  the  occa- 
sion might  require,  was  the  one  theme  in  the  minds  of  all,  at  Head- 
quarters as  elsewhere.  The  bridges  over  the  river  had  been  ordered 
the  night  before,  and  Col.  Alexander  had  spent  the  whole  night  in 
bridging  the  numerous  ditches  intersecting  the  bottom  lands,  all  for 
this  single  object.  Gen.  Smith's  division  had  been  ordered  down  to 
the  "  New  Bridge,"  and  Brook's  brigade  was  waiting  at  the  bridge 
for  the  order  to  pass. 

I  have  stated  in  my  official  report  (p.  35)  that  the  "  New  Bridge 
was  passable"  for  all  arms  at  8.15  A.  M.  ;  that  a  few  hours  later  I 
found  the  bottom  lands  so  completely  overflowed  that,  while  the 
enemy  held  the  commanding  heights  in  front  with  artillery,  I  did  not 
think  the  passage  practicable ;  and  that  at  that  moment  I  was  ut- 
terly ignorant  of  the  condition  of  affairs  on  the  other  side.  The 
preceding  evening  had  brought  us  gloomy  accounts  of  our  situation. 
The  battle  had  been  renewed  in  the  morning,  and  was  going  on.  I 
knew  nothing  whether  it  was  with  success  or  with  additional  disas- 


NOTES.  79 

ter  to  us.  Now  the  time  of  this  report  from  me  was  actually  about 
(somewhat  preceding)  that  of  the  final  repulse  of  the  rebels  by 
Gen.  Su inner.  It  was  the  very  time  at  which  to  decide  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  our  victory  to  sweep  the  hostile  forces  from  the  heights 
facing  "  New  Bridge,"  and  to  bring  over  our  right  wing — "  unite"  it 
to  the  left,  and  "  make  a  vigorous  pursuit,"  etc. 


NOTE  10.— PAGE  32. 

The  only  bridges  existing  might  have  been  seized  by  the  enemy 
simultaneously  with  his  attack,  as  pointed  out  in  the  following  ex- 
tracts : 

"  The  left  cannot  be  turned,  being  protected  by  the  impenetrable 
morasses  of  White  Oak  Swamp  ;  but  the  right  might  be  surrounded. 
At  this  very  moment,  indeed,  a  strong  Confederate  column  is  mov- 
ing in  that  direction.  If  it  succeeded  in  getting  between  Bottom's 
Bridge  and  the  Federal  troops  who  are  fighting  at  Savage's  Station, 
the  whole  left  wing  is  lost.  It  will  have  no  retreat  left,  and  must 
be  overwhelmed.  But  exactly  at  this  moment  (6  o'clock  p.  M.)  new 
actors  came  upon  the  stage." — (Prince  de  Joinville.) 

"  Had  the  attack  which  Sumner  met  and  repulsed  been  made 
simultaneously  with  the  assault  in  front,  a  single  battalion,  nay,  a 
single  company,  could  have  seized  and  destroyed  "  Sumner's  Upper 
Bridge,"  the  only  one,  as  before  remarked,  then  passable..  Sumner 
would  consequently  have  been  unable  to  take  part  in  the  battle, 
and  our  left  wing  would  have  been  taken  in  flank,  and,  in  all  prob- 
ability, defeated. — ("  The  Peninsular  Campaign"  Atlantic  Monthly. 
March,  1864.) 


NOTE  11.— PAGE  32. 

A  sentence  in  the  President's  dispatch  of  this  period  (May  24th), 
"I  wish  you  to  move  cautiously  and  safely,"  is  italicized  by  Gen. 
McClellari  as  approving  of  and  justifying  the  astonishingly  dilatory 
proceedings  intended  to  be  considered  "  cautious"  and  "  safe."  This 
was  while  Heintzelman  and  Keyes  were  for  a  whole  week  lying  in 
their  remarkably  "  safe"  positions. 


80  NOTES. 

NOTE  12.— PAGE  36. 

The  following  is  Gen.  McClellan's  testimony,  pp.  432-33  (1)  : 

Question. — "  When  were  those  bridges  completed,  or  were  they 
ever  completed  T' 

Answer.  "  The  most  important  ones  were  completed,  I  should 
think,  about  the  20th  of  May — not  far  from  then." 

Question.  "  After  the  completion  of  the  bridges,  why  was  not 
the  attempt  made  to  drive  the  enemy  from  that  position  ?" 

Answer.  "  The  main  causes  of  the  delay  were,  I  think,  the  condi- 
tion of  the  ground  and  the  necessity  for  finishing  the  defensive  works 
regarded  as  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  army  should  it  meet  with 
a  disaster  in  the  attack." 

Question.  "  At  what  point  were  the  defensive  works  to  which  you 
refer  ?" 

Answer.  "  They  were  mainly  in  the  vicinity  of  the  battle-field  of 
Fair  Oaks,  and  then  to  the  right  of  that,  looking  to  the  position  of 
the  enemy  at  New  Bridge.  The  affair  of  the  25th  of  June  was  the 
beginning  of  the  operations  against  the  enemy.  I  had  expected  to 
attack  the  position  in  rear  of  New  Bridge  by  the  26th  or  27th  of 
June,  but  was  prevented  by  the  series  of  occurrences  known  as  the 
seven  days'  battle." 

The  "  defensive  works"  were  to  be  completed,  as  per  Report 
(p.  21),  June  21.  The  "  condition  of  the  ground"  was  good  enough 
at  any  time  after  those  dates. 


NOTE  43.— PAGE  39. 

Magruder's  language  as  quoted  by  Pollard,  is : 

"  Had  McClellan  massed  his  whole  force  in  column,  and  ad- 
vanced it  against  any  point  of  our  line  of  battle,  as  was  done  at 
Austerlitz,  under  similar  circumstances,  by  the  greatest  captain  of 
any  age,  though  the  head  of  the  column  would  have  suffered  greatly, 
its  momentum  would  have  insured  him  success,  and  the  occupation 
of  our  works  about  Richmond,  and  consequently  of  the  city,  might 
have  been  his  reward." 

Pollard,  it  is  true,  attempts  to  refute  Magruder,  and  says  that  by 
12  M.  of  Friday  (June  27)  the  communications  of  Lee's  main 
body  with  Richmond  were  re-established  by  the  possession  of  the 
New  Bridge.  But  the  attack  described  by  Magruder  should  have 


NOTES.  81 

been  made  by  daylight  on  Friday.  Whether  at  that  hour,  or 
later,  was  immaterial,  however,  so  far  as  the  isolation  of  Lee  was 
concerned,  for  part  of  our  operation  would  have  been  to  occupy  the 
heights  from  Dr.  Garnett's  house  to  opposite  Mechanicsville  with 
artillery.  Lee  could  not  have  repassed  the  Chickahominy  without 
great  delays  and  disastrous  losses,  and  time  would  have  been 
acquired  for  all  that  Magruder  describes. 


NOTE  14. — PAGE  40. 

Mr.  Hiram  Ketcham  of  New  York  has  made  a  praiseworthy 
effort  to  illustrate  Gen.  McClellan's  military  exploits ;  in  doing 
which  he  has  apparently  considered  it  necessary  to  his  purpose  to 
convict  me  of  baseness  of  conduct  and  of  being  actuated  by  dis- 
honorable motives.  He  finds  it  "  melancholy  to  think  that  men, 
who  never  lack  courage  in  the  field  of  battle,  should  ever  fail  to 
speak  their  honest  conviction  where  they  have  reason  to  suppose 
their  undisguised  convictions  will  give  offence  to  those  in  power." 

He  sees  "  a  melancholy  example  of  this  truth  in  the  case  of  Gen. 
Barnard,"  and  does  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  I  "  knew  what  kind 
of  testimony  the  Committee  wanted,"  and  to  insinuate  that  I  shaped 
it  accordingly  (I  was  unconscious  that  such  a  Committee  yet  existed 
when  I  wrote  the  report  which  constitutes  the  bulk  of  my  "  testi- 
mony.") 

I  should  not  have  noticed  this  "  Heraclitus"  among  military 
critics,  this  "  melancholy"  libeler  of  the  moral  character  of  others, 
and  sorry  apologist  of  Gen.  McClellan,  but  for  a  letter  to  him  of 
F.  J.  Porter,  written  to  "  bear  cheerful  testimony  to  the  accuracy  of 
his  statements  in  reviewing  the  operations  of  this  campaign,  and  to 
the  soundness  of  his  "  conclusions." 

In  this  letter  the  writer  says,  "  But  what  induced  me  to  address 
this  note  to  you  at  this  time  is  your  recent  review  of  the  battle  of 
Games'  Mill.  Our  forces  which  amounted  to  32,000  were  under  my 
command  in  that  battle.  The  force  of  the  enemy  brought  against 
us  was  more  than  double  our  number.  If,  in  this  battle,  I  had  been 
reinforced  in  time  with  15,000  fresh  troops,  the  enemy  who  was 
repulsed  three  times  would  have  been  finally  driven  back  and  the 
battle  won  on  our  side." 

Whatever  the  above    "  cheerful  testimony"  may  be,   in   other 


82  NOTES. 

respects,  it  is  a  "  stunner"  indeed  in  its  bearings  upon  the  general- 
ship of  his  Chief.  Fighting  a  decisive  battle  with  32,000  men 
against  double  numbers  of  an  enemy  who  employed  the  bulk  of  his 
army  in  the  attack,  leaving  between  us  and  Richmond  only  just 
enough  troops  to  keep  up  a  show  of  force,  while  nearly  70,000  of 
our  men  lay  idle  a  few  miles  distant,  witnesses  almost  of  the  battle 
— it  becomes  evident  to  the  dullest  comprehension  that  (in  F.  J. 
Porter's  words)  "  all  we  wanted  to  insure  success  before  Richmond 
was  the  reinforcements  which  had  been  repeatedly  called  for  by 
Gen.  McClellan,  and  which  by  a  vigorous  and  prompt  effort  could 
have  been  supplied." 


NOTE  15. — PAGE  42. 

Pollard's  "Second  Year  of  the  War"  has  the  following  para- 
graph: 

"The  assault  of  the  enemy's  works  near  Games'  Mill  is  a  memor- 
able part  of  the  engagement  of  Friday,  and  the  display  of  fortitude, 
as  well  as  quick  and  dashing  gallantry  of  our  troops  on  that  occa- 
sion, takes  its  place  by  the  side  of  the  most  glorious  exploits  of  the 
war.  Gen.  A.  P.  Hill  had  made  the  first  assault  upon  the  lines  of 
the  enemy's  intrenchments  near  Gaines  Mill.  A  fierce  struggle 
had  ensued  between  his  division  and  the  garrison  of  the  line  of  de- 
fence. Repeated  charges  were  made  by  Hill's  troops,  but  the 
formidable  character  of  the  works,  and  murderous  volleys  from  the 

artillery  covering  them,  kept  our  troops  in  check." 

*  *  *  *  *  * 

"  The  works  carried  by  our  noble  troops  would  have  been  in- 
vincible to  the  bayonet,  had  they  been  garrisoned  by  men  less 
dastardly  than  the  Yankees.  All  had  been  done  on  our  side  with 
the  bullet  and  the  bayonet.  For  four  hours  had  our  inferior  force, 
unaided  by  a  single  piece  of  artillery,  withstood  over  30,000, 
assisted  by  26' pieces  of  artillery ." 

The  above  quotations  are  made  in  order  to  contradict  their  auda- 
cious misrepresentations. 

The  battle  of  "  Gaines'  Mill"  was  fought  on  unfortified  ground,  all 
our  fortifications  being  guarded  by  the  70,000  men  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river.  There  was  not  a  defensive  work  of  any  kind  on  that 
side  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  as  to  the  "  inferior  force"  of  the 


NOTES.  83 

rebels,  there  were  by  Pollard's  own  statements  present,  the  corps 
of  Jackson  estimated  at  35,000 ;  the  corps  of  Longstreet,  consist- 
ing of  his  own  division  and  that  of  D.  II.  Hill ;  the  corps  of  A.  P. 
Hill  ("  about  14,000  men"— Pollard)  and  the  troops  of  Brig.-Gen. 
Branch  (number  unknown).  The  number  of  65,000,  given  after- 
wards in  the  Richmond  papers,  is  fully  made  up  in  the  above 
organizations.  Porter's  corps  (including  McCall)  numbered  about 
27,000  ;  it  was  reinforced  to  about  35,000,  but  Slocum's  d  ivision, 
the  only  reinforcement  that  took  part  in  the  battle,  kept  on  its  legs 
from  7  A.  M.,  did* not  get  into  action  until  3.30  P.  M. 

Concerning  the  manner  in  which  reinforcements  were  actually 
furnished  to  Porter,  the  following  extract  is  made  from  Gen.  Frank- 
lin's testimony,  showing  how  the  only  body  of  men  that  actually 
did  reach  Porter  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle,  was  handled  : 

"  At  7  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  that  day  I  was  ordered  to  send 
Gen.  Slocum's  division  to  assist  Gen.  Porter.  This  order  was  coun- 
termanded about  9  o'clock,  after  a  part  of  the  division  had  crossed 
the  Chickahominy  ;  the  division  was  then  sent  to  its  old  position.  I 
was  again  ordered  about  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  to  send  it  to  the 
assistance  of  Gen.  Porter.  It  did  go  over  and  was  severely  engaged, 
losing  nearly  2,000  men. 

"  Question.  Do  you  know  why  the  order  for  Slocum's  division  to 
move  forward  was  countermanded  ? 

"Answer.  The  order  to  send  the  division  over  was  signed  by  Col. 
Colburn,  and  I  sent  back  some  word,  I  do  not  remember  what.  Gen. 
Marcy  answered  that  he  hardly  supposed  the  general  commanding 
could  have  intended  to  send  the  division  over ;  that  there  must  have 
been  some  mistake  about  it,  he  thought.  Then  about  9  o'clock, 
perhaps  nearly  10,  the  order  was  countermanded,  the  order  coun- 
termanding coming  from  Gen.  McClellan,  although  I  do  not  remem- 
ber who  signed  it.  What  was  the  reason  for  ordering  the  division 
back  I  do  not  know." 

At  5  P.M.,  when  the  fortunes  of  the  day  had  become  desperate,  the 
brigades  of  French  and  Meagher  were  ordered  over,  arriving,  as 
might  be  supposed,  too  late  to  render  any  important  service ;  in- 
deed, I  heard  at  the  time,  that  the  shouts  of  Meagher's  men  caused 
our  troops  in  front  to  believe  the  rebels  had  got  in  their  rear,  and 
thus  increased  the  disorder." 


84  NOTES. 


NOTE  16.— PAGE  43. 

Pollard  describes  the  works  on  each  side  of  the  railroad  as  "  turn- 
ing out  to  be  an  immense  embrasured  fortification,  extending  for 
hundreds  of  yards  on  either  side  of  the  track." 

As  these  works  were  not  taken  by  "  assault "  from  the  "  dastardly 
Yankees,"  he  has  no  reason  for  the  exaggeration,  or  rather  falsehood 
used  in  reference  to  the  imaginary  "  intrenchments  near  Games' 
Mill  j"  nor  are  the  words  used  a  very  great  exaggeration  of  the 
truth.  Their  "  defensive  works,"  though  styled  by  Gen.  McClellan 
"  slight  earthworks,"  were  heavier  works  than  those  at  Manassas 
and  Centreville,  which  he  has,  with  another  object,  characterized  as 
"  strong  lines  of  intrenchments,"  "  heavy  earth- works,"  etc. 


NOTE  17.— PAGE  43. 

General  Franklin  testifies  as  follows : 

"  Question.  If  there  was  a  necessity  to  keep  a  portion  of  our 
troops  on  the  left  bank  to  do  that,  ought  there  not  to  have  been 
communications  opened  from  the  one  bank  to  the  other,  so  that  the 
two  wings  could  have  been  united  without  delay  ? 

"Answer.  That  was  impossible,  as  the  land  lay  then,  without 
whipping  the  enemy  at  Old  Tavern,  opposite  New  Bridge. 

"  Question.  In  your  judgment  should  not  the  enemy  have  been 
driven  from  that  position  instead  of  being  allowed  to  remain  there  ? 

"  Answer.  They  should  have  been ;  and  I  think  that  ought  to 
have  been  done  by  concentrating  the  whole  army  on  the  same  side 
of  the  river  before  making  the  attack.  I  think  the  whole  of  Fitz- 
John  Porter's  command  ought  to  have  been  withdrawn  to  the  right 
bank  of  the  river  on  the  night  of  the  26th  of  June,  instead  of  fight- 
ing where  they  did  the  next  day." 


NOTE  18. — PAGE  44. 

In  Gen.  McClellan's  self-satisfied  and  self-laudatory  report  of 
June  15th,  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill  and  the  holding  of  the  enemy 
"  at  bay,"  were  but  necessary  incidents  to  the  "  changing  of  base" 


NOTES.  85 

• 

to  the  James,  and  he  sends  Gen.  Woodbury  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  "  to  increase  the  number  of  bridges  "  over  the  White  Oak 
Swamp,  as  if  some  had  already  been  made.  All  the  bridges  and  pas- 
sages of  the  White  Oak  Swamp  had  long  been,  as  Gen.  McClellan 
well  knew,  destroyed  and  obstructed,  and  when  Gen.  Woodbury 
arrived  at  White  Oak  Swamp  Bridge,  on  the  morning  of  the  28th, 
he  found  Gen.  Peck  still  engaged  in  increasing  the  obstructions.  The 
confusion  of  ideas  between  retreating  to  the  James  and  "  taking 
Richmond  "  pervades  all  the  statements  in  relation  to  this  period. 
In  answer  to  one  question  he  tells  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  that  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill  enabled  him  "  to  withdraw 
the  army  and  its  material ;"  and  in  another  he  tells  them  that  the 
retreat  to  the  James  was  only  "  a  contingency  he  thought  of.  But 
my  impression  is,  that  up  to  the  time  of  the  battle  of  Games'  Mill, 
I  still  hoped  that  we  should  be  able  to  hold  our  own." 

In  his  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  June  28th,  12.20  A.M. 
(p.  131),  the  General  says  :  "  Had  I  20,000,  or  even  10,000,  fresh 
troops  to  use  to-morrow,  I  could  take  Richmond.  *  *  *  If,  at 
this  instant,  I  could  dispose  of  10,000  fresh  men,  I  could  gain  the 
victory  to-morrow."  Quite  likely  that  he  could,  even  without  the 
additional  men  •  that  is,  that  an  able  commander  could  have  done 
so.  But,  after  having  previously  stated  that  his  enemy  was  nearly 
double  his  own  force  in  numbers— that  Richmond  was  defended  by 
strong  works — this  assertion  on  the  very  heels  of  a  disastrous  de- 
feat !  Let  the  reader,  even  though  he  has  been  one  of  those  who 
have  laid  all  the  blame  of  the  disastrous  failure  of  Gen.  McClellan's 
campaign  on  the  administration,  and  has  vilified  it  for  putting  on 
the  shelf  its  "  ablest "  commander,  attentively  read  the  dispatches 
published  in  this  Report,  and  say  what  confidence  any  administra- 
tion could,  at  this  period,  have  in  their  author.  The  dispatch  just 
quoted  from,  winds  up  by  telling  the  Secretary  of  War,  "  You  have 
done  your  best  to  sacrifice  this  army  !" 


NOTE  19. — PAGE  45. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  testimony  of  Generals  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  Franklin,  and  McCall  are  given  in  this  connection. 
Gen.  Franklin's  story  is  very  brief,  but  pertinent : 

"  Not  being  able  to  communicate  with  head-quarters  I  determined 
to  evacuate  the  position  (i.  e.,  at  White  Oak  Swamp  Bridge)  at  10 


86  NOTES. 

• 

o'clock  at  night,  and  fall  back  to  the  James  River.    Before  evacuat- 
ing I  sent  word  to  Gen.  Heintzelman  that  I  was  about  to  leave." 

Sumner.  "  That  action  also  closed  at  dark.  About  8  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  while  we  were  collecting  the  wounded  and  dead,  Gen. 
Seymour  came  to  me  and  told  me  that  Gen.  Franklin  had  retreated, 
and  that  Gen.  Heintzelman  was  preparing  to  follow  him.  I  had  re- 
ceived no  orders  to  retreat,  and  should  not  have  retreated  if  I  had 
not  received  this  information.  But  finding  myself  left  with  my 
corps  entirely  unsupported,  I  felt  compelled  to  fall  back  with  the 
rest  of  the  army  to  Malvern.  I  accordingly  fell  back  and  reported 
at  day-light  the  next  morning  to  Gen.  McClellan  on  the  James 
River.  He  told  me  that  he  had  intended  that  the  army  should  have 
held  on  where  they  were  the  day  before,  and  that  no  orders  had 
been  sent  to  retreat;  but  as  the  rest  of  the  army  had  fallen  back,  he 
was  very  glad  I  had  done  so.  The  next  morning  the  troops  were 
placed  in  position  by  direction  of  Gen.  McClellan,  under  the  imme- 
diate orders  of  the  Engineer  officers.  The  action  at  Malvern  com- 
menced on  the  left  about  10  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Gen.  McClel- 
lan had  deemed  it  necessary  to  go  down  to  Harrison's  Landing  to 
determine  on  the  point  to  which  the  troops  were  to  retire.  I 
therefore  found  myself,  by  virtue  of  my  seniority  of  rank,  in  com- 
mand of  the  army,  without  having  been  invested  formally  with  that 
command,  or  having  received  any  instructions  in  relation  to  it." 

Heintzelman.  w  About  that  time  it  got  to  be  dusk  and  soon 
after  that  the  firing  ceased,  except  some  little  cannonading.  I  met 
three  of  Gen.  McClellan's  aides,  and  by  one  of  them  I  had  sent  word 
how  we  were  situated  and  what  I  thought  could  be  done.  I  thought 
we  could  not  hold  our  position,  but  would  have  to  fall  back.  About 
8  or  9  o'clock  that  night  an  officer  came  to  me  and  told  me  that 
Gen.  Franklin  had  fallen  back  from  White  Oak  Swamp  Bridge.  I 
could  not  believe  it,  because  that  at  once  gave  the  enemy  a  chance 
to  cut  us  off.  After  a  while  Gen.  Seymour  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves  came  to  me  and  told  me  the  same  thing.  I  asked  him  if 
he  was  sent  to  inform  me,  and  he  said  he  was  not.  I  then  said  that 
was  no  authority  for  me  and  that  I  could  not  fall  back.  Gen. 
Slocum  wanted  me  to  fall  back.  I  said  that  I  was  ordered  to  hold 
the  position  and  must  obey  orders  ;  that  I  had  sent  to  head-quarters 
to  report  the  condition  of  affairs,  and  expected  to  get  an  answer.  I 


NOTES.  87 

sent  an  aide  to  learn  the  facts.  He  came  back  and  reported  that 
Gen.  Franklin  had  actually  fallen  back,  and  the  enemy  were  repair- 
ing the  bridge  and  would  soon  be  over.  I  then  made  arrangements 
to  fall  back.  I  went  to  Gen.  Sumner's  head-quarters  and  got  him  to 
write  a  note  to  Gen.  McClellan  and  state  to  him  what  had  occurred." 

Me  Call.  "  To  McCall's  division  was  assigned  by  order  of  the 
General-in-Chief  (through  Gen.  Porter)  a  position  a  short  distance 
in  front  of  the  point,  where  the  line  of  march  turned  abruptly 
from  the  Newmarket  road  towards  the  river.  I  accordingly 
formed  my  divisions  in  two  lines  crossing  at  right  angles  the 
Newmarket  road,  and  in  front  of  the  Turkey  Bridge  or  Quaker 
road  leading  to  the  river,  and  along  which  the  trains  were  then 
moving.  Sumner's  position  was  at  some  distance  to  the  left  of 
mine  and  somewhat  retired ;  Hooker  was  on  Sumner's  left  and 
slightly  advanced ;  Kearney  was  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  road 
and  consequently  on  my  right ;  there  was  more  or  less  interval  be- 
tween each  two.  The  Confederate  forces  advanced  from  Richmond 
down  the  Newmarket  road,  Lee's  object  being  to  cut  or  break 
through  the  Union  army  at  this  point.  Had  he  succeeded  in  doing 
so,  he  could  have  seized  and  strongly  occupied  the  only  two  ap- 
proaches to  James  River  and  then  the  left  wing  of  our  army 
(Heintzelman's  and  Franklin's  corps)  would  inevitably  have  been 
cut  off  from  McClellan,  and  the  right  wing  would  have  been  taken 
in  rear  on  its  march.  That  this  was  Lee's  object,  as  it  was  his 
expectation  to  accomplish  it,  is  established  by  the  declaration  of 
Gen.  Longstreet,  that,  if  McCall's  division  had  not  fought  as  well 
as  it  did,  they  would  have  captured  the  Federal  army.  (See  Sur- 
geon Marsh's  testimony  herewith.)  And  from  the  disposition  of 
Lee's  forces  it  necessarily  followed  that  the  brunt  of  the  attack 
would  be  on  my  position.  It  was  so ;  and  to  my  division,  which 
had  been  fighting  and  marching  for  four  days  and  nights  without 
rest  for  a  single  night,  it  was  indeed  a  desperate  affair.  My  divi- 
sion, with  the  exception  of  an  unimportant  reinforcement,  had 
fought  the  battle  of  Mechanicsville  single-handed,  on  the  26th,  and 
had  inflicted  on  Lee  the  only  defeat  the  Confederates  acknowledged 
they  sustained  in  front  of  Richmond ;  their  own  accounts  admit- 
ting they  were  repulsed  at  every  point  with  unparalleled  loss.  On 
the  27th  my  division  fought  again  at  Games'  Mill,  and  having  lost 
heavily  in  the  last  battle,  they  were  now  reduced  to  about  6,000 


88  NOTES. 

men.  On  the  30th,  at  Newmarket  Cross  Roads,  the  attack  was 
made  on  my  division  by  Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill's  division,  crack 
troops,  and  about  18,000  strong.  For  some  time  my  division  alone 
was  engaged,  several  attempts  having  been  made  to  find  a  weak  point 

in  my  line. 

****** 

"  Had  my  division  been  routed,  the  march  of  the  Federal  army 
would  certainly  have  been  seriously  interrupted  by  Lee  forcing  his 
masses  into  the  interval.  (See  Gen.  Porter's  statement  herewith.) 
When  I  was  surrounded  and  taken  prisoner,  I  was  conducted  at 
once  to  Lee's  head-quarters.  Here  Longstreet  told  me  they  had 
70,000  men  bearing  on  that  point,  all  of  whom  would  arrive  before 
midnight ;  and  had  he  succeeded  in  forcing  McClellan's  column  of 
march,  they  would  have  been  thrust  in  between  the  right  and  left 
wings  of  the  Federal  army.  Now,  under  this  very  probable  con- 
tingency, had  I  not  held  my  position,  (see  Gen.  Porter's  report 
herewith,)  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  left  wing  of  McClellan's  army 
would  have  been  critical  indeed ;  but  Lee  was  checked  (as  Long- 
street  admitted)  by  my  division  (see  Surgeon  Marsh's  report  here- 
with) and  the  divisions  in  the  rear,  together  with  the  Pennsylvania 
Reserves,  and  others  moved  on  during  the  night  and  joined  Mc- 
Clellan  at  Malvern  Hill  before  daylight." 


NOTE  20.— PAGE  46.  , 

The  "  rout  of  McCall's  division,"  refuted  by  Gen.  McCall  him- 
self has  been  a  subject  of  controversy.  That  the  division  con- 
tributed most  essentially  to  the  saving  of  the  army,  and  that  it 
was  in  no  proper  sense  of  the  word  "  routed,"  is  maintained,  and  I 
think,  successfully  by  that  general. 

"  It  was  very  late  at  night,"  indeed,  before  it  was  known  at  head- 
quarters that  any  disaster  had  taken  place  with  McCall — that  he 
himself  was  wounded — that  Meade  was  wounded,  Simmons  killed, 
and  Seymour's  brigade  dispersed  and  himself  missing.  The  affair 
was  over  at  dark  and  the  distance  from  Dew's  house,  where  (after 
dark)  was  Gen.  McClellan,  about  three  miles.  Yet  such  was  the 
efficiency  of  the  command  and  of  the  staff  arrangement?,  that  an 
event  upon  which  hinged  the  fortunes  of  the  next  day  and  the  fate 
of  the  army,  was  not  known  until  "  very  late  at  night,"  nor  even 


NOTES.  89 

then  was  "  the  true  position  of  affairs"  at  all  understood.  The  army 
(as  stated  elsewhere)  was  saved  by  the  independent  action  of  the 
corps  commanders. 


NOTE  21. — PAOK  46. 

The  commanding  general  in  his  evidence  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  is  strangely  oblivious  of  a  six  hours' 
journey  made  on  a  day  of  battle. 

"  Question.  At  what  point  or  points  were  you  from  the  time  you 
left  the  field  until  you  returned  ? 

"  Answer.     I  was  at  head-quarters,  near  Haxall's  house. 

"  Question.  Were  you  down  to  the  river  or  on  board  the  gun- 
boats during  any  part  of  that  day,  between  the  time  you  left  the 
field  and  your  return  to  it  1 

"Answer.  I  do  not  remember ;  it  is  possible  I  may  have  been? 
as  my  camp  was  directly  on  the  river." 

In  the  report,  however,  (p.  138)  it  is  stated  that  after  making  the 
"entire  circuit  of  the  position,  I  returned  to  Haxall's,  whence  I  went 
with  Capt.  Rodgers  to  select  the  final  location  for  the  army  and  its 
depots,"  and  that  he  "returned  to  Malvern  before  the  serious 
fighting  commenced." 

On  the  26th  June  we  have  seen  that  the  enemy  was  so  dis- 
courteous as  to  frustrate  our  "  final  advance,1'  decided  upon  for  that 
day,  by  "  attacking  our  right  in  strong  force"  at  3£  p.  M.  of  same 
day.  On  this  memorable  day  of  Malvern  he  is  far  from  being  so 
disobliging,  since  he  waits  until  after  5  p.  M.  for  the  general's  re- 
turn to  commence  his  "  serious  fighting." 

The  following  is  Gen.  Heintzelman's  account : 

"After  some  time  I  rode  over  to  Malvern  Hill,  and  found  Gen. 
McClellan,  who  had  just  got  information  of  what  was  going  on"  (he 
alludes  to  the  falling  back  of  the  army  from  Glendale  and  White 
Oak  Swamps,  of  which  I  have  quoted  his  account  in  Note  16.) 
"  He  directed  me  to  go  and  find  Gen.  Porter  and  Gen.  Barnard,  his 
chief  engineer,  and  they  would  point  out  the  ground  on  Malvern 
Hill  we  could  occupy.  I  found  them,  but  it  was  so  dark  that  we 
could  not  do  anything.  It  was  half  past  one  o'clock  in  the  morning 
then.  I  laid  down  and  slept  a  little  while.  At  daylight  I  called 
those  generals,  and  they  went  out  to  see  where  we  could  be  posted. 


90  NOTES. 

After  an  hour  or  more  they  came  back  and  pointed  out  the  direction 
very  indefinitely.  A  few  minutes  after  Gen.  McClellan  arrived. 
I  joined  him  and  we  went  round,  and  he  pointed  out  the  position  for 
Gen.  Porter's  corps  and  told  me  where  to  post  mine.  I  left  staff- 
officers  to  post  the  troops,  and  went  around  and  left  Gen.  McClellan 
at  his  camp  on  James  River.  About  10  o'clock  that  day  the  enemy 
commenced  an  attack  with  artillery.  We  replied  to  them  when, 
after  a  while,  it  ceased.  Not  long  after  it  commenced  again.  They 
sent  some  infantry  up.  That  attack  was  repulsed  and  ceased.  Late 
in  the  afternoon  they  made  their  grand  attack  on  our  extreme  left. 
That  lasted  until  some  time  after  night.  We  gave  them  a  very 
thorough  repulse.  Late  in  the  afternoon  Gen.  Porter  sent  to  Gen. 
Sumner  for  a  brigade  and  battery.  Gen.  Sumner  turned  to  me  and 
asked  me  what  I  thought  of  it.  I  said,  '  by  all  means  furnish  it ; 
if  we  are  beaten,  we  may  as  well  be  defeated  at  one  place  as  at  an- 
other.' I  also  sent  a  brigade  and  a  battery,  and  the  consequence 
was  we  gave  them  that  terrible  defeat  so  that  they  did  not  follow 
us  the  next  day. 

"  Question.     Where  was  Gen.  McClellan  during  that  fight  ? 

"Answer.  He  was  down  at  his  head-quarters  on  the  James 
River.  He  came  up  some  time  late  in  the  afternoon.  Gen.  Sum- 
ner told  one  of  his  aides  that  he  had  sent  up,  that  he  intended  to 
mass  his  troops,  unless  he  gave  orders  to  the  contrary.  That  was 
made  known  to  Gen.  McClellan  and  he  sent  up  orders  not  to  move 
the  troops.  He  came  up  and  was  with  Gen.  Porter  about  half  an 
hour." 

In  reference  to  the  battle  of  Malvern,  Gen.  McClellan  states 
(p.  138)  : 

"  Gen.  Barnard  then  received  full  instructions  for  posting  the 
troops  as  they  arrived,"  and  Gen.  Heintzelman  testifies  above,  "  that 
those  generals,  (Porter  and  Barnard,)  after  making  a  tour  of  the 
field,"  came  back  and  "pointed  out  the  direction  very  indefinitely." 

I  knew  nothing  about  Gen.  Porter  in  this  connection,  but  I  know 
that  I  returned,  as  stated  by  Gen.  Heintzelman,  and  "  pointed  out" 
to  him  the  direction,  and  described  as  well  as  I  could  the  where- 
abouts of  a  position  for  him — it  being  out  of  my  power  at  that 
moment  to  do  anything  more.  Excepting  an  orderly  I  was  alone. 
My  acting  aide-de-camp,  Lieut.  Abbot,  had  gone  down  to  "  Haxall's" 
sick — my  adjutant,  Lieut.  Hall,  had  been  taken  from  me  by  Gen. 


NOTES. 


91 


Marcy  forty-eight  hours  before,  without  any  intimation  to  me, 
and  I  had  not  seen  him  the  previous  day  or  night.  Col.  Alexander, 
Lieut.  Comstock,  and  Lieut.  Farquhar  had  been  sent  away  on  a 
reconnoissance  and  had  not  since  reported.  I  could  not  lead  Gen. 
Heintzelman's  corps  to  its  position,  but  desirous  of  getting  it  ou  t  or 
the  way  (as  the  other  corps  were  now  rapidly  crowding  in)  indicated 
the  road  to  take,  and  described  as  definitely  as  possible  an  approxi- 
mate position  ;  I  sent  a  pressing  request  to  head-quarters  for  aides, 
and  returned  to  an  examination  of  the  field,  presuming  Gen. 
Heintzelman  would  move  his  corps  in  the  direction  I  indicated,  and 
that  I  should  place  it  more  "  definitely"  afterwards. 

It  seems  that  Gen.  McClellan  gave  orders  to  me  to  "  post  the 
troops,"  went  to  Haxall's,  and  gave  exactly  the  same  order  to  Gen. 
Humphrey,  without  notifying  him  or  me  of  the  other's  orders — 
then  went  into  the  field  and  (according  to  Gen.  Heintzelman's  ac- 
count) posted  the  troops  himself.* 

In  my  report  (p.  42)  I  have  done  injustice  to  Gen.  Humphreys 
in  speaking  of  him  merely  as  an  assistant.  I  was  not  aware  that  he 
had  independent  orders,  nor  that  the  officers  who  accompanied  him 
had  been  primarily  directed  to  report  to  him,  and  not  to  me.  As 
stated  in  my  report,  the  execution  of  the  "posting"  was  done  by 
others  after  I  left  that  part  of  the  line  (the  relative  positions  of  the 
different  corps  having  been  agreed  on  between  us)  and  was  done 
under  direction  of  Gen.  Humphreys.  The  giving  of  independent 
orders  to  Gen.  Humphreys  and  myself,  and  the  subsequent  direct 
orders  to  corps  commanders,  and  the  ignorance,  in  which  Gen. 
Sumner  was  left  as  to  the  positions  of  the  troops,  when,  by  Gen. 
McClellan 's  departure,  the  command  of  the  whole  army  devolved 
upon  him  (see  Note  19)  are  all  characteristic. 


NOTE  22.— PAGE  47. 

Inapt  to  confirm  and  take  advantage  of  an  existing  superiority 
in  the  morale  of  his  army,  as  we  have  seen  Gen.  McClellan  to  be  at 
Yorktown,  to  seize  a  moment  of  victory  and  of  very  complete  demo- 
ralization in  the  enemy's  ranks  after  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  it  be- 

*  Gen.  McClellan  also  states  in  his  evidence  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con- 
duct of  the  War :  "  I  selected  the  positions  in  a  general  way.  *  *  * 
indicating  to  Gie  di/erent  commanders  the  approximate  positions  they  were  to 
occupy." 


92  NOTES. 

comes  almost  amusing  to  read  the  following,  from  his  testimony 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War : 

"  Question.  Will  you  state  in  what  you  consider  your  chances  for 
success  would  have  been  greater  with  the  addition  of  20,000  men  to 
the  number  which  you  had  at  Harrison's  Landing,  than  they  were 
when  you  were  in  front  of  Richmond,  and  before  Jackson  had 
formed  a  junction  with  the  rest  of  the  rebel  forces  ? 

"Answer.  I  should  have  counted  upon  the  effect  of  the  battles 
which  had  just  taken  place  upon  the  enemy.  We  had  then  strong 
reason  to  believe  that  the  enemy's  losses  had  been  very  much  hea- 
vier than  our  own,  and  that  portions  of  his  army  were  very  much 
demoralized,  especially  after  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill." 

A  battle-fibld  from  which  we  made  a  precipitate  retreat,  leaving 
our  dead  and  wounded  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  was  not  a  matter 
to  cause  great  elation  on  our  side,  nor  seriously  to  demoralize  our 
enemy  ;  and  as  for  losses,  whatever  they  might  have  been  to  the 
enemy,  Gen.  McClellan  estimates  his  numbers  at  20,000  men.  It 
is  almost  perverting  language  to  use  it  seriously  as  used  in  the 
above  quotation.  Our  own  army,  if  not  demoralized,  had  lost  all 
that  self-confidence — that  sense  of  invincibility,  which  makes,  when 
it  exists,  the  moral  strength  of  an  army.  It  had  not  the  "  elan"  of 
victory,  for  it  knew  not  what  victory  was.  After  four  months  of 
hardship,  unrelieved  by  any  brilliant  successes — always  in  its  bat- 
tles (even  at  Williamsburg)  fighting  on  the  defensive  —  driven  at 
length  from  Richmond,  and  barely  succeeding  in  each  combat  on  its 
retreat  in  holding  its  own,  while  abandoning  dead  and  wounded  and 
losing  heavily  in  that  of  which  the  loss  so  much  touches  the  soldier's 
pride — artillery — the  army  was  certainly  disheartened,  and  in  the 
higher  ranks,  confidence  in  the  commander  was  wanting. 

To  appreciate  the  state  of  feeling  in  the  rebel  army  (whether  its 
"losses"  had  been  "heavier"  than  our  own  or  not),  let  the  circum- 
stances be  considered.  Hardly  more  than  one  month  before  a  rela- 
tive of  Jeff  Davis  wrote  :  "  When  I  think  of  the  dark  gloom  that 
now  hovers  over  our  country,  I  am  ready  to  sink  with  despair. 
*  Uncle  Jeff  thinks  we  had  better  go  to  a  safer  place 
than  Richmond."  ***** 

And  now,  at  this  moment  of  which  we  write,  the  great  source  of  un- 
happiness  was  that  Gen.  McClellan's  army  had  been  permitted  to  escape 
at  all. 


NOTES.  93 

Pollard  ("  Second  Year  of  the  War  "),  page  75: 

"  The  glory  and  fruits  of  our  victory  may  have  been  seriously 
diminished  by  the  grave  mishap  or  fault  by  which  the  enemy  was 
permitted  to  leave  his  camp  on  the  south  side  of  the  Chickahominy, 
in  an  open  country,  and  to  plunge  into  the  dense  cover  of  wood  and 
swamp,  when  the  best  portion  of  a  whole  week  was  consumed  in 
hunting  him  and  finding  out  his  new  position,  only  in  time  to  attack 
him  under  the  uncertainty  and  disadvantage  of  ths  darkness  of 
night. 

"But  the  successes  achieved  in  the  series  of  engagements  which 
had  already  occurred  were  not  to  be  lightly  esteemed,  or  to  be  de- 
preciated, because  of  the  errors  which,  if  they  had  not  occurred, 
would  have  made  our  victory  more  glorious  and  complete.  The 
seige  of  Richmond  had  been  raised;  an  army  of  150,000  men  had 
been  pushed  from  their  strongholds  and  fortifications  and  put  to 
flight;  we  had  enjoyed  the  eclat  of  an  almost  daily  succession  of 
victories;  we  had  gathered  an  immense  spoil  in  stores,  provisions, 
and  artillery ;  we  had  demolished  and  dispersed,  if  we  had  not  suc- 
ceeded in  annihilating,  an  army  which  had  every  resource  that  could 
be  summoned  to  its  assistance,  every  possible  addition  to  numbers 
within  the  reach  of  the  Yankee  government,  and  every  material 
condition  of  success  to  ensure  for  it  the  great  prize  of  the  capital  of 
the  Confederacy,  which  was  now,  as  far  as  human  judgment  could 
determine,  irretrievably  lost  to  them,  and  secure  in  the  protection 
of  a  victorious  army." 

The  dashing,  fearless,  and  enterprising  army  which  Lee  brought 
against  Pope  is  the  most  perfect  illustration  of  "  the  effects  of  the 
battles  which  had  just  taken  place  upon  the  enemy  ;"  and  it  was 
against  such  a  body  of  men,  numbering  200,000  (according  to  his 
own  estimates),  that  Gen.  McClellan  was  going  to  march  with 
120,000  men,  counting  upon  the  demoralization  produced  ("  especi- 
ally ")  by  Malvern  Hill ! 

It  was,  as  we  all  know,  the  habit  of  Napoleon  to  estimate  in  num- 
bers the  chances  for  and  against  success  in  his  plans  of  campaign. 
Gen.  McClellan,  however,  quite  exceeds  Napoleon  in  accuracy  of 
calculation.  From  an  enemy  200,000  strong,  "  very  much  demor- 
alized "  (as  we  know)  by  "  the  battle  of  Malvern  Hill,"  we,  with 
120,000  men,  "  can  take  Richmond  if  we  have  but  half  a  chance" — 
(Dispatch  of  July.  12,  1862.) 


94  NOTES. 

NOTE  23,  TO  APPENDIX,  PAGE  51. 

It  may  be  doubted  whether  this  is  a  fair  exhibition  of  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan's  plan;  whether  such  a  scheme  could  really  have  been 
soberly  entertained. 

Urbanna  is  50  miles  in  a  straight  line  from  Richmond.  Across 
the  route  lay  the  "  Dragon  Swamp  "  (head  of  the  Piankatank  River), 
the  two  formidable  rivers,  the  Matapony  and  Pamunkey,  and  the 
well-known  Chickahominy. 

From  Fredericksburg  to  Richmond  is,  in  a  straight  line,  but 
about  50  miles  ;  from  Manassas  Junction  to  Richmond  80  miles,  or 
by  railroad  120  miles.  To  collect  transports  for  35,000  or  40,000 
men ;  to  embark  that  number,  move  to  Urbanna,  land  that  force, 
with  its  artillery,  horses,  and  supplies,  force  the  passage  of  the 
Piankatank,  the  two  great  rivers  mentioned,  and  the  Chickahominy, 
before  the  enemy  could  move  his  forces  at  Fredericksburg  and 
Manassas,  50,  80,  and  120  miles,  with  railroads  all  the  way,  is  truly 
an  incredible  conception.  Here,  however,  is  Gen.  McClellan's  tes- 
timony : 

"  Question.  Did  you  anticipate  that  that  movement  could  be  made 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  rebels,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
enable  jrou  to  cut  off  or  intercept  their  retreat  from  Manassas  to 
Centreville  ? 

"  Answer.  I  do  not  think  that  we  could  entirely  intercept  their 
retreat  to  Richmond,  but  the  chances  were  that  if  this  movement 
was  fairly  started,  before  they  were  aware  of  it,  we  could  fight  them 
in  front  of  Richmond  to  their  disadvantage,  before  they  could  get 
all  their  troops  in  hand. 

"  Question.  Do  you  mean  by  that  that  you  expected  to  intercept 
their  retreat  to  Richmond  in  such  a  manner  as  to  divide  their  forces, 
leaving  a  part  of  it  on  this  side  of  the  point  where  you  intercept 
their  communications,  and  then  fight  the  balance  of  it  at  Richmond  ? 

"  Answer.  In  reply  to  that  I  can  only  repeat  that  I  hoped,  if  pro- 
per secrecy  was  observed,  to  reach  the  vicinity  of  Richmond  before 
they  could  concentrate  all  their  troops  there ;  that  they  could  not 
get  all  their  troops  down  from  Manassas,  and  before  we  got  there." 


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those  of  the  chess-board,  and  we  cannot  doubt  that  there  are  certain  principles 
of  tactics  in  actual  war  as  in  that  game,  which  may  determine  the  result  inde- 
pendently, in  a  greut  measure,  of  the  personal  strength  and  courage  of  the  men 
engaged.  The  difference  between  these  principles  as  applied  in  the  American 
Army  and  in  the  Austrian,  is  so  wide  as  to  have  suggested  the  translation  of 
the  work  before  us,  which  contains  the  whole  result  of  the  famous  Field-Marshal 
RADETZKY*S  experience  for  twenty-five  years,  while  in  supreme  command  in 
Italy."— New  York  Century. 


D.   Van  NostrancVs  Publications. 

Gunnery  Instructions. 

Simplified  for  the  Volunteer  Officers  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,  with  hints  to 
Executive  and  other  Officers.  By  Lieut-Commander  EDWARD 
BARRETT,  U.  S.  N.,  Instructor  in  Gunnery,  Navy  Yard,  Brook- 
lyn. Third  edition,  revised  and  enlarged.  1  vol.  12mo,  cloth. 
$1  25. 

"It  is  a  thorough  work,  treating  plainly  on  its  subject,  and  contains  also  some 
valuable  hints  to  executive  officers.  No  officer  in  the  volunteer  navy  should  be 
without  a  copy." — Boston  Evening  Traveller. 

."This  work  contains  detailed  and  specific  instructions  on  all  points  connected 
•with  the  use  and  management  of  guns  of  every  kind  in  the  naval  service.  It  has 
full  illustrations,  and  many  of  these  of  the  most  elementary  character,  especially 
designed  for  the  use  of  volunteers  in  the  navy.  The  duties  of  executive  officers 
and  of  the  division  officers  are  so  clearly  set  forth,  that  '  he  who  runs  may  read' 
and  understand.  The  manual  exercise  is  explicit,  and  rendered  simple  by  dia- 
grams. Forms  of  watch  and  quarter  bills  are  given ;  and  at  the  close  there  is  a 
table  of  ranges  according  to  the  kind  and  calibre  of  gun,  the  weight  of  the  ball, 
and  the  charge  of  powder.  A  valuable  little  hand-book." — Philadelphia  In- 
quirer. 

"  I  have  looked  through  Lieut  Barrett's  book,  and  think  it  will  be  very  valu- 
able to  the  volunteer  officers  who  are  now  in  the  naval  service. 

"C.  R.  P.  RODGERS, 
Commanding  U.  S.  Steam  Frigate, 


The  "  C.  S.  A."  and  the  Battle  of 
Bull    Run. 

(A  Letter  to  an  English  Friend.)  By  J.  G.  BARNARD,  Major  of  Engi- 
neers, U.  S.  A.,  Brigadier-General,  and  Chief  Engineer,  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  With  five  maps.  1  vol.  8vo,  cloth.  $1  50. 

"This  book  was  begun  by  the  author  as  a  letter  to  a  friend  in  England, but  as 
he  proceeded  and  his  MSS.  increased  in  magnitude,  he  changed  his  original  plan, 
and  the  book  is  the  result  General  Barnard  gives  by  far  the  best,  most  compre- 
hensible and  complete  account  of  the  Battle  of  Bull  Run  we  have  seen.  It  is  il- 
lustrated by  some  beautifully  drawn  maps,  prepared  for  the  War  Department  by 
the  topographical  engineers.  He  demonstrates  to  a  certainty  that  but  for  the 
causeless ~panic  the  dav  might  not  have  been  lost  The  author  writes  with  vigor 
and  earnestness,  and  nas  contributed  one  of  the  most  valuable  records  yet  pub- 
lished of  the  history  of  the  war." — Boston  Commercial  Bulletin. 


Models  of  Fortifications. 

Vauban's  First  System — One  Front  and  two  Bastions ;  Scale,  20  yards 
to  an  inch.  The  Modern  System — One  Front;  Scale,  20  yards 
to  an  inch.  Field-Works — The  Square  Redoubt ;  Scale,  5  yards 
to  an  inch.  Mr.  Kimber's  three  volumes,  viz. :  Vauban's  First 
System,  The  Modern  System,  and  Field- Works,  will  accompany 
the  Models.  Price  for  the  Set  of  Three,  with  books,  $76. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

Hand- Book  of  Artillery, 

For  the  Service  of  the  United  States  Army  and  Militia.  New  and 
revised  edition.  By  Maj.  JOSEPH  HOBERTS,  U.  S.  A.  1  vol. 
18mo,  cloth,  New  and  enlarged  edition.  $1  00. 

"  A  complete  catechism  of  gun  practice,  covering  the  •whole  ground  of  this 
branch  of  military  science,  and  adapted  to  militia  and  volunteer  drill,  as  •well  as 
to  the  regular  army.  It  has  the  merit  of  precise  detail,  even  to  the  technical 
names  of  all  parts  of  a  gun,  and  how  the  smallest  operations  connected  with  its 
use  can  be  best  performed.  It  has  evidently  been  prepared  with  great  care, 
and  with  strict  scientific  accuracy.  By  the  recommendation  of  a  committee 
ajipoiuted  by  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Artillery  School  at  Fort  Monroe, 
\a.,  it  has  been  substituted  for  '  Burns' Questions  and  Answers,' an  English 
work  which  has  heretofore  been  the  text-book  of  instruction-in  this  country." 
— Kvw  York  Century. 


New  Infantry  Tactics, 

For  the  Instruction,  Exercise,  and  Manoeuvres  of  the  Soldier,  a  Com- 
pany, Line  of  Skirmishers,  Battalion,  Brigade,  or  Corps  d'Armee. 
By  Brig.-Gen.  SILAS  CASET,  U.  S.  A.  3vols.  24mo.  Half  roan, 
lithographed  plates.  $2.50. 

VOL.  I. — School  of  the  Soldier  ;    School  of  the  Company  ;    In- 
struction for  Skirmishers. 
VOL.  II.— School  of  the  Battalion. 

VOL.  III. — Evolutions   of   a  Brigade ;    Evolutions  of   a   Corps 
d'Armee. 

The  manuscript  of  this  new  system  of  Infantry  Tactics  was  carefully  ex- 
amined by  General  MCCLET.LAN,  and  met  with  his  unqualified  approval,  which 
he  has  since  manifested  by  authorizing  General  CASEY  to  adopt  it  for  his  entire 
division.  The  author  has  retained  much  that  is  valuable  contained  in  the  sys- 
tems of  SCOTT  and  HAKDEE.  but  has  made  many  important  changes  and  addi- 
tions which  experience  and  the  exigencies  of  the  service  require.  General 
CASEY'S  reputation  as  nn  accomplished  soldier  and  skilful  tactician  is  a  guar- 
antee that  the  work  he  has  undertaken  has  been  thoroughly  performed. 

"These  volumes  are  based  on  the  French  ordonnances  of  1831  and  1845  for 
the  manoeuvres  of  heavy  infantry  and  chauseurs  d  pied  ;  both  of  these  systems 
have  been  in  use  in  our  service  for  some  years,  the  former  having  been  trans- 
lated by  Gen.  Scott,  and  the  hitter  by  Col.  Hardee.  After  the  introduction  of 
the  latter  drill  in  our  service,  in  connection  with  Gen.  Scott's  Tactics,  there 
arose  the  necessity  of  a  uniform  system  for  the  manoeuvres  of  all  the  infantry 
arm  of  the  service.  These  volumes  are  the  result  of  the  author's  endeavor  to 
communicate  the  instruction,  now  used  and  adopted  In  the  army,  to  achieve 
this  result." — Boston  Journal.  , 

"  Based  on  the  best  precedents,  adapted  to  the  novel  requirements  of  the  art 
of  war,  and  very  full  in  its  instructions,  Casey's  Tactics  will  be  received  as  the 
most  useful  and  most  comprehensive  work  of  its  kind  in  our  language.  From 
the  drill  and  discipline  of  the  individual  soldier,  or  through  all  the  various 
combinations,  to  the  manosuvres  of  a  brigade  and  the  evolutions  of  a  Corps 
D'Armee,  the  student  is  advanced  by  a  clear  method  and  steady  progress.  Nu- 
merous cuts,  plans,  and  diagrams  illustrate  positions  and  movements,  and  de- 
monstrate to  the  eye  the  exact  working  out  of  the  individual  position,  brigading, 
order  of  battle,  &c.,  &c.  The  work  is  a  model  of  publishing  success,  being  in 
three  neat  pocket  volumes," — Few  Yorker. 


7>.  Van  NbstrancZ'' s  Publications. 

Rifles  and  Rifle  Practice. 

An  Elementary  Treatise  on  the  Theory  of  Rifle  Firing ;  explain- 
ing the  causes  of  Inaccuracy  of  Fire  and  the  manner  of  cor- 
recting it ;  with  descriptions  of  the  Infantry  Rifles  of  Europe 
and  the  United  States,  their  Balls  and  Cartridges.  By  Capt. 
C.  M.  WILCOX,  U.  S.  A.  New  edition,  with  engravings  and 
cuts.  Green  cloth.  $1.75. 

"Although  eminently  a  scientific  -work,  special  care  seems  to  have  been 
taken  to  avoid  the  use  of  technical  terms,  and  to  make  the  whole  subject  readily 
comprehensible  to  the  practical  enquirer.  It  was  designed  chiefly  for  the 
use  of  Volunteers  and  Militia;  but  the  War  Department  has  evinced  its  ap- 
proval of  its  merits  by  ordering  from  the  publisher  one  thousand  copies,  for  the 
use  of  the  United  States  Army." — Louisville  Journal. 

"The  book  will  be  found  intensely  interesting  to  all  who  are  watching  the 
changes  in  the  art  of  war  arising  from  the  introduction  of  the  new  rifled  arms. 
We  recommend  to  our  readers  to  buy  the  book."— Military  Gazette. 

"  A  most  valuable  treatise." — New  York  Herald. 

"  This  book  is  quite  original  in  its  character.  That  character  is  complete- 
ness. It  renders  a  study  of  most  of  the  works  on  the  rifle  that  have  been 
published  quite  unnecessary.  We  cordially  recommend  the  book."—  United 
Service  Gazette,  London. 

"The  work  being  in  all  its  parts  derived  from  the  best  sources,  is  of  the 
highest  authority,  and  will  be  accepted  as  the  standard  on  the  subject  of  which 
It  treats."—  .V«w  Yorker. 


Army  Officer's  Pocket  Companion. 

Principally  designed  for  Staff  Officers  in  the  Field.  Partly  trans- 
lated from  the  French  of  M.  DE  ROUTRE,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
of  the  French  Staff  Corps,  with  Additions  from  Standard  Amer- 
ican, French,  and  English  Authorities.  By  WM.  P.  CRAIGHILL, 
First  Lieutenant  U.  S.  Corps  of  Engineers,  Assist.  Prof,  of 
Engineering  at  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  West  Point. 
1  vol.  18mo.  Full  roan.  $1.50. 

"  I  have  carefully  examined  Capt  CRAIGHILL'B  Pocket  Companion.  I  find 
it  one  of  the  very  best  works  of  the  kind  I  have  ever  seen.  Any  Army  or 
Volunteer  officer  who  will  make  himself  acquainted  with  the  contents  of  this 
little  book,  will  seldom  be  ignorant  of  his  duties  in  camp  or  field." 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A, 

"  I  have  carefully  examined  the  '  Manual  for  Staff  Officers  in  the  Field.'  It 
is  a  most  invaluable  work,  admirable  in  arrangement,  perspicuously  written, 
abounding  in  most  useful  matters,  and  such  .1  book  as  should  be  the  constant 
pocket  companion  of  every  army  officer,  Kegular  and  Volunteer." 

G.  W.  CULLUM, 
Brigadier-General  U.  8.  A. 
Chief  of  General  Halleck's  Staff, 
Chief  Engineer  Department  Mississippi 

"This  little  volume  contains  a  large  amount  of  indispensable  information 
relating  to  officers'  duties  in  the  siege,  camp,  and  field,  and  will  prove  to  them 
a  most  valuable  pocket  companion.  It  is  illustrated  with  plans  and  drawings." 
—Boston  Com.  Bulletin. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

Sword-Play. 

THE  MILITIAMA^S  MANUAL  AND  SWORD-PLAY  WITHOUT 
A  MASTER. — Rapier  and  Broad-Sword  Exercises  copiously 
Explained  and  Illustrated ;  Small- Arm  Light  Infantry  Drill  of 
the  United  States  Army ;  Infantry  Manual  of  Percussion  Mus- 
kets ;  Company  Drill  of  the  United  States  Cavalry.  By  Major 
M.  W.  BERRIMAN,  engaged  for  the  last  thirty  years  in  the  prac- 
tical instruction  of  Military  Students.  Second  edition.  1  vol. 
12mo,  red  cloth.  $1. 

"Captain  Berriman  has  had  thirty  years'  experience  in  teaching  military 
students,  and  his  work  is  written  in  a  simple,  clear,  and  soldierly  style.  It  is 
illustrated  with  twelve  plates,  and  is  one  of  the  cheapest  and  most  complete 
works  of  the  kind  published  in  this  country."  —Hew  York  World. 

"  This  work  will  bo  found  very  valuable  to  all  persons  seeking:  military  in- 
struction; but  it  recommends  itself  most  especially  to  officers,  and  those  who 
have  to  use  the  sword  or  sabre.  We  believe  it  is  the  only  work  on  tho  use  of 
the  sword  published  in  this  country." — Neio  York  Tablet. 

"  It  is  a  work  of  obvious  merit  and  value."— Boston  Traveller. 


Military  Law  and  Courts  Martial, 

By  Capt.  S.  V.  BENET,  U.  S.  Ordnance,  Asst.  Prof,  of  Ethics  in  the 
United  States  Military  Academy.  1  vol.  8vo.  Law  sheep,  $3.50. 


The  Artillerift's  Manual : 

Compiled  from  various  Sources,  and  adapted  to  the  Service  of  the 
United  States.  Profusely  illustrated  with  woodcuts  and  engrav- 
ings on  stone.  Second  edition,  revised  and  corrected,  with 
valuable  additions,  By  Capt.  JOHN  GIBBON,  U.  S. 

Army.     1  vol.  8vo,  half  roan,  $5 ; 

This  book  is  now  considered  the  standard  authority  for  that  particular  branch 
of  the  Service  in  the  United  States  Army.  The  War  Department,  at  Washing- 
ton, has  exhibited  its  thorough  appreciation  of  the  merits  of  this  volume,  the 
want  of  which  has  been  hitherto  much  felt  in  the  service,  by  subscribing  for  700 
copies. 

"  It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  we  welcome  the  appearance  of  a  new  work  on 
this  subject,  entitled  'The  Artillerist's  Manual,'  by  Capt  John  Gibbon,  a 
highly  scientific  and  meritorious  officer  of  artillery  in  our  regular  service.  Tho 
work,  an  octavo  volume  of  500  pages,  in  large,  clear  type,  appears  to  be  well 
adapted  to  supply  just  what  has  been  heretofore  needed  to  fill  the  gap  between, 
the  simple  Manual  and  the  more  abstruse  demonstrations  of  the  science  of  gun- 
nery. The  whole  work  is  profusely  illustrated  with  woodcuts  and  engravings 
on  stone,  tending  to  give  a  more  complete  and  exact  idea  of  the  various  matters 
described  in  the  text.  The  book  may  well  be  considered  as  a  valuable  and  im- 
portant addition  to  the  military  science  of  the  country," — New  York  Seratd. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

The  Political  and  Military  Hiftory 
of  the  Campaign  of  Waterloo. 

Translated  from  the  French  of  General  BARON  DE  JOMINI.  By 
Capt.  S.  V.  BENET,  U.  S.  Ordnance.  1  vol.  12mo,  cloth,  third 
edition.  $1.25 

"  Baron  Jomlni  has  the  reputation  of  being  one  of  the  greatest  military  his- 
torians and  critics  of  the  century.  His  merits,  have  been  recognized  by  the 
highest  military  authorities  in  Europe,  and  were  rewarded  in  a  conspicuous 
manner  by  the  greatest  military  power  in  Christendom.  He  learned  the  art  of 
•war  in  the  school  of  experience,  the  best  and  only  finishing  school  of  the  soldier. 
He  served  with  distinction  in  nearly  all  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon,  and  it  was 
mainly  from  the  gigantic  military  operations  of  this  matchless  master  of  the 
art  that  he  was  enabled  to  discover  its  true  principles,  and  to  ascertain  the  best 
means  of  their  application  in  the  infinity  of  combinations  which  actual  war  pre- 
sents. Jomini  criticizes  the  details  of  Waterloo  with  great  science,  and  yet  in  a 
manner  that  interests  the  general  reader  as  well  as  the  professional." — New 
York  World. 

"This  book  by  Jomini,  though  forming  the  twenty-second  chapter  of  his 
iLife  of  Napoleon,'  is  really  a  unit  In  itself,  and  forms  a  complete  summary  of 
the  campaign.  It  is  an  interesting  volume,  and  deserves  a  place  in  the  affec- 
tions of  all  who  would  be  accomplished  military  men." — New  York  Times. 

"  The  present  volume  is  the  concluding  portion  of  hi*  great  work,  '  Vie  Toli- 
tlque  et  Militaire  de  Napoleon,'  published  in  1826.  Capt.  Benet's  translation  of 
it  has  been  for  some  time  before  the  public,  and  has  now  reached  a  second  edi- 
tion; it  is  very  ably  executed,  and  forms  n  work  which  will  always  be  interest- 
ing, and  especially  so  at  a  time  when  military  affairs  are  uppermost  in  the  public 
mind." — Philadelphia  Horlh  American. 


A  Treatife  on  the  Camp  and  March. 

With  which  is  connected  the  Construction  of  Field  Works  and  Mil 
itary  Bridges ;  with  an  Appendix  of  Artillery  Ranges,  &c. 
For  the  use  of  Volunteers  and  Militia  in  the  United  States. 
By  Capt.  HENRY  D.  GRAFTON,  U.  S.  A.  1  vol.  12mo,  cloth. 
75  cents.  

Manual  for  Engineer  Troops, 

Comprising  Drill  and  Practice  for  Ponton  Bridges,  and  PASLKY'S 
Rules  for  Conducting  Operations  for  a  Siege.  The  Sap,  Military 
Mining  and  Construction  of  Batteries.  By  Capt.  J.  C.  DUANE, 
TJ.  S.  Engineers.  Plates  and  woodcuts.  12mo,  cloth.  Ilf. 
mor.  $2-00 

New  Manual   of  Sword   and  Sabre 
Exercife. 

By  Captain  J.  C.  KELTON,  F.  S.  A.     Thirty  plates.     In  Press. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

Siege  of  Bomarfund  (1854). 

Journals  of  Operations  of  the  Artillery  and  Engineers.  Published 
by  permission  of  the  Minister  of  War.  Illustrated  by  maps  and 
plans.  Translated  from  the  French  by  an  Army  Officer. 
1  vol.  12mo,  cloth.  75  cents. 

"To  military  men  this  little  volume  is  of  special  interest.  It  contains  it 
translation  by  an  officer  of  the  United  States  Army;  of  the  journal  of  operations 
by  the  artillery  and  engineers  at  the  siege  of  Bomarsund  in  1854,  published  by 
permission  of  the  French  Minister  of  War  in  the  Journal  des  Armees  specialen 
etdel'Etat  Major.  The  account  of  the  same  successful  attack,  given  by  Sir 
Howard  Douglas  in  the  new  edition  of  his  work  on  Gunnery,  is  appended;  and 
the  narrative  is  illustrated  by  elaborate  maps  and  plans." — New  York  Paper, 

Lefsons  and  Practical  Notes  on 
Steam, 

The  Steam-Engine,  Propellers,  &c.,  &c.,  for  Young  Marine  Engi- 
neers, Students,  and  others.  By  the  late  W.  R.  KING,  U.  S.  N. 
Revised  by  Chief-Engineer  J.  W  KING,  U.  S.  Navy.  Fifth 
edition,  enlarged.  8vo,  cloth.  $2.00 

"This  is  the  second  edition  of  a  valuable  work  of  the  late  W.  E.  KINO, 
TJ.  S.  N.  It  contains  lessons  and  practical  notes  on  Steam  and  the  Steam- 
Engine,  Propellers,  &c.  It  is  calculated  to  be  of  great  use  to  young  marine  en- 
gineers, students,  and  others.  The  text  is  illustrated  and  explained  by  numerous 
diagrams  and  representations  of  machinery.  This  new  edition  has  been  revised 
and  enlarged  by  Chief  Engineer  J.  W.  KING,  U.  S.  N.,  brother  to  the  deceased 
author  of  the  work." — Boston  Daily  Advertiser. 

"  This  is  one  of  the  best,  because  eminently  plain  and  practical,  treatises  on 
the  Steam-Engine  ever  published." — Philadelphia  Press. 

"  Its  re-publication  at  this  time,  when  so  many  young  men  are  entering  the 
service  as  naval  engineers,  is  most  opportune.  Each  of  them  ought  to  have  a 
copy."— Philadelphia  Evening  Bulletin. 


Manual  of  Internal  Rules  and  Reg- 
ulations for  Men-of-War. 

By  Commodore  TJ.  P.  LEVY,  U.  S.  N.,  late  Flag-officer  command- 
ing U.  S.  Naval  Force  in  the  Mediterranean,  &c.  Flexible 
bine  cloth.  Second  edition,  revised  and  enlarged.  50  cents. 

"Among  the  professional  publications  for  which  we  are  indebted  to  the  war. 
wo  willingly  give  a  prominent  place  to  this  useful  little  Manual  of  Rules  and. 
Regulations  to  be  observed  on  board  of  ships  of  war.  Its  authorship  is  a  suffi- 
cient guarantee  for  its  accuracy  and  practical  value  ;  and  as  a  guide  to  young 
officers  in  providing  for  the  discipline,  police,  and  sanitary  government  of  tho 
vessels  under  their  command,  we  know  of  nothing  superior.  — N.  Y.  Meraut. 

"  Should  be  in  the  hands  of  every  Naval  officer,  of  ^whatever  grade,  and  will 
not  come  amiss  to  any  intelligent  mariner."— Boston,  Traveller. 

"  A  work  which  will  prove  of  great  utility,  in  both  the  Naval  service  and 
the  mercantile  marine." — Baltimore  American. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

Evolutions  of  Field  Batteries  of 
Artillery. 

Translated  from  the  French,  and  arranged  for  the  Army  and  Militia 
of  the  United  States.  By  Gen.  ROBERT  ANDERSON,  U.  S.  Army. 
Published  by  order  of  the  War  Department.  1  vol.  cloth,  32 

plates.    $1. 

WAK  DEPAKTMENT,  Nov.  2d,  1859. 


and  i 

of  the  __-_--„ 

published  for  the  information  and  government  of  the  army. 

All  Evolutions  of  Field  Batteries  not  embraced  in  this  system  are  prohibited, 
and  those  herein  prescribed  will  be  strictly  observed. 

J.  B.  FLOYD,  Secretary  of  War. 

"This  system  having  been  adopted  by  the  War  Department,  is  to  the  artil- 
lerist what  llardee's  Tactics  is  to  the  infantry  soldier ;  the  want  of  a  work  like 
this  lias  been  seriously  felt,  and  will  be  eagerly  welcomed." — Louisville  Journal. 


Hiftory  of"  the  United  States  Naval 
Academy 

With  Biographical  Sketches,  and  the  names  of  all  the  Superintendents, 
Professors  and  Graduates,  to  which  is  added  a  Record  of  some 
of  the  earliest  Votes  by  Congress,  of  Thanks,  Medals  and  Swords 
to  Naval  Officers.  By  EDWARD  CHAUNCEY  MARSHALL,  A.  M, 
formerly  Instructor  in  Captain  Kinsley's  Military  School  at  West 
Point,  Assistant  Professor  in  the  N.  Y.  University,  etc.  $!• 


Ordnance  and  Gunnery. 

A  Course  of  Instruction  in  Ordnance  and  Gunnery.  Compiled  for 
the  Use  of  the  Cadets  of  the  United  States  Military  Academy. 
By  Captain  J.  G.  BENTON,  Ordnance  Department  U.  S.  A.,  late 
Instructor  of  Ordnance  and  the  Science  of  Gunnery,  U.  S.  Mili- 
tary Academy,  West  Point,  and  First  Assistant  to  the  Chief 
of  Ordnance,  U.  S.  A.  Second  edition,  revised  and  enlarged. 
1  vol.  8vo,  half  morocco,  $5. 

Capt.  Benton  has  carefully  revised  and  corrected  this  valuable  work  on  Ord- 
nance nnd  Gunnery,  the  first  edition  of  which  was  published  only  about  a  year 
ajro.  The  many  important  improvements  introduced  in  this  branch  of  the  service 
have  reilaered  such  a  revision  necessary.  The  present  edition  will  be  invalua- 
ble, not  only  to  the  student,  but  as  a  standard  book  of  reference  on  the  subject 
of  which  it  treats. 


D.  Van  Nostrand^s  Publications. 

A  Treatife  on  Ordnance  and  Naval 
Gunnery. 

Compiled  and  arranged  us  a  Text-Book  for  the  TJ.  S.  Naval  Acad- 
emy, by  Lieutenant  EDWARD  SIMPSON,  U.  S.  N.  Second  edi- 
tion, revised  and  enlarged.  1  vol.  8vo,  plates  and  cuts,  half 
morocco.  $5. 

"As  the  compiler  has  charge  of  the  instruction  In  Naval  Gunnery  at  the 
Naval  Academy,  his  work,  in  the  compilation  of  which  he  has  consulted  a  large 
number  of  eminent  authorities,  is  probably  well  suited  for  the  purpose  designed 
l>y  it— namely,  the  circulation  of  information  which  many  officers,  owing  to 
constant  service  afloat,  may  not  have  been  able  to  collect.  In  simple  and  plain 
language  it  gives  instruction  as  to  cannon,  gun  carriages,  gun  powder,  projectiles, 
fuzes,  locks,  and  primers;  the  theoiy  of  pointing  guns,  rifles,  the  practice  of 
gunnery,  and  a  great  variety  of  other  similar  matters,  interesting  to  fighting 
men  on  sea  and  land." — Washington  Daily  Globe. 

"  A  vast  amount  of  information  is  conveyed  in  a  readable  and  familiar  form. 
The  illustrations  are  excellent,  and  many  of  them  unique,  being  colored  or 
bronzed  so  as  lo  represent  various  military  arms,  &c.,  with  more  than  photo- 
graphic literalness." —  Washington,  Star. 

"It  is  scarcely  necessary  for  us  to  say  that  a  work  prepared  by  a  writer  so 
practically  conversant  with  all  the  subjects  of  which  he  treats,  and  who  has  such 
a  reputation  for  scientific  ability,  cannot  fail  to  take  at  once  a  high  place  among 
the  text-books  of  our  naval  service.  It  has  been  approved  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  and  will  henceforth  be  one  of  the  standard  authorities  on  all  matters 
connected  with  Naval  Gunnery." — New  York  Herald. 

"  The  book  itself  is  admirably  arranged,  characterized  bv  great  simplicity 
and  clearness,  and  certainly  at  this  time  will  bo  a  most  valuable  one  to  officers 
of  the  Navy." — Boston  Commercial  Bulletin. 

"Originally  designed  as  a  text-book,  it  is  now  enlarged,  and  so  far  modified 
in  its  plan  as  to  make  it  an  invaluable  hand-book  for  the  naval  officer.  It  is 
comprehensive — preserving  the  cream  of  many  of  the  best  books  on  ordnance 
and  naval  gunnery-and  is  printed  and  illustrated  in  the  most  admirable  man- 
ner."— New  York  World. 


Elementary    Instruction    in    Naval 
Ordnance  and  Gunnery. 

By  JAMES  H.  WARD,  Commander  U.  S.  Navy,  Author  of  "  Naval 
Tactics,"  and  "Steam  for  the  Million."  New  edition,  revised 
and  enlarged.  8vo.  Cloth,  $2, 

"  It  conveys  an  amount  of  information  in  the  same  space  to  be  found  no- 
where else,  and  given  with  a  clearness  which  renders  it  useful  as  well  to  tho 
general  as  the  professional  inquirer." — N.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

"  This  volume  is  a  standard  treatise  upon  the  subject  to  which  it  is  devoted. 
It  abounds  in  valuable  information  upon  all  the  points  bearing  upon  Naval 
Gunnery." — 2f.  Y.  Commercial  Advertiser. 

"The  work  is  an  exceedingly  valuable  one,  and  is  opportunely  issued." — 
Boston  Journal. 


D.  Van  Nbstrand's  Publications. 

Rhymed  Tactics,   by   "Gov." 

1  vol.  18mo,  paper.      With  portraits.     25  cents. 

"  It  will  strike  the  military  man,  familiar  with  the  tedious  routine  of  drill, 
by  theory,  practice,  and  memory,  as  a  most  unique  and  valuable  method  of 
strengthening  the  hitter,  with  the  least  mental  exertion.  The  author  is  a 
thorough  soldier,  and  his  ability  as  a  rhymester  will  be  conceded  by  any  intelli- 
gent reader." — New  York  Leader. 

"Our  author  deserves  great  credit  for  the  ingenuity  he  has  displayed  in 
putting  into  verse  a  Manual  which  would  at  first  glance  seem  to  defy  the  most 
persistent  efforts  of  the  rhymer.  The  book  contains  a  number  of  illustrations 
representing  some  of  the  more  difficult  positions,  in  the  figures  of  which  por- 
traits of  severalprominent  officers  of  the  New  York  Volunteers  may  bo  recog- 
nized."— New  York  Times. 


Maxims    and    Inftructions    on    the 
Art  of  War. 

Maxims,  Advice,  and  Instructions  on  the  Art  of  "War  ;  or,  A  Practi- 
cal Military  Guide  for  the  use  of  Soldiers  of  all  Arms  and  of  all 
Countries.  Translated  from  the  French  by  Captain  LENDT, 
Director  of  the  Practical  Military  College,  late  of  the  French 
Staff,  etc.,  etc.  1  vol.  18mo,  cloth.  75  cents. 


Nolan's  Treatife  on  the  Training 
of  Cavalry  Horfes. 

By  Capt.  KENNER  GARRARD,  U.  S.  A.      1  vol.  12mo,  cloth,  with 
twenty-four  lithographed  plates.     $1.50. 


Official  Army    Regifter    for    1862. 

New  edition.     8vo,  paper.     50  cents. 


American  Military  Bridges, 

With  India-Rubber  and  Galvanized  Iron  Pontons  and  Trestle  Sup- 
porters, prepared  for  the  use  of  the  Armies  of  the  United 
States.  By  Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  W.  CULLUM,  Major  Corps  of  En- 
gineers U.  S.  A.;  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  Maj.-Gen.  HALLECK; 
Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi.  Second  edition, 
with  notes  and  two  additional  chapters.  1  vol.  Svo,  with  plates. 
In  Press. 


D.  Van  Nostranfrs  Publications. 

Notes  on  Sea-Goad  Defence  : 

Consisting  of  Sea-Coast  Fortification ;  the  Fifteen-Inch  Gun ;  and 
Casemate  Embrasures.  By  Gen.  J.  G.  BARNARD,  Corps  of 
Engineers,  U.  S.  Army.  1  vol.  8vo,  cloth,  plates.  $1  50. 

"This  small  volume  by  one  of  the  most  accomplished  officers  !n  the  United 
States  service  is  especially  valuable  at  this  time.  Concisely  anil  thoroughly 
Major  Barnard  discusses  the  subjects  included  in  this  volume,  and'  gives  infor- 
mation that  will  be  rend  with  great  profit  by  military  men,  and  by  all  interested 
in  the  art  of  war  as  a  defensive  force." — New  York  Commercial. 

"It  is  no  light  compliment  when  we  say  that  Major  Barnard's  book  does  no 
discredit  to  the  corps  to  which  he  belongs.  He  writes  concisely,  and  with  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  his  subject." — ItusselVs  Army  and  ft  my  Gazette,  ' 


Instructions    for    Naval    Light 
Artillery, 

Afloat  and  Ashore.      By  Lieut.  S.  B.  LUCE,  U.  S.  N.     1  vol.  8vo, 
with  22  lithographic  plates.     Cloth.     $2.00, 


Steam  for  the  Million. 

A  Popular  Treatise  on  Steam  and  its  Application  to  the  Useful 
Arts,  especially  to  Navigation.  By  J.  II.  WARD,  Commander 
U.  S.  Navy.  New  and  revised  edition.  1  vol.  8vo,  cloth.  $1. 

"A  most  excellent  work  for  tho  young  engineer  and  general  reader.  Many 
facts  relating  to  the  management  of  the  boiler  and  engine  are  set  forth  with  a 
simplicity  of  language,  and  perfection  of  detail,  that  brings  the  subject  home  to 
the  reader.  Mr.  Ward  is  also  peculiarly  happy  in  his  illustrations."— American 
Engineer. 

Screw   Propulfion. 

Notes  on  Screw  Propulsion,  its  Rise  and  History.  By  Capt.  W.  IT. 
WALKER,  U.  S.  Navy.  1  vol.  8vo.,  cloth.  75  cents. 

"Some  interesting  notes  on  screw  propulsion,  its  rise  and  prosrress,  have  just 
been  issued  by  Commander  W.  II.  WALKER,  U.  S.  N.,  from  which  all  that  is 
likely  to  be  desired  on  the  subject  may  be  readily  ntquircd.  *  *  *  *  After 
thoroughly  demonstrating  ttte  efficiency  of  the  screw,  Mr.  Walker  proceeds  to 
point  out  the  various  other  points  to  bo  attended  to  in  order  to  secure  an  effi- 
cient man-of-war,  and  eulogizes  throughout  the  readiness  of  the  British  Admi- 
ralty to  test  every  novelty  calculated  to  give  satisfactory  results.  *  *  *  * 
Commander  "Walker's  book  contains  an  immense  amount  of  concise  practical 
data,  and  every  item  of  information  recorded  fully  proves  that  the  various 
points  bearing  upon  it  have  been  wc-11  considered  previously  to  expressing  an 
opinion."— London  Mining  Journal. 

"  Every  engineer  should  have  it  in  his  library." — American  Engineer. 


D.   Van  N'ostrancVs  Publications. 

Nautical  Routine  and  Stowage, 

With  Short  Rules  in  Navigation.     By  JOHN  McLEOD  If  URPHT,  and 
WM.  K  JEFFERS,  Jr.,  U.  S.  N.     1  vol.  8vo,  cloth.     $2  50. 


Union  Foundations. 

A  Study  of  American  Nationality,  as  a  Fact  of  Science.  By  Major 
E.  B.  HUNT,  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A.  1  vol.  8vo,  paper. 
30  cents. 


Standing  Orders  of  the  Seventh  Reg- 
iment,  National  Guard. 

For  the  Regulation  and  Government  of  the  Regiment  in  the  Field  or 
in  Quarters.  By  A.  DURYEE,  Colonel.  New  edition.  Flexible 
cloth.  40  cents. 

"This,  which  is  a  new  edition  of  a  popular  work,  cannot  fnil  to  bo  eagerly 
sought  after,  as  presenting  clearly  and  succinctly  the  principles  of  organization 
and  discipline  of  a  most  favorite  corps.  An  appropriate  index  facilitates  refer- 
ence to  the  matter  of  the  volume." — New  Yorker. 


The  Automaton  Regiment; 

Or,  Infantry  Soldiers'  Practical  Instructor.  For  all  Regimental  Moye- 
ments  in  the  Field.  By  G-.  DOUGLAS  BREWERTON,  U.  S.  A. 
Neatly  put  up  in  boxes,  price  $1  ;  when  sent  by  mail,  $1  40. 

The  "Automaton  Regiment"  is  a  simple  combination  of  blocks  and  counters, 
so  arranged  and  designated  by  a  carefully  considered  contrast  of  colors,  that  it 
supplies  the  student  with  a  perfect  miniature  regiment,  in  which  the  position  in 
the  battalion  of  each  company,  and  of  every  officer  and  man  in  each  division,  com* 
pany,  platoon,  and  section  is  clearly  indicated.  It  supplies  the  studious  soldier 
with  the  means  whereby  he  can  consult  bis  "tactics,  and  at  the  same  time  join 
practice  to  theory  by  manoeuvring  a  mimic  regiment. 


The  Automaton  Company; 

Or,  Infantry  Soldiers'  Practical  Instructor.  For  all  Company  Move- 
ments in  the  Field.  By  G-.  DOUGLAS  BREWERTON,  U.  S.  A. 
Price  in  boxes,  $1  25 ;  when  sent  by  mail,  $1  95. 

The  Automaton  Battery; 

Or,  Artillerists'  Practical  Instructor.  For  all  Mounted  Artillery  Ma- 
noeuvres in  the  Field.  By  G.  DOUGLAS  BREWERTON,  U.  S.  A. 
Price  in  boxes,  $1 ;  when  sent  by  mail,  $1  40. 


D.   Van  NostrancFs  Publications. 

Viele's  Hand-Book. 

Hand-Book  for  Active  Service,  containing  Practical  Instructions  in 
Campaign  Duties.  For  the  use  of  Volunteers.  By  Brig. -Gen. 
EGBERT  L.  VIELE,  U.  S.  A.  12mo,  cloth.  $1. 

Monroe's  Company  Drill. 

The  Company  Drill  of  the  Infantry  of  the  Line,  together  with  the 
Skirmishing  Drill  of  the  Company  and  Battalion,  after  the  method 
of  Gen.  LE  LOUTEREL.  And  Bayonet  Fencing.  By  Col.  J.  MON- 
ROE, 22d  Regiment  N.  Y.  S.  M.  24mo,  cloth.  60  cents. 

A  System  of  Target  Practice. 

For  the  use  of  Troops  when  armed  with  the  Musket,  Rifle-Musket, 
Rifle,  or  Carbine.  Prepared,  principally  from  the  French,  by 
Captain  HENRY  HETH,  10th  Infantry,  U.  S.  A.  50  cents. 

""WAR  DEPARTMENT,  "Washington,  March  1st,  1863. 

"The  'System  of  Target  Practice,'  prepared  under  direction  of  the  War  De- 
partment, by  Captain  Henry  Heth,  10th  Infantry,  having  been  approved,  is 
adopted  for  the  instruction  of  troops  when  armed  with  the  musket,  rine-inusket, 
rifle,  or  carbine." 

Hints  to  Company  Officers. 

By  Lieut-Colonel  C.  C.  ANDREWS,  3d  Regiment  Minnesota  Volunteers. 
1  vol.  18mo,  cloth.  50  cents. 

American  Military  Bridges, 

"With  India-Rubber  and  Galvanized  Iron  Pontons  and  Trestle  Sup- 
porters, prepared  for  the  use  of  the  Armies  of  the  United  States. 
By  Brig.-Gen.  GEO.  "W.  CULLUM,  Lt.-Col.  Corps  of  Engineers,  U. 
S.  A.,  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  Major-Gen.  Halleck.  Second  edition, 
with  notes  and  two  additional  chapters.  1  voL  8vo,  with  plates. 
$3.50. 

Holley's  Railway  Practice. 

American  and  European  Railway  Practice,  in  the  Economical  Gener- 
ation of  Steam,  including  the  materials  and  construction  of  Coal- 
burning  Boilers,  Combustion,  the  Variable  Blast,  Vaporization, 
Circulation,  Superheating,  Supplying  and  Heating  Feed-water, 
&c.,  and  the  adaptation  of  "Wood  and  Coke-burning  Engines  to 
Coal-burning ;  and  in  Permanent  "Way,  including  Road-bed, 
Sleepers,  Rails,  Joint  Fastenings,  Street  Railways,  &c.,  &c.  By 
ALEXANDER  L.  HOLLEY,  B.  P.  "With  seventy-seven  lithographed 
plates.  1  vol.  folio,  cloth.  $10. 


D.  Van  Nbstrand's  Publications. 

Scott's  Military  Dictionary. 

Comprising  Technical  Definitibns;  Information  on  Raising  and 
Keeping  Troops ;  Actual  Service,  including  makeshifts  and 
improved  materiel,  and  Law,  Government,  Regulation,  and 
Administration  relating  to  Land  Forces.  By  Colonel  H.  L. 
SCOTT,  Inspector-General  U.  S.  A.  1  vol.,  large  octavo,  fully 
illustrated,  half  morocco.  $6. 

"It  is  a  complete  Encyclopaedia  of  Military  Science." — Philadelphia  Even- 
ing Bulletin. 

"We  cannot  speak  too  much  ia  legitimate  praise  of  this  work." — National 
Intelligencer. 

"It  should  bo  made  a  Text-book  for  the-  study  of  every  Volunteer."—  Har- 
per'* Magazine. 

"  We  cordially  commend  it  to  public  favor." — Washington  Globe. 

"This  comprehensive  and  skilfully  prepared  work  supplies  a  want  that  has 
long  been  felt,  and  will  be  peculiarly  valuable  at  this  time  as  a  book  of  refer- 
ence."— Boston  Commercial  Bulletin. 

"The  Military  Dictionary  is  splendidly  got  up  in  every  way,  and  reflects 
credit  on  the  publisher.  The  officers  of  every  company  in  the  service  should 
possess  it."— N.  Y.  Tablet. 

"  The  work  is  more  properly  a  Military  Encyclopaedia,  and  is  profusely  illus- 
trated with  engravings.  It  appears  to  contain  every  thine  that  can  be  wanted 
in  the  shape  of  information  by  officers  of  ail  grades." — Philadelphia  North 
American. 

"This  book  is  really  an  Encyclopedia,  both  elementary  and  technical,  and 
as  such  occupies  a  gap  in  military  literature  which  has  long  been  most  incon- 
veniently vacant.  This  book  meets  a  present  popular  want,  and  will  be  secured 
not  only  by  those  embarking  in  the  profession  but  by  a  great  number  of  civilians, 
•who  are  determined  to  follow  the  descriptions  and  to  understand  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  various  movements  of  the  campaign.  Indeed,  no  tolerably  good 
library  would  be  complete  without  the  work." — New  York  Times. 

"  The  work  has  evidently  been  compiled  from  a  careful  consultation  of  tho 
best  authorities,  enriched  with  the  results  of  the  experience  and  personal 
knowledge  of  tho  author." — N.  Y  Daily  Tribune. 

"  Works  like  the  present  are  invaluable.  The  officers  of  our  Volunteer  ser- 
vice would  all  do  well  to  possess  themselves  of  tho  volume." — N.  Y.  Herald. 


New  Bayonet  Exercise. 

A  New  Manual  of  the  Bayonet,  for  the  Army  and  Militia  of  the  United 
States.  By  Colonel  J.  C.  KELTON,  U.  S.  A.  With  thirty 
beautifully-engraved  plates.  Red  cloth.  '$1.75. 

This  Manual  was  prepared  for  the  tise  of  the  Corps  of  Cadets,  and  has  been 
Introduced  at  the  Military  Academy  with  satisfactory  results.  It  is  simply  the 
theory  of  the  attack  and  defence  of  the  sword  applied  to  the  bayonet,  on  the 
authority  of  men  skilled  in  the  use  of  arms. 

The  Manual  contains  practical  lessons  in  Fencing,  and  prescribes  the  de- 
fence against  Cavalry  and  the  manner  of  conducting  a  contest  with  a  Swords- 
man. 

"This  work  merits  a  favorable  reception  at  the  hands  of  all  military  men. 
It  contains  all  the  instruction  necessary  to  enable  an  officer  to  drill  his  men  in 
the  use  of  this  weapon.  The  introduction  of  the  Sabre  Bayonet  in  our  Army 
renders  ft  knowledge  of  th.u  B?er:ise  inors  iiaperative.'WVtw  York  Times. 


THE  CRAVEN. 


(From  an  tmptMifked  pne.m  by  Alfred  Ami  hi. ion.) 


On  that  mighty  day  of  battle,   'mid  the  booming  and  the 

rattle, 
Shouts  of  victory  and  of  anguish,  wherewith  Malvern's 

hill  did  roar. 
Did  a  general  now  quite  fftmeleaa,  who  in  these  lines  shall 

be  nameless, 
Show    himself  as    rather  gameless,    game'e-;*    on  the 

James'  shore: 

Safely  smoking  on  a  gunboat,  while  the  tempest   raged  on 
shore  ? 

Only  this,  and  nothing  more. 

The    Congressional    Committee    sat    within    the    nation's 

city, 
And    each    Congressman    so   witty   did     the    general 

implore: 
"Tell  us  if  thou  at  that  battle,  'mid  the  booming  and  the 

rattle, 
Wert  on  gunboat  or  in  saddle  while  the  tempest  raged 

ashore?" 

Answer'd   he:     I   don't    remember;    might   have    been." 
What  more  ? 

Only  this,  and  nothing  more. 

By  the   the  truth,    which    is  eternal,    by  the  lies    that    are 

diurnal, 
By     our     Abraham    paternal,   General,    we   do    thee 

implore. 
Tell  the  truth  and   shame   the  devil,    parent   of  Old    Jeff 

and  evil ; 
Give  us  no  more  of  such  drivel.     Tell   us,    wert  thou 

on  the  shore?  " 

"  Don't  remember  —  might   have    been,  "   thus   spoke   he 
o'er  and  o'er  — 

Only  this,  and  nothing  more. 

"  On  that  day,  sir,  had  you  seen  a  gunboat  of  the    name 

Galena, 
In    an    anchorage   to  screen    a   man   from  danger  on 

the  shore  ? 
Was  a  man  about  your  inches,    smoking  with  those  two 

French  princes' 
With  a  caution   which  evinces  care  for  such  a  garde 

de  corps? 

Were  you  that  man  on  the  gunboat?"      "  Don't  remember, 
might  have  been.  "    The  bore. 

Only  this,  and  nothing  more. 

(Evening  Post.) 


WEDNESDAY,  NOVEMBER  2,  186C 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  AND  GEN,  McCLELUN, 


Gen.  Barnard's  Review  of  McClellan's  Report,  and 
his  Reply  to  the  National  Intelligencer. 


McClellan  alike   Disingenuous  and  Incapable 
as  a   Military    Leader. 


CBQWKIKG    KT1CENCK    OF    HIS    INCOMPBTENOY. 


General  J.  G-.  Barnard,  the  engineer- In-chief  of 
the  army,  the  friend  and  associate  of  Lieut.  Gen. 
Scott,  and  a  soldier  long  distinguished  before  Gen. 
McClellan  became  known  to  fame,  has  addressed 
the  following  letter  to  the  Washington  Chronicle. 
General  Barnard  was  engineer-in-chief  under  Mc- 
Clellan, as  now  under  Grant,  and  his  opinion  of 
McClellan's  Peninsula  campaign  Is  well  known. 
He  regarded  it  as  a  disaster  due  to  the  incapacity 
of  Gen.  McClellan.  Provoked  by  the  many  falsa 
statements  of  Its  author,  Gen.  B.  lately  reviewed 
at  length  the  report  of  General  McClellan,  and  ex- 
cited vituperation  and  slander  from  the  political 
partisans  of  the  incompetent  commander.  He  re- 
plies to  the  attack  in  the  Intelligencer  of  the  remnant 
of  argument  made  to  palliate  McClellan's  mili- 
tary failures,  on'the  ground  that  he  acted  on  the  ad- 
vice «r  his  best  generals,  and  was  only  decieved,  by 
the  Admlnistrc**^  As  General  Barnard's  review 
and  letter  are  entirSrj-^mjtary  documents,  they 
will  receive  wide  attention,  an«~ui  be  classed  with 
the  testimony  of  McCall,  KearneyVSft-oner  Hooker 
and  more  of  the  bravest  and  ablest  me-  ^  ^e 
army,  in  proof  of  the  Incompetency  of  MoOleuat. 
General  Barnard's  letter  appears  -to '  prove  that 
"the  Young  Napoleon"  is  quite  as  disingenuous  as 
incapable : 

CITY  POINT,  Va.,  Oct.  29, 1864. 
To  tlie  Editor  of  tie  Chronicle: 

In  an  article  of  four  and  a  half  columns,  headed 
"  An  Engineer  Turned  Pamphleteer,"  devoted  to 
noy  review  of  General  McCleliar.'s  report,  the  Na- 
tional intelligencer  commence  by  calling  it  a  "  coarse 
and  malignant  personal  attack  on  General  McClel- 
lan." It  then  proceeds  to  soject  and  quote  what  I 
am  bound  to  presume  it  finds  the  most  character- 
istic passages  in  support  of  its  allegation.  They 
are  as  follows :  "Mismanagement  in  face  of 
the  enemy,"  "culpable  negligence,"  "more  than 
childish  levity  and  obstinacy,''*"  and  with  having 
forfeited  every  .ulaim  to  generalship,  even  of 
the  most  indifferent  character."  As  it  was  the 
object  of  the  review  to  prove  the  iufitice  of 
these  expressions—  as  their  propriety  or  impropriety 
depend s  entirely  upon  the  proof  offered— I  simply 
reJer  the  reader  to  the  work  itself.  But  as  the  "  lust 
of  defamation"  is  not  sufficiently  exhibited  In 
phrases  which  are  simply  corollaries  from  the  evi- 
dence set  forth,  the  Intelligencer  charges  me  with 
"impeaching  the  truthfulness  and  candor  of  Gane- 
ral  McOellan  by  levelling  against  it"  (sic)  "  the 
grossest  accusations,"  and  the  phrases  specified  are 
"resorting  to  an  unworthy  subterfuge,"  (p.  20,) 
"stultifying  his  own  conclusions,"  (p.  21,)  "falsifi- 
cations"— the  Intelligencer's  own  word,  not  mine  — 
•which  bear  "the  stamp  of  disingenuous  after- 
thought," (p.  25,)  "and  other  such  dishonorable  im- 
putations." I  repeat  here  the  passage  from  page  20  ; 
"  Citing  the  order  detaining  McDowell,  Gen.  Mc- 
Clellan resorts  to  the  unworthy  subterfuge  of  repre- 
senting it  as  a  withdrawal  of  troops  from  his  com- 
mand, by  the  President,  in  violation  of  his  promise 

'that    BOthlnar  Of    the  sort.    s)in.il/l    ho    vor>nata/l>    /ho 


eident  of  the  United  States  with  violation  of  his 
"  promise,"  in  withdrawing  troops  from  his  com- 
mand, and  has  alleged  that  it  frustrated  all  his 
plans  for  impending  operations.  He  has  charged 
the  Secretary  of  War  with  imposing  upon 
him  a  line  of  march  and  a  location  of  de- 
pots which  frustrated  the  plan  of  the  campaign. 
He  has  charged  his  predecessor— no  other  than  the 
illustrious  Scott— with  "the  total  absence  of  a  ge- 
neral pla.n,"  "  the  utter  disorganization  and  want 
of  preparation  in  the  Western  armies ;"  and  he  has 
made  against  the  Secretary  of  War  the  outrageous 
charge  of  "  doing  his  best  to  sacrifice"  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  These  charges  are  but  the  graver 
specimens  of  the  character  of  the  whole  report, 
which,  while  it  exhibits  the  disingenuousness  of  the 
writer,  proves  even  more  forcibly  his  incapacity. 
Those  who,  like  myself,  wept  on  the  field  of  Mal- 
vern  Hill,  need  no  apology  if,  in  a  matter  in  which 
the  destinies  of  the  ration  are  concerned,  they  feel 
that  convictions  of  truth  demand  to  be  uttered,  re- 
gardless of  personal  considerations. 

The  Intelligencer  lemarks  in  the  commencement 
of  its  article  that  "  when  he  wrote  his  '  review,' 
General  Barnard  was  'only  a  brigadier  general  of 
volunteers ;  since  the  publication  he  has  been  made 
a  major  general  of  volunteers."  As  the  editors  are 
not  attacking  the  Administration,  but  me,  the  in- 
ference they  intend  to  have  drawn  is  that  I  wrote  it 
to  gain  professional  advancement.  The  Intelligencer 
had  knowledge,  or  might  have  had,  to  what  ex- 
tent I  w* old  seek  the  good  graces  of  the  Adminis- 
tration in  order  to  obtain  professional  advancement, 
when  previous  to  this  publication  I  declined  a  nomi- 
nation; actually  made,  to  one  of  the  most  honorable 
and  distinguished  positions  in  the  United  States 
army,  out  of  deference  to  what  I  believed  the  just 
claims  of  another  and  older  officer,  and  besause  I 
preferred,  during  the  crisis  in  my  country's  exist' 
ence,  service  in  the  field  to  a  buroau  iu  Wasnington. 
The  "brevet"  of  "major  general  of  volunteers  " 
would  be  a  rioh  compensation,  indeed,  for  the  chief 
engineership  of  the  United  States  and  for  prostitu- 
ting my  pen  to  courting  the  favor  of  the  Adminis- 
tration, or  for  using  it  otherwise  than  according  to 
my  convictions  of  truth. 


NTVE- 

>  ^- — 


C.—  "/,t  Gtn. 


and 


!iby  ,"**£">*  only  parti*! 
when  In  the  energy'*  e;>uu- 


r*ynjent|  to  our  tiWp*  *r 
try,  ntifi  frp  civ  ing  " 

l§?S§Siiil 

ids.  ^2frt  to  bad  a  tnsm  to  run  with  Pendll- 


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,01155632     1 


grossest  accusations,"  ana  mo  parases  speciaea  are 

resorting'  to    an  unworthy  subterfuge,"    (p.   20.) 

stnltiiyiEg  his  own  conclusions,"  (p.  21,)  "f*lsifl- 

salient"—  the  Intelligencer's  own  word,  not  mine  — 

•which    bear   "the    stamp    of  disingenuous   after- 

bought,"  (p.  25,)  "and  other  such  dishonorable  1m- 

rotations."  I  repeat  here  the  passage  from  p*ge  20  ; 

"  Citing  the  order  detaining  McDowell,  Gen.  Mc- 

Melian  resorts  to  the  unworthy  subterfuge  of  repre- 

enting  it  as  a  withdrawal  of  troops  from  his  com- 

mand, by  the  President,  in  violation  of  his  promise 

that  nothing  of  the  sort  should  be  repeated'  (he 

efers  to  a  previous  withdrawal  of  Blenker'a  divl- 

ion—  a  body  of  troops  of  which  he  Lad  more  than 

iBce  expressed  his  determination  tand  himself  la 

cme  way);  'that  I  might  rest  aaMfred  that  the 

Campaign  should  proceed  with  no  further  deduction 

rcm  the  force  upon  which  Its  operations  had  been 

Earned  ;'  whereas,  It  was  simply  an  enforcement 

of  tte  conditions  upon  which  th'e  President  !reluu- 

tantJy  sanctioned  the  plan." 

Let.  the  reader  judge  ;  it  is  an  Issue  made  by  Gen- 
BlcClellan  himself.  He  charges  the  President  of 
he  United  States  with  a  violation  of  his  promise.  I 
)rbve  that  the  charge  Is  unfounded,  and  style  It 
'an  unworthy  subterfuge." 

Gen.  McClellan  cites  a  despatch  of  the  Sacretary 
f  "War,  of  March  18,  and  proceeds  to  state  : 

"ItwHl  be  observed  that  this  order  rendered  It 

irpcsFible  for  me  to  use  the  James  river  as  a  base  of 

ptretion?.  and  forced  me  to  establish  our  depots  on 

£e  Paicunkey,  and  to  approach  Blchmond  irom  the 

north." 

Can  anythicg  be  more  explicit  than  this  language? 
is  further  adds: 

"The  land  movement  obliged  me  to  expose  my  right 
n  order  to  secure  the  junction,  and  as  the  order 
or  General  McDowell's  march  was  soon  coun'.er- 
majided,  1  Incurred  great  risk,  of  which  tbe  enemy 
cck  advantage,  and  frustrated  the  plan  of  the  cam- 
>aign. 

"  Here  Is  a  charge  against  the  War  Department  of 

he  very  gravest  character.    I  show  (and  it  is  a  no- 

oiicus  fact)  that,  at  the  date  of  this  order,  "our 

depots"  were  already  "  established  on  the  Pamun- 

tey,"  and  that  the  army  was  nearly  up  to  the  Chlcfca- 

ioiLiny  on  its  march  "  to  approach  Richmond  from 

he   north  ;"   and   I   quote   General   McUlellan's 

:ef  timcny,  given  before  tte  CommiUee  on  the  Con- 

duct of  the  War,  to  show  that  in  this  grave  charge 

he  contracicts  Ms  own  statement,  made  under  the 

clemnity  cf  an  oath.    The  record  is  worth  repeat- 

ing: 

11  Question.  Could  not  tte  advance  on  Richmond 
from  \Villianisburg  have  been  made  with  better 
r-rcspeet  of  success  by  the  Jam«s  river  than  by  the 
•cote  pursued,  and  what  were  the  reasons  for  taking 
ihe  rcute  adopted? 

Ar  swer.  I  do  not  think  that  the  navy  at  that  time 
was  in  a  condition  to  make  the  line  of  the  James 
river  perfectly  fnre  for  our  supplies.  The  line  of 
the  Pamunkey  offered  greater  advantages  in  that  re- 
ject. The  place  was  In  a  better  position  to  effect  a 
unction  with  any  troops  that  might  more  from 
ashington  on  th«  Frederick«.burg  line.  I  remem- 
ber that  the  idea  ot  moving  on  the  James  river  was 
teiUua'ry  diiiussed  at  that  time.  Bat  the  conctu- 
tlan  «as  arrived  at  that,  under  the  circa  instance* 
then  existing,  the  loute  actually  followed  was  the 
best.  I  think  tte  Merrtmac  was  destroyed  while 
we  were  at  W 


Jfy  comment  is,  "Tte  stamp  of  dUlngenuonJ  after- 
thought, so  palpable  on  every  page  of  the  report  to 
these  who  »re  familiar  with  the  march  of  emu  of 
this  campaign,  is  here  made  palpable  to  the  general 
reader."    Had  I  teen  as  "fluent  ID  crimination," 
copious  fa  my  vocabulary  of  literary  "garbage," 
my  defamer,  I  stenld  hare  ftrand  aae«ur  term 
tisn  "  aeterecacm  aftg**^-;^!"  f  ftff  *h«rge 


1  *** 
\  «rce 


r 



^^  .^^.  ._^a 


ttaptto  dislodge  tbe 
UeKtomacwa.  not 
official  Jetter  of  mine :  " . 

all  tte  eoBS«<inenc««  which  ma 
iato  sn  operatJoi, 

baueri«?     I  t  ^ 

wri'ten    at    the    end    of    February  V 
a'ter    tk*    bUwki- e  of   the   Potomac  had  been 
perwit'ed  for  fire  — J*fc"ilil|  it  *  •— "*  when  t: 
MKBcneneM  of  aeti«  field epe»»« 
«tect*<?     I  state  that  to  eaftvre 
SVeircmld  h*T» mU  to  do  If  we  were  reaUy  opeatoi! 
a  campaign  agaiuttbem  there ;"  *nd  it  was  In  the 
aktog  the  batterle*  the  objeettve  of  a 
atter  they  bad  baen  permlttwi  to  ex3« 
I m««  faM  * .the i r»- 
against  tbe  enemy  in 
bjected  toi       — 
tlon.    The  matiei  was  nbMMMni 
tte  ccnncil  ol  war  of  March  3d,  and  BTJT  eonclurtoM 


Bt 
IT' 
58 

•-,  l 

n 

3a 
uo. 

X 


uuo  i.uuiiuji  vi  war  ui  marcn  zu,  linu  my  conclusions 

substantially  arrived  at. 

The  Irticlligencer  quotes  from  my  report  on  the 
siege  of  Yerktowa  to  General  Totten,  chief  engi- 
neer, U.  S.  A.,  to  convict  me  of  inconsistency,.!  say: 
"  It  we  could  have  broken  the  enemy's  lines  across 
the  Isthmus,  we  could  have  invested  Yorktown," 
&c.,  and  add.  '-it  was  not  deemed  practicable,  con- 
sidering- the  strength  of  that  line,  and  the  difficulty 
oi  handling  our  forces  (owing  to  the  impracticable 
character  of  the  country),  to  do  so.  If  we  could 
take  Y orktown,  or  drive  the  enemy  out  of  Yorktown, 
the  enemy's  lines  were  no  longer  tenable.  This  we 
could  oo  by  siege  operations,  acd  the  result  was,  In 
my  mind,  a  certainty."  Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that 
1  was  writiEg  a  report  from  the  field,  aud  while  the 
army  was  in  active  campaign.  It  was  my  duty  to 
set  lorth  the  reasons  which  controlled,  or  were  sup- 
posed to  ctntrol,  the  course  taken,  not  to  criticise  It. 
I  state  that  the  result  of  a  siege  was,  In  my  mind,  a 
certainty.  1  do  not  profess  to  have  controlled  the 
course  taken  (a  siege),  but  state  that  "  It  was  deemed 
too  hazardous  to  attempt  the  reduction  of  the  place 
by  assault."  This  is  the  committal,  and  the  only 
committal  to  which  I  refer  »in  my  report  to 
General  McClellan.  I  do  not  profoss  to  have 
urged  en  an  assault,  or  to  have  objected  to  a 
siege.  1  suggested  to  General  MoDlellan  an 
afsault,  and  1  indicated  the  places.  He  did  not 
think  proper  to  make  It,  and  I  deterred  to 
his  judgment.  General  McOlellan  was,  by  profes- 
sion si  mrtltnTv  engineer.  He  had  had  experience 
in  that  branch  of  the  profession  which  concerns  the 
practical  auues  of  field  engineering.  He  had, 
moreover,  visited  the  scene  of  the  most  Instructive 
operatiots  of  this  kind  on  record  (where  he  had  been 
sentexpressly  to  study  them),  Sebastopol.  To  him, 
not  to  me,  was  entrusted  the  destinies  of  the  nation, 
arid  his,  not  mine,  was  the  campaign.  I  did  my 
duty,  as  a  subordinate,  in  giving  Him  all  the  data  I 
had  as  to  the  works,  and  In  leaving  the  course  to  be 
taken  to  his  judgment.  If,  with  the  light  of  his 
subsequent  operations,  and  from  other  sources,  I 
now  pronounce  that,  "  if  there  ever  was  a  case  in 
whlcn  such  a  step  (an  assault)  was  not  merely  jus- 
tifiable and  advisable,  It  was  surely  this."  I  have 
reasons  lor  the  opinion,  and  give  them. 

As  to  the  not  opening  the  batteries  as  they  were 
ready,  I  nowhere  call  It  a  "great  blunder."  I  say 
they  ought  to  have  been  opened,  and  when  called 
to  testily  why  they  were  not  opened,  I  take  the 
blame  to  myself.  I  really  do  not  see  the  point  the 
Intelligencer  strives  to  make  of  it,  unless,  to  presume 
to  criticise  General  McClellan,  I  must  prove  mv 
own  infallibility. 

My  letter  to  Mr.  Wm.  Henry  Hurlbert,  which  the 
Intelligencer  has  given  at  length,  as  a  proof  ol  Incon- 
sistency, was  prompted  by  certain  remarks  of  his,  in 
his  translation  ol the  Prince  de  Jolnviile's  pamphlet, 
concerning  the  graduates  of  the  military  academy, 
to  affirm  that,  while  they  (the  Southern  graduates) 
ha\e  maintained  their  own  at  the  Academy  and  in 
the  service,  and  In  the  various  fields  ot  warfare,  to 
which  our  little  army  has  been  called,  there  was 
"not  a  Horded  by  their  career  or  reputation  the 
slightest  ground  for  attributing  to  them  military 
or  scientific  superiority ;"  and  in  illustrating 
this,  the  advantages  of  the  defence,  and  the 
disadvantages  of  our  own  part  (offensive  war- 
fare) were  pointed  out.  The  faults  of  the  Adminis- 
tration in  the  management  of  the  war  were 
indicated  without  charging  what  is  charged 
against  it  by  the  friends  ol  General  McGlellan, 
that  "to  the  blunders  and  Incapacity  of  the  Ad- 
ministration all  our  disasters  are  due."  It  had 
no  farther  special  reference  to  Geneial  McClellan 
or  his  campaign  than  to  the  division  of  commands 
and  the  general  difficulties  of  the  campaign.  My 
opinion  as  to  General  McClellan's  generalship  and 
agency  in  producing  the  disasters  of  the  campaign 
were  then  precisely  what  they  are  now,  as  1  can 
readily  prove  by  the  evidence  of  others,  among 
whom  I  might  name  the  venerable  Governor  Kem- 
ble,  of  New  York,  and  General  Melgs. 

This  letter  to  Wm.  Henry  Hurlbut  was  written 
but  a  lew  weeks  before  writing  my  official  report. 
It  was  written  some  time  after  General  McClellan's 
removal  from  command,  as  was  the  official  report. 
Any  one  whose  inward  corruption  did  not  make  the 
air  of  heaven  seem  but  "noisome  odor,"  and  whose 
natuial  food  was  aught  but  "garbage,"  would  have 
found  In  this  letter  the  proof  of  my  readiness  to 
speak  my  convictions  without  regard  to  the  good 
graces  of  either  Stanton  or  McClellan,  rather  than 
of  the  vile  imputations  the  Intelligencer  has  brought 
upon  me. 

The  "  Intelligencer"  fees  fit,  by  "  legal  presump- 
tion," by  attempted  witticisms  and  sundry  quota- 
tions Irom  Shakspeare,  to  discredit  my  assertion 
that  1  vas  "unconscious  that  such  a  committee 
[i.  e.  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct,  of  the 
Wai]  yet  existed  when  1  wrote  my  report."  If 
1  had  said  "  I  was  unconscious  that  sucti  a  paper 
as  the  "  National  Intelligencer'  was  published 
in  Washington  wrlfa  I  wrote  that  report,"  my 
detainer  would  have  triumphantly  affirmed,  as  a 
proof  of  the  contrary,  that  I  was  a  subscriber  to 
that  paper,  ana  that  it  was  daily  delivered  at  my 
house.  And  yet  the  assertion  would  have,  been 
strictly  true.  I  wrote  that  report  In  complete  un- 
consciousness of  the  publication  cf  that  journal,  as 
I  also  did  In  complete  unconsciousness  of  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War. 

The  language  of  gross  insult  which  the  1-tttelli- 
gtr.cer  has  used  in  connection  with  my  name  has 
been  chosen  in  order  to  discredit  what  it  cannot 
deny.  The  statements  of  my  review  are  made  upon 
the  evi<3eice  of  others,  among  whom  Is  General  >lc- 
ClellBn  himself.  In  a  report  prepared  with  all  de- 
liberation, General  MoCIellan  has  charged  the  Pro- 


